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INTRODUCTION
In December 2001 the History of Twentieth Century Medicine Group chose a
veterinary disease for the subject of a Witness Seminar, the first time in its nine
years’ existence. Although the title specified the 1967–68 outbreak, it so
happened that at that time Britain was still in the grip of its worst outbreak of
foot and mouth disease (FMD) since 1967. 
Epizootics, or plagues affecting domestic animals, have for centuries caused
havoc in farming communities in every continent across the globe. FMD may
be assumed to have appeared in higher mammals at the time when man began
his first forays into animal husbandry and became dependent on herds of
domestic animals, inevitably susceptible to diseases of various kinds. Their
presence is documented in descriptions in early Graeco–Roman literature from
Aristotle (384–322 BCE) and the elder Pliny (CE 24–79) to Vegetius (fl.c.
CE 450), although retrospective diagnosis must always be treated with caution.
Confusion between FMD and rinderpest (cattle plague), both viral diseases and
highly infectious, continued well into the nineteenth century.1 As indicated by
its suffix ‘plague’, the latter disease is far more deadly than FMD, with a fatality
rate of up to 1 in 10 animals per affected herd.
That Britain’s position as an island offered some protection against the
introduction of animal diseases from its continental neighbours was described as
early as 1807 by Samuel Bardsley (1764–1851), physician to the Manchester
Infirmary.2 George Fleming (1833–1901), veterinary inspector to the War Office
and later to the Army, noted 30 years later that in 1839 ‘…our ports were thrown
open to foreign cattle’,3 and rinderpest, FMD, and contagious pleuropneumonia
of cattle were introduced to a country whose veterinary profession was not well
prepared to deal with epizootics in domestic animals in general. Most veterinary
surgeons had been educated at the London Veterinary College, under Edward
Coleman (1765–1839), that animal medicine was inferior to its human
counterpart, and that horses were worth exclusive attention compared to other
domestic animals. 
By the end of the 1860s, after the rinderpest epidemic, the responsibility for
increasingly tighter controls on imports from countries harbouring infections
with cattle diseases finally passed to the state. After very serious outbreaks in
1871 affected an estimated 3 million animals, the sheer scale of that epidemic led
to the inclusion of FMD as notifiable under the Contagious Diseases (Animals)
Act (1869).4 The economic burden was high. To quote again George Fleming,
writing in 1871 after the 1865–66 outbreak of rinderpest: 
The losses from only two exotic bovine maladies (‘contagious
pleuropneumonia’ and the so-called ‘foot and mouth disease’) have
been estimated to amount …to 5 549 780 head, roughly valued at
£83 616 854.5
In Britain the emphasis was on isolation of infected animals and their possible
contacts; prevention of movement of livestock within infected areas; and
consequent closure of markets and fairs; measures which were successful in
banishing endemic FMD from Britain by the end of 1884.6
By the later decades of the nineteenth century, increased microbiological knowledge
paved the way for the emergence of the new discipline of bacteriology. Discovery of
the existence, if not yet the structure and the nature of ‘filterable viruses’ additionally
facilitated diagnostic characterization. Early work on vaccines followed Koch’s work
on anthrax and Pasteur’s on rabies; work which was to develop in the twentieth
century to benefit the fight against animal diseases as well as human ones.7
With regard to FMD vaccines in Britain, it is curious that although state-
sponsored research followed the serious outbreaks in 1922 and 1924 at the
Pirbright Institute,8 the resultant effective vaccines have never been used in
outbreaks in Britain. Even now, into the twenty-first century, the exclusive use of
slaughter continues to find favour, as demonstrated in the most recent, severe
outbreaks in 2001–02. Yet the Pirbright Animal Virus Research Institute has long
been recognized as the World Reference Laboratory, with samples submitted from
countries worldwide, and offering information, published annually, in return.9
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4 See note 6, page 4.
5 Fleming (1871): xxxiv.
6 See Henderson (1954): 91.
7 Fleming (1871): xxxiv.
8 See note 8, page 5. 
9 For details of the work of the World Reference Laboratory, see Brooksby (1974): 20–21.
The work at Pirbright had been preceded in this country by important work on
pleuropneumonia and FMD at the Brown Institution, established by the
University of London in the 1870s.10 By the 1920s, this work continued, with
the benefit of better facilities and improvements in methodology at the Lister
Institute. The Lister Institute’s work on FMD was carried out during a period
of threats of new outbreaks. For safety reasons the experiments took place on an
obsolete warship moored off Harwich,11 under the auspices of the Ministry of
Agriculture. This work showed the possibility of transmission of FMD to
guinea pigs and other small mammals, which in turn led to the realization of
the danger of transmissibility of the disease within natural populations of
hedgehogs, which could act as carriers over considerable distances. That
possibility has been mentioned in discussions of sources on the spread of the
disease in 1967 – perhaps as well in a country intent on preserving its
populations of hedgehogs.12
In spite of all the important work done in the 1920s, by June 1926 the British
Medical Journal warned that the country was still ‘suffering from this very serious
disease, which threatens to become enzootic’, and stressed the ‘utmost
importance’ of keeping the country free from the disease ‘by scientific means’: 
‘Britain is no longer an island, and it seems obvious that the pole-
axe method cannot be indefinitely used to stamp out the disease. It
has been fairly successful in the United States – but that country is
a much more effective “island” than this country, and there is less
danger of its reintroduction there.’13
We might add here that Professor Fred Brown FRS, who spent most of his
working life in Britain, but unfortunately could not attend our Witness Seminar
because of other commitments, is currently working at the US Department of
Agriculture’s Plum Island Animal Disease Centre, NY.14 During the 2001 FMD
crisis he was interviewed by the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC); while
making no reference to our relatively protected position as an island, as first
ix
10 See Wilkinson (1992): chapter 10.
11 Chick et al. (1971): 1135–1136.
12 See Northumberland (1969a): 114.
13 Anon. (1926): 1002.
14 See Biographical notes on page 85.
noted almost two centuries earlier by Bardsley,15 he did pronounce himself
entirely in favour of a combined slaughter plus vaccination policy.16
Progress in the experimental work at Pirbright is reflected in its first five reports from
1925 to 1937, when each report lists laboratory alterations and improvements,
matching increasing knowledge of virus diseases in general and of FMD in particular.
Also all experimental areas had improved safety measures including ‘vermin-proof’
fencing, carcass incinerators, and manure destructors. Meanwhile the research work
at other centres was gradually discontinued; and in 1939, the last such laboratories
at the National Institute for Medical Research (NIMR), at Hampstead, were closed.
From then on the Pirbright Institute expanded its laboratories and experimental units
as the only centre for work on FMD in the UK.17
A severe postwar FMD outbreak in 1952 coincidentally saw the beginnings of
another major expansion to increase facilities at Pirbright for virus research in the
fields added in the 1950s and 1960s, such as research on pathology and genetics,
using tissue culture. However, in spite of additional work on exotic viruses,
Pirbright still had no provision for filtration of outgoing air. Only after that
outbreak were filtration plants installed in all experimental cattle units.18
The 1952–53 outbreak was as severe as those in the 1920s, and was described in
detail in the first of the new postwar Committee of Inquiry Reports to the
Ministry of Agriculture. This became known as the ‘Gowers’ Report after its
chairman, Sir Ernest Gowers,19 and was addressed to the Rt Hon. Sir Thomas
x
15 See note 2 above.
16 Professor Fred Brown wrote: ‘I consider that the FMD Witness Seminar was a worthwhile exercise,
timed as it was in the wake of the devastating outbreak of the disease in the UK in 2001. Although 
I was a member of the staff at Pirbright in 1967–68, not being a veterinarian, I was only on the fringe
of what was going on in the field. Nevertheless I learned a lot about the larger world by talking to
colleagues such as Drs Brooksby, Sellers and Mowat. Several clear messages emerged during the
1967–68 outbreak: (1) the role of sheep as a reservoir for the virus; (2) the presence of virus in the milk
of cattle before they showed any clinical signs of the disease; (3) the importance of keeping animal
movement to a minimum; (4) the logic of not importing products from FMD-infected countries. So
why did the 2001 outbreak get out of control? It was largely because the lessons learned in the 1967–68
outbreak were ignored. A major recommendation of the Northumberland Report was to introduce ring
vaccination if the disease got out of control. This should have been introduced in 2001.’ Fax to 
Mrs Lois Reynolds, 25 August 2003.
17 See Brooksby (1974): 16–17.
18 See notes 71 and 72, page 51. See also ibid., 18–19. 
19 See biographical note on page 87.
Dugdale, the Minister of Agriculture and Fisheries. Their recommendations
stress the necessity for ‘energetic and rigorous measures’ to prevent FMD
becoming endemic in this country and hence causing a ‘national calamity’. In
spite of all the well-meaning precautions – of the implementation of devastating
slaughter policies and of advice from expert committees and the Ministry
concerned – the two later major epidemics, although not causing lasting
endemicity, have fallen not far short of becoming calamities.20
In the present volume the 1967–68 FMD outbreak and its effects on the
community are discussed by the professionals who were involved in its control
and the efforts which eventually brought it to a close.
Lise Wilkinson
Wellcome Trust Centre for the History of Medicine at UCL
xi
20 See Gowers (1954): Chapter 6, and Northumberland (1969a, 1969b).
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WITNESS SEMINARS:
MEETINGS AND PUBLICATIONS1
In 1990 the Wellcome Trust created a History of Twentieth Century Medicine
Group, as part of the Academic Unit of the Wellcome Institute for the History
of Medicine, to bring together clinicians, scientists, historians and others
interested in contemporary medical history. Among a number of other initiatives
the format of Witness Seminars, used by the Institute of Contemporary British
History to address issues of recent political history, was adopted, to promote
interaction between these different groups, to emphasize the potential of
working jointly, and to encourage the creation and deposit of archival sources for
present and future use. In June 1999 the Governors of the Wellcome Trust
decided that it would be appropriate for the Academic Unit to enjoy a more
formal academic affiliation and turned the Unit into the Wellcome Trust Centre
for the History of Medicine at University College London from 1 October 2000.
The Wellcome Trust continues to fund the Witness Seminar programme via its
support for the Centre.
The Witness Seminar is a particularly specialized form of oral history, where several
people associated with a particular set of circumstances or events are invited to
come together to discuss, debate, and agree or disagree about their memories. To
date, the History of Twentieth Century Medicine Group has held over 30 such
meetings, most of which have been published, as listed on pages xvii–xxiii.
Subjects for such meetings are usually proposed by, or through, members of the
Programme Committee of the Group, and once an appropriate topic has been
agreed, suitable participants are identified and invited. These inevitably lead to
further contacts, and more suggestions of people to invite. As the organization
of the meeting progresses, a flexible outline plan for the meeting is devised,
usually with assistance from the meeting’s chairman, and some participants are
invited to ‘set the ball rolling’ on particular themes, by speaking for a short
period of time to initiate and stimulate further discussion. 
Each meeting is fully recorded, the tapes are transcribed and the unedited
transcript is immediately sent to every participant. Each is asked to check their
own contributions and to provide brief biographical details. The editors turn the
transcript into readable text, and participants’ minor corrections and comments
are incorporated into that text, while biographical and bibliographical details are
added as footnotes, as are more substantial comments and additional material
provided by participants. The final scripts are then sent to every contributor,
accompanied by forms assigning copyright to the Wellcome Trust. Copies of all
additional correspondence received during the editorial process are deposited
with the records of each meeting in Archives and Manuscripts, Wellcome
Library, London. 
As with all our meetings, we hope that even if the precise details of some of the
technical sections are not clear to the nonspecialist, the sense and significance of
the events are understandable. Our aim is for the volumes that emerge from
these meetings to inform those with a general interest in the history of modern
medicine and medical science; to provide historians with new insights, fresh
material for study, and further themes for research; and to emphasize to the
participants that events of the recent past, of their own working lives, are of
proper and necessary concern to historians.
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Dr Tilli Tansey: May I begin by welcoming you all to this meeting of the History
of Twentieth Century Medicine Group, which was established in 1990 by the
Wellcome Trust to bring together doctors, clinicians, scientists, historians,
journalists, and others interested in the history of recent medicine and
biomedical science. It devised a number of mechanisms to do that, one of which
is this Witness Seminar format, where we invite people who have been involved
in a particular event or discovery, to meet together, discuss and debate among
themselves in a chairman-led discussion about what really happened. This
meeting on foot and mouth disease (FMD) was organized by my colleagues, 
Dr Daphne Christie, Dr David Aickin and Ms Abigail Woods. We are delighted
that so many of you have come here to share your experiences and reminiscences
with us, and we are particularly delighted that Lord Soulsby has very generously
offered to chair the meeting. And so without further ado, I will hand the meeting
over to Lord Soulsby.
Lord Soulsby:1 Thank you very much indeed. It is a great honour for me to chair
this session, which I think will be very interesting indeed, because we have a
number of people here who were very deeply involved in the 1967–68 outbreak.
The Gowers Committee of 1954 reported among many observations that there
had been no single year between 1929 and 1953 in which this country was
completely free of FMD, though the outbreaks at that time were not of a major
nature. But in October 1967 a major outbreak started in Bryn Farm, Oswestry,
Shropshire, and that was traced to pig swill that contained infected Argentine
lamb. There were more than 2000 reported cases of the disease over a nine-
month period, and the slaughter of nearly half-a-million animals.2 Thirty years
later we have another outbreak where we have exceeded those figures.3 We are
concerned today with the historical aspects of the 1967 outbreak, and what
happened at that time; we are here to explore veterinary, farming, scientific and
political perspectives, and the implementation of these.
Foot and Mouth Disease:The 1967 outbreak
3
1 For biographical information on participants and others, see the notes on pages 85–94.
2 Great Britain relied on a slaughter policy for controlling FMD following the Contagious Diseases
(Animals) Act 1892, which authorized and funded the Board of Agriculture and its successors to carry
out compulsory slaughter of ruminant animals and swine affected by FMD. See Northumberland
(1969b): 11.
3 The last of 2364 cases was diagnosed on 4 June 1968. The cost to MAFF was around £370 million
(in 2001 prices), including £280 million paid as compensation to farmers. The 2001 outbreak cost over
£3 billion, including £1.2 billion paid to farmers. See Auditor General (2002): Appendix 2,
Comparison with 1967–68 outbreak, 112.
Following the 1967 outbreak there was the Northumberland Report4 of which
Lord Plumb, for example, was a member. While we don’t want to trespass on the
present outbreak of FMD – and there may be occasions when I may have to stop
you from doing that – nevertheless one is, of course, related to the other. 
We have a lot of ground to cover and by my reckoning we should spend
approximately 30 minutes on each topic area. May I request that when you do
speak in the discussion that you give your name for the transcriber, so that we
know who said what. You will be able to assess whether the transcript is an
accurate record of what you said when it is sent to you. Please, when you do
speak, try to keep it fairly brief and to the point. I am now going to ask for a
historical introduction by Ms Woods, a veterinary surgeon and a graduate of
Cambridge, who is doing a PhD on the history of FMD. So over to you, 
Ms Woods.
Ms Abigail Woods: I have been looking at the history of foot and mouth for
about two-and-a-half years and I have to say this year’s outbreak was quite a
shock, because I thought my history had finished in 1968. I have gone back to
the very beginning, 1839, when FMD was first recognized in Britain,5 and
chased the changing perceptions of, and responses to, the disease right up to the
present day. As you probably know, FMD control first became the responsibility
of the state in 1869, just after the cattle plague outbreak. Over the next 15 years,
increasingly tight controls were placed on the import of livestock from infected
nations, and measures at home were extended to enforce the isolation of infected
animals and their contacts and to prevent the movement of livestock within
designated infected areas. Veterinary officials then gained the power to close
markets and fairs.6 This is the framework of controls that is still in operation
Foot and Mouth Disease:The 1967 outbreak
4
4 See Northumberland (1969a). The Duke of Northumberland chaired the committee appointed by
Frederick Peart, Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, in February 1968. Members were
Anthony Cripps, QC, Professor David Evans, C Henry Plumb, Eric Thomas, Sir Edward Thompson,
Professor David Walker and Professor Sir William Weipers, with Mr John Jotcham as Secretary and
Mrs Melba White as Assistant Secretary. See also note 2 and Woods (2004).
5 FMD was first recognized in Britain in 1839 and the first statistical records show 27 254 cases during
1870. See MAFF (1968), based on MAFF (1965). 
6 The Contagious Diseases and Animals Act 1869 made FMD a notifiable disease and gave local
authorities power to prohibit the movement of affected animals, and to appoint inspectors who could
require premises be disinfected. An extension of that Act in 1878 required local authorities to employ
veterinary inspectors, who could enter premises where they suspected the disease to exist. See MAFF
(1968): 1–2. See also Blancou (2002); Brown (2003). 
today. They succeeded in eliminating endemic FMD from Britain in 1884.
Slaughter only became a common response in the early years of the twentieth
century, when its application was gradually extended until it became the
accepted policy of the Ministry of Agriculture (MAFF), and there have been no
exceptions to slaughter since 1924. While vaccines have been in common use in
parts of Europe and South America since the 1940s,7 they have never been used
in Britain, despite the substantial progress made in this department by
researchers at Pirbright, where state-sponsored research began in 1926.8 Until
1968 FMD was a frequent visitor. It usually entered either from Europe, where
systematic attempts to control the disease had only really got going in the late
1950s and 1960s, or in Argentine meat. Most outbreaks were quite limited in
scope and were rapidly stamped out under the direction of the Ministry of
Agriculture, Fisheries and Food’s (MAFF) veterinary inspectors. But on the
handful of occasions extremely large epidemics occurred, 1922, 19249 and 1951
outbreak, which the Gowers inquiry looked into, and, of course, 1967.10 Each of
these massive epidemics has prompted the same sort of questions: Where did the
disease come from? How can its future entry be prevented? Is the traditional
policy for FMD control working, or should it be altered in some way? What
factors assisted the spread of this disease, or prevented the rapid success of
slaughter? Also accompanying every FMD outbreak is the human tragedy, where
farmers see their life’s work destroyed, and are confined to their homes for weeks.
I hope today we are going to be able to explore some of these aspects of the 1967
outbreak, by learning of your experiences with and opinions about this disease. 
Soulsby: Thank you very much for that brief outline. We will now go to the
main part of the seminar, the first of which is the central response to the
outbreak and Howard Rees will talk.
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7 See Glossary. See also Brown (2003); Vallée, et al. (1925); Frenkel (1947) and note 58.
8 Dr Bob Sellers wrote: ‘Pirbright Cattle Testing Station [Pirbright, Surrey] was made available for
FMD in 1924 and the first experiments in cattle started on 2 May 1925. See Skinner (1989).’ Note on
draft manuscript, 15 August 2002. See also Glossary.
9 See Pretyman (1922, 1925). 
10 Outbreaks of FMD in Europe declined between 1951 and 2000 as a result of vaccination in most
areas (see Figure 12), as well as the application of effective sanitary measures and importation control.
Vaccination of cattle against FMD within the European Union (EU) and most of continental Europe
ceased by 1992. See notes 61, 62 and Figure 12. The Middle Eastern strains of FMD caused outbreaks
later in Bulgaria, Italy, Greece and Turkey and were treated by slaughter, not vaccination. See
www.aleffgroup.com/avisfmd/A010-fmd/mod0/0132-euro-his-geo.html (visited 13 May 2003),
Gowers (1954); Kitching (1998).
Mr Howard Rees: Thank you, Chairman. I hope you will excuse me, but my
memory of 34 years ago is a bit sparse in parts, but I will try my best and I am
sure that people like Angus Taylor, who perhaps has got a better memory than I
have, will correct me on some of the details. 
As you all know, foot and mouth was not a new disease to us in 1967–68. Right
through the 1950s and 1960s, it was not unusual to have outbreaks of FMD and
sometimes we had two or three outbreaks in a year. The State Veterinary Service
(SVS) as a whole was well prepared and trained to deal with FMD, so the
response from head office would be to enact the procedures that were well
practised over the years and had been successful. From 1954 to 1967, excluding
the 1967–68 outbreak, we had had 1002 outbreaks, with an average of 75 cases
every year, and there were only two years – 1963 and 1964 – when we were
without the disease, the longest period without the disease since 1908. The SVS
in those days was well practised in all the procedures that were required and we
had a manual of instructions, which gave all the details of procedures that should
be adopted, and after each outbreak if a new situation arose, then the
instructions would be modified to take account of it. When the first case was
diagnosed on 25 October 1967, the normal procedures were put into effect.
Head office would set up its emergency team of veterinarians, and administrative
support staff. When the disease was confirmed the infected area would be so
designated by the admin staff and they would draw up the necessary legal
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Figure 1: Howard Rees, CB DVSM
HonFRCVS, Chief Veterinary Officer,
1980–88.
instruments to enforce the standstill order.11 In the field the control centres
would be set up, this was all well drilled in the past as to where the centres should
be, what they required etc, so the whole response was automatic in those days. 
I have mentioned that between 1954 and 1967 there were 1002 cases, of which 179
were classified as primaries.12 Now of these 179 primaries, over half never produced
secondaries, so when the first case arrived in Oswestry, there was no reason to believe
that it was going to explode into the epidemic it did, because we had experience of
many incursions of the virus which didn’t spread at all. Of these 179 primaries, 97
of them were attributed to imported meat, not only from Argentina, but from other
South American countries, through swill, imported bones, meat, offal, meat
wrappers, etc., and those 97 exclude the 1967–68 outbreak.
Source Argentine Other Unknown Total
meat South American origin
meat
Swill 18 12 14 44
Bones 13 12 5 30
Meat and offal 12 7 4 23
Total 43 31 23 97
Table 1: Origins of FMD outbreaks, 1954–67: 97 cases out of 179 primary outbreaks 
attributed to imported meat and meat wrappings.
See Northumberland (1969b),Table 10, 77.
Roughly 90 per cent of our primaries going right back to 1954 had been due to
importations from South America. The response from the centre was to enact all the
well-drilled procedures that had been used over the years and had been successful. 
One of the complicating factors in this particular outbreak was that when it was
diagnosed on 25 October, a Wednesday, the normal Oswestry market was taking
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11 The basic legislation for controlling FMD in Great Britain at the time was the Diseases of Animals
Act, 1950, where Form C enforced a standstill or stop on all movements of susceptible animals. See
Glossary and Northumberland (1969b): 11. For a description of the organization of veterinary staff,
see The National Archives (PRO) MAF 287/512.
12 See Glossary.
place, and when the disease was suspected Form C procedures were enacted,13
which brings in the five miles emergency standstill order, and involved the
market, just within the five miles. There were 3299 stock still left in the market,
which were impounded there. Two cows from the original Ellis case14 had gone
to the market that morning. One had left the market and luckily the police were
able to stop the vehicle and redirect it back to the farm, and the other was sent
directly there. These two were examined the next day, 26 October, found free of
the disease, but were included, of course, in the slaughter. It was decided that
there would be no compulsory slaughter of all the stock in the market. The
animals in the market were then dispersed within the infected area that had been
declared in the meantime and a ten-mile standstill area imposed. If the recipient
farms were outside that ten-mile area, the animals were sent to slaughterhouses15
in the area. Some animals had left and gone as far as Banffshire in Scotland and
to Devon in the south-west before Form C was enacted. All these animals were
traced and found healthy, so the decision was taken not to introduce compulsory
slaughter of all the animals in the market. 
In retrospect I think a lot of people would say this was a very brave decision to
take. No diseased animals came out of the market, although two animals from
the infected farm had gone to the market that very morning. Once diagnosed on
25 October, the disease was discovered to have been present on the farm since
21 October. The decision not to slaughter was taken between head office and the
Regional Veterinary Officer, Ernest Corrigall, who was a very strong character.
That’s the immediate background, Chairman, to the initial response.
Soulsby: May I just pose one or two questions before I open up the questioning?
The first is to ask if you had any idea at the time how extensive the outbreak
might become?
Rees: No, because we had no idea of the origin, the source of the infection, and
we didn’t know whether there were other affected farms in the area. This was a
secondary concern, we didn’t know whether this was a primary outbreak at that
stage, so there was no idea as to how the disease would develop. 
Foot and Mouth Disease:The 1967 outbreak
8
13 Arrangements for controlling FMD before 1967–68 are listed in Northumberland (1969b): 11–22,
and Appendix 2, 116–120.
14 See Figure 3a–d, where the Ellis farm, near Nantmawr, Oswestry, Shropshire, is in the lower left corner.
15 In 1967–68 there were more than 3000 slaughterhouses in the UK and 500 in 2001. See Auditor
General (2002): Appendix 2, 11. See also figures for abattoirs in note 53.
May I go on, perhaps briefly, Chairman, to describe what happened after the
disease was diagnosed on 25 October? On Saturday 28 October, there was a
further case at a farm adjacent to Bryn Farm and on 29 October a further case
was confirmed, again in close proximity to the original case, but these didn’t give
rise to concern at all. This was a normal pattern, it was just a very local spread.
On Monday 30 October, the situation changed dramatically, when there were
nine fresh cases confirmed, six close to the original outbreak. The other three
represented big jumps of 12, 35 and 100 miles (the last in Carnforth,
Lancashire), which did give us reason for concern, we knew we had something
brewing. But until 30 October there was no reason to think that the number of
cases was going to explode. 
Soulsby: That opens the general discussion, we have about 20 minutes or so.
Professor Leslie Brent: I wonder whether a vaccine was available in 1967 and,
if it was, whether its application was ever considered?
Rees: The answer, of course, is no. There were no Ministry vaccines available at
that stage. Vaccine would have been available from manufacturers, but we did
not have a vaccine bank then.16
Mr James Morris: I would like to point out that I arrived in the Oswestry centre
from Pembrokeshire on Thursday morning, 26 October, and was sent out by the
Divisional Veterinary Officer (DVO) to relieve the local veterinary officer who was
there with the valuers at that time, following confirmation. The significance escaped
me at the time, but the auctioneer, the farmer and the local veterinary officer were
eating roast lamb. I am sure Howard Rees will explain the significance of that later
on. I examined every animal at the time of slaughter and supervised burial, and
there was no clinical evidence of disease in the cattle. The disease had been confined
entirely to the pigs. The second case was in a farm across the road, which shared a
weighing machine for the pigs with Ellis, so there was constant movement across the
road and he was the next one to go down. So the disease at that stage, as far as Ellis
was concerned, was apparently confined entirely to pigs and had not got into the
cattle, which was fortunate in view of the Oswestry market. 
Dr Bob Sellers: I just want to mention the Carnforth [Lancashire] outbreak,
because when I was looking into outbreaks of FMD after the war, Bill Parkinson
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16 On 28 November 1967 MAFF made plans to stockpile vaccine and contingency plans were made
for ring vaccination. See Northumberland (1969b): 73. See also note 20 and Glossary for details on the
International Vaccine Bank. For contingency plans, see TNA(PRO) MAF 287/461 and for the
discussion of future vaccination policy, see TNA(PRO) MAF 287/479/1.
told me a lot about the 1967 outbreak and what happened at Tolworth at that
time.17 The Carnforth outbreak was known as the John Kerr outbreak, as the
field report came in at the same time as many others and John Kerr said, ‘Let’s
take it’ [confirm as FMD], and so they did.18
Soulsby: I am sure there will be more questions, but it does seem to me that 30
years, or more, ago the local livestock farming industry was quite different from
today. Many of the markets were local and were probably held every week. One
knew where all the animals came from and where they went after the market. Is
that so, compared with the present outbreak where there were a very limited
number of markets and animals went nationwide?
Rees: Yes, I think it is true that we knew their destinations then, as the
auctioneers had to keep a record of where the animals had gone.19 I have
mentioned that they did travel long distances even then. Maybe they came into
the market from local areas, but they could go to Scotland and down to the
south-west. I forgot to mention earlier that the 1967 outbreak, which started in
Oswestry in October, was the third outbreak that year. We had had one in
January in Hampshire, which resulted in 29 cases, and then a further outbreak
in Warwickshire in September, with four cases.
Professor David Rowlands: Could I just ask which species of animals were
principally involved in the earlier sporadic outbreaks?
Mr Angus Taylor: It was very often in pigs, and often due to swill. Could I just
correct one point that the Chairman mentioned? Swill was not fed in the original
farm near Oswestry. The report said that sheep bones were found in the yard
which the pigs had access to, and we discovered eventually that the butcher did
sell Argentine meat. But we occasionally had outbreaks in sheep. I can remember
diagnosing an outbreak in a farm in Hampshire, although we never discovered
the origin. We had a lot of FMD in that particular year, 1957–58, which went
right down from Hampshire to Gloucestershire, Dorset and Somerset.
Sellers: As far as it goes, that is quite right; a lot of them were pigs and cattle, but
there was quite an extensive outbreak involving sheep in Northumberland in 1966.
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17 Tolworth, Surrey, was the headquarters of the SVS from 1945 to 2001. 
18 Dr Bob Sellers wrote: ‘John Kerr was Assistant Chief Veterinary Officer (ACVO) and Bill Parkinson
was Divisional Veterinary Officer (DVO) at Tolworth in 1967.’ Note on draft transcript, 22 May 2003.
19 This also applied during the 2001 outbreak.
Miss Mary Brancker: You asked about vaccination and I didn’t hear the reply, but
I do know that there were very detailed arrangements made, because the Chief
Veterinary Officer [John Reid, Figure 2] and I [as President of the British Veterinary
Association] made them, and of course they were there for emergency use,20 and if
there had been a certain number of outbreaks by a certain date, then the plan would
go into action. We planned every detail exactly – where the vaccine would be put in
every area, including how much the veterinary surgeons would be paid. 
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20 Miss Mary Brancker wrote: ‘The Chief Veterinary Officer phoned me on Sunday 28 November, and
asked me to come to Tolworth early on Monday morning (29 November) for a private discussion. We
spent two hours together and during that time we made detailed plans for ring vaccination in the event
that a specified number of outbreaks had been reached by a certain date. I cannot remember either the
date or the number of outbreaks. Bearing in mind the vaccination had to be completed in ten days, the
question concerned the number of veterinary surgeons that would be required. We calculated the
number of animals to be vaccinated, the number that could be examined and vaccinated in an hour
and the number of hours of daylight available in December. These calculations gave us the number of
veterinary surgeons required and I estimated that enough volunteers could be found and that the offers
from abroad need not be taken up. Finally we agreed the rate of pay for them. I did not attend the
meeting at Oswestry on 2 December 1967.’ Note on draft transcript, 5 September 2002.
Figure 2: Mr John Reid (1906–90)
CB FRCVS DVSM, Chief Veterinary
Officer, 1965–70.
Rees: Taking up Mary’s point, I think the question was whether we had a vaccine
available at the outset? Well, there was no bank of vaccine available at the
Ministry at that stage. Obviously manufacturers had vaccine. I know Mary took
part in the meetings, but this was on 2 December when they started looking into
the possibility of vaccination, and perhaps we can come back to this later.
Soulsby: Howard, from what you say, because of the continuing number of
outbreaks over the years, despite the two years of freedom, you were in fact
geared up for an outbreak, all ready to move when it occurred. Is that so?
Rees: Yes, but the scale of the outbreak stretched our resources. In the first seven
days we had had 23 outbreaks, 14 in the Nantmawr area [Figure 3] and the others
scattered around, but it was difficult at that stage to conclude that these were all
secondaries. The second week there were 104 fresh cases, and new control centres
were set up then in Crewe, Chester, Ellesmere, Stafford and Northwich, and the
distribution of the disease began to take this pattern. The third week there were
215 cases, the fourth week had 385 cases; 600 of the cases up to that time were
on the Cheshire plain, which had the highest density of dairy cattle in this
country, and possibly in the world. The epidemic reached its peak of 490 cases in
the fifth week and on Friday, 24 November, we had 81 cases in one day, which
turned out to be the peak. Two days later we had 80 cases, but it started to decline.
As Mary said, there was a meeting in Oswestry on the 2 December with the
Regional Veterinary Officer and a group of private veterinarians, to develop plans
for vaccination, if the need should arise. When the epidemic appeared to be
declining, this was abandoned, and although the plans were made, and vaccine
was purchased, the decision was made not to vaccinate.
Dr Noel Mowat: I worked at Pirbright at the time and I seem to remember that
provisions were made for purchasing something in the order of 3 million doses
of the Frenkel-type vaccine from France.21 I think there were also additional
supplies earmarked from one of the South American countries.22 One of my
duties was to check that the potency of the vaccine was satisfactory, and I am
happy to say that it was. I do remember that the Ministry at the time was
obviously plotting the daily number of outbreaks and it was gradually reaching
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21 For historical background see Brown (2003) and Sellers (1984). See also Vallée et al. (1925, 1926);
Frenkel (1947) and note 16 for discussion of vaccination policy.
22 Dr Bob Sellers wrote: ‘The vaccine came from Coopers (owned by Wellcome) in Uruguay.’ Note on
draft transcript, 15 August 2002.
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Figure 3a–b: Outbreaks of FMD during the first and second weeks, October – November
1967. See the bottom left corner which is the Ellis farm, near Nantmawr. See note 14.
a.
b.
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Figure 3c–d: Outbreaks of FMD during the third week and total outbreaks between 25 October
1967 and 4 June 1968. See note 14.
c.
d.
the peak. John Brooksby came to the conclusion that if the increase in cases
continued for another day or two, then vaccination was inevitable. But the curve
took a downward turn at that point and vaccination was not instituted.
Mr Sherwin Hall: In October 1967 I was in the Veterinary Investigation Centre,
Wolverhampton. In mid-November when it was clear that the epidemic was
beginning to spread, the laboratory staff were called out and I had to report to
the Oswestry centre. By the end of November the Chief Veterinary Officer, John
Reid, was concerned about how the FMD control centres and the normal
reporting system were working. He gave me the task of getting the data on the
history of the outbreak, with a view to having the details ready for the inquiry
that would inevitably be held.23 My problem was how to tackle it. It struck me
that there was a variety of topics that seemed pertinent, and those were listed as
subject headings, under which the evidence could be collected. The actual topic
headings are listed below.
Armed with that sort of topic list, the interviews were all recorded on tape. Those
tapes are not available now, but they were transcribed as 250 source sheets. The
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23 See Reid (1968), reproduced in Northumberland (1969a): Appendix 3, 115–117. See also
TNA(PRO) MAF 287/493.
1 Tolworth head office policy and 
technique 
2 Weybridge Laboratory, Pirbright,
and other laboratory services 
3 Staff and accommodation 
4 Valuation and compensation 
5 Slaughter and immobilization 
6 Carcass disposal and disinfection of 
infected premises (IPs)
7 Local authorities, police and fire services 
8 Civilian contractors
9 Ministry of Defence and the Army 
10 NFU, NUAW, CLA, RASE,WRVS 
11 RSPCA 
12 RCVS and the BVA
13 Milk Marketing Board and artificial 
insemination 
14 Disruptions and consequential losses 
15 Parliamentary, public and farming reaction 
16 Press and information services 
17 Supplies and equipment
18 Utility boards (gas, electricity and water) 
and the river authorities 
19 Fatstock licensing, slaughterhouses 
and markets 
20 Pest control
21 Animals 
22 Origins of the epidemic and jumps;
epidemiology 
23 Insurance 
24 Previous outbreaks in 1967
Sherwin Hall’s topic headings
first few of them recorded all of the details about the market at Oswestry that
Howard Rees has alluded to and the difficulties facing Ernest Corrigall. I can
remember at the time the MP for Oswestry wanted to raise a question in
Parliament, but the Speaker apparently wouldn’t accept it and so he wrote a letter
to the Minister of Agriculture instead. Presumably all those notes should be in the
Public Record Office [The National Archives (PRO), Kew, since April 2003].
Mr Keith Meldrum: At the time I was a veterinary officer working in both
Northumberland and Hampshire, and later on in Crewe. 
Howard, can you tell us how the disease was confirmed at the time? Did it have
to relate to positive laboratory confirmation, such as virus isolation, or could it
be done without? I remember later on, as you will, in 1972, that we confirmed
FMD in pigs, which actually was swine vesicular disease (SVD), based simply on
clinical grounds. Was that the norm? 
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Figure 4: Mr Keith Meldrum
CB MRCVS DVSM
HonFRSH, Chief Veterinary
Officer, 1988–97.
Secondly, in passing, the outbreak in Hampshire was particularly interesting
historically, because, of course, that was disease in a slaughterhouse lairage24 and
it had very close similarities to the problems we have had this year. The first case
in 2001 was diagnosed in Cheale’s slaughterhouse in Essex,25 where they brought
in swill-fed pigs; and the same applied in Funtley abbatoir in Hampshire, where
pigs were kept far too long and went down [with the disease] due to lairage
contamination with the virus.
Rees: Returning to your question about the initial case. Normally, in those days,
confirmation for the first case was usually on the basis of laboratory diagnosis, to
ensure that we had FMD virus. Thereafter, diagnoses would be taken on clinical
grounds, more often than not, with occasional samples being sent to Pirbright to
check on the virus, to see that we were dealing with the same strain. The first
suspect case would introduce the standstill order (Form C). We wouldn’t bring
in the infected order until we had laboratory diagnosis from Pirbright, normally
about four hours later; there was no great time lapse. That happened in 1981
when I was CVO, and we held fire [confirmation of FMD] until 11 o’clock at
night to get the sample investigated at Pirbright. 
Hall: Just an addition to that. I am sure the veterinary officer concerned was
Cyril Walker, and the diagnosis was taken on clinical grounds alone, nothing was
sent to Pirbright. 
Taylor: Sherwin is quite right. I do remember a case in Hampshire in 1957 in
the New Forest, when there was no FMD in the country. The disease was
reported by a veterinary surgeon, and I went along and diagnosed the disease.
Four cows were affected. I rang head office and was cross-examined. Eventually
I spoke to the Deputy Chief Veterinary Officer and he said, ‘Are you quite
satisfied it is FMD?’ and I said, ‘Yes’. He said, ‘All right, we will confirm’. There
was no material sent to Pirbright until after that particular incident.
The Regional Veterinary Officer arrived towards the evening, and I remember it
particularly, because by the time he arrived all the cattle and pigs had been valued
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25 The first FMD outbreak was confirmed in pigs in an abattoir in Essex on 20 February 2001
(FMD/01), the origin for that outbreak, and the index case for the whole epidemic, is considered to
have been a pig finishing unit at Burnside Farm, Heddon on the Wall, Northumberland (FMD/04),
which was licensed to feed processed waste food under the Animals Byproducts Order 1999. See
Auditor General (2002).
and shot.26 He invited me out to dinner that night to the Crown Hotel in
Lyndhurst. That was a thing that Regional Veterinary Officers never did!
Sellers: This is about the initial diagnosis of the 1967 outbreak in the laboratory.
I was in charge of the laboratory at the time, because John Brooksby was having
a hernia operation and John Davie was doing the actual diagnosis. Although the
case came in on the Wednesday night, I don’t think we got the sample either
until late Thursday or early on the Friday and then we did the usual tests. At that
time the usual test was the complement fixation test,27 which gave an answer in
three hours. After that the samples came in, although we didn’t have a sample
from every outbreak. I think there were something like 250 or 300 samples and
they came from outbreaks in new areas, or where the Ministry was doubtful as
to what it was.28
Source Samples examined Samples from which the FMD
(No.) virus was isolated (No.)
Confirmed cases 117 114
Doubtful cases 105 19
Total 222 133
Table 2: Isolation of FMD virus O1 from samples taken during the 1967–68 epidemic.
See Northumberland (1969a),Table 6, 55.
Mr Ken Tyrrell: Coming through in the central requirements was the fact that so
many veterinary officers were experienced in FMD and most of us had passed
through Pirbright at some stage, where we had been shown what it was, if we
hadn’t seen it before. Now it actually happened that we in Cheshire had carried
out some rather good planning, though we didn’t know about it at the time. On
24 October 1967, the day before this outbreak was confirmed in Shropshire, we
ran a veterinary meeting in the Rising Sun Inn, Tarporley, where we showed the
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26 Mr Angus Taylor wrote: ‘All veterinary officers carried Webley and Scott pistols in their cars at that
time. This was stopped in the 1960s.’ Note on draft transcript, 19 May 2003.
27 See Glossary.
28 Dr Bob Sellers wrote: ‘The actual numbers were 355 samples and the results can be found in the
Northumberland Report, part 1 [Table 2 above], Northumberland (1969a): 55.’ Note on draft
transcript, 15 August 2002.
FMD film to local veterinary inspectors. Subsequently, one of those [who
attended the meeting on Thursday] rang up on the following Monday and said,
‘I think I have something nasty here’. This was in Darnhall, not far from
Tarporley. I took Peter McCready with me, who had never seen FMD before,
and we confirmed it straight away on one animal. Only one was good enough
for me, as I had seen plenty of it in my time. I got it confirmed over the phone,
without sending any samples up. Peter McCready stayed on the farm. I came
away, and we went off to the big one down in Crewe before we knew where we
were. It was quickly diagnosed and quickly confirmed, because, first of all, we
were experienced, even though it was a jump of 35 miles from the previous case,
or the previous focus in the Oswestry area. Yes, it was in cattle [Figure 5].
Soulsby: Time for one more comment before we move on to the next section.
On the sheep that you had, was there ever any despair at this outbreak, as it
moved along and got bigger and bigger and bigger?
Rees: I think there was, even in the first week, when it was escalating with no
real explanation as to whether they were all secondaries or we had other
primaries, and until we investigated the origin, there was obviously a concern
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Figure 5: Steer at Pirbright shows excess
salivation indicative of the development of
FMD lesions in the mouth.
about the escalation of the disease. When it got to 81 cases in one day, there were
serious thoughts about whether we should blanket vaccinate in the whole
infected area.
Morris: I think it is important to recognize that the attitude of the veterinary
staff in those days was that speed was essential. We were all schooled that the
quicker you killed animals reproducing virus, the better. With Ellis’s case the
disease was in adult pigs that had been treated for rheumatism for some days,
when it was clinical FMD, so there had been a delay. As you know, pigs produce
a lot of virus, and the delay gave time for the virus to multiply. The other thing
we must recognize is that the whole series of outbreaks was due to multiple
primaries, and obviously you will come to that later. The multiple primaries were
a result of a known shipload of known infected lamb carcasses but there was no
legal authority to seize that shipload or to stop any further distribution. Infected
meat was being distributed, and again Howard will know the details better than
I on this, but that was what resulted in the multiple primaries. 
Soulsby: If we can now move on to policy implementation: how it was organized
and implemented and what problems occurred. How did the MAFF
veterinarians relate to farmers and to their bosses in London? How did things
change during the course of the epidemic? Angus Taylor will address that.
Taylor: I was the DVO in Cheshire when the outbreak occurred. I had a staff of
seven veterinary officers, five of whom were very experienced in FMD. Various
other divisions or counties throughout the country had similar staff with
experience of FMD. That has already been mentioned, I think, by Ken Tyrrell,
and is something that is very important to remember. 
I have been looking back over the years and I opened the first FMD centre in
Cheshire at Crewe in 1967, which was my 17th centre since 1944. We were very
fortunate in Cheshire at that time to have had close links with the National
Farmers’ Union (NFU). We had organized study groups, evening meetings for
farmers throughout the county, and we knew all the local secretaries as well as
the county secretary. They were a tremendous help throughout the outbreak. We
took over the civil defence centre in Crewe on the 31 October with some of the
staff from Cheshire and other staff from neighbouring counties. Ken Tyrrell was
sent out to the first reported case, Alan Beech of Stocker Lane Farm, Darnhall,
near Winsford. He and another veterinary officer dealt with that case. He will
probably tell us a bit more about it than I can. Shortly after the first centre in
Crewe was opened, one of the veterinary officers in Chester rang me up and said
he had another confirmed case just outside Chester. So we set up another centre
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in Chester itself and finished up with four centres – Crewe, Chester, Northwich
and Macclesfield – in Cheshire during the 1967–68 outbreak. I think it is
important to emphasize this, because it is quite impossible to control things
properly if a centre becomes too large. That may have been one of the features
of the present outbreak that some of the centres were much too large.29
I should also mention the MAFF set-up for the veterinary staff, for those who
are probably not aware of it. At that time we had about eight regional officers
and their deputies in England and Wales, and then the DVO who was in charge
of a county. Throughout the outbreak the veterinary staff were in charge, in
contrast to what happened recently. We very quickly had other cases reported
and in Cheshire we were into double figures in the first week. We knew there was
something seriously wrong and that it would be a very difficult outbreak. I will
always remember one of the deputy chief veterinary officers came down to take
charge in the Crewe centre, and we discussed what was developing. The first
thing he said after he had listened to me, was that the book of instructions
should be thrown out of the window and that we would play this by ear, which
is what we did at Crewe. We never referred to the book of instructions after that. 
Dr Alan Richardson: I was a veterinary investigation officer at that time. I
reported on the first day to Macclesfield. The organization was so structured, and
so professionally run, that as a comparative novice, or rather a complete novice,
there were no problems coming from the outside. There was always somebody
you could rely upon to give you the correct guidance and more or less make sure
you didn’t go wrong. That again contrasts with the present situation.30
Soulsby: I was interested in one of your comments, Angus [Taylor], that some
centres were much too large. What was the drawback of the centre being too large?
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29 The Northumberland Report described MAFF’s regional infrastructure in 1967. See Glossary and
Northumberland (1969a): 19–24. Mr Angus Taylor wrote: ‘I insisted that the veterinary officer dealing
with the report case contact the centre before phoning head office. This enabled us to deal immediately
with dangerous contacts or tracings from the infected premises rather than await HO confirmation. In
some cases a second opinion might be required before contacting HO and a senior veterinary officer
was sent out to the farm.’ Note on draft transcript, 19 May 2003.
30 MAFF’s contingency plan for FMD assumed that up to ten premises would be infected, although in
2001 more than 57 premises were infected by the time the first case was diagnosed. No other scenarios
were explored, not even one based on the 1967–68 outbreak. An internal departmental review, the
Drummond Report of 1999, reported wide variations among the SVS preparations to deal with
outbreaks and stated that a rapid spread of FMD would quickly overwhelm their resources. See Public
Accounts (2003). See also notes 62 and 116.
Taylor: At Crewe at the peak of the outbreak we had 120 veterinary officers and
about 70 technical staff, and that was quite difficult to organize. I understand
that in the large centres in the present outbreak they had probably twice that
number of veterinary staff, and it would just be impossible to organize them
properly. In running an FMD centre, organization is absolutely essential.31 The
difficulty they experienced in the present outbreak was that few of the SVS staff
had much experience of FMD.
Meldrum: I worked with Angus [Taylor], my mentor in Crewe, and he’s a fine
guy to work with because he knew so much about FMD, as did all the local staff.
I had come to the centre from Oxford and worked there for 16 weeks. We had
a lot of veterinary surgeons, including some from overseas, weren’t they, Angus?
They came from English-speaking countries for training, and we had temporary
veterinary inspectors (TVI) from veterinary practices, and also from the Royal
Army Veterinary Corps (RAVC). It worked extremely smoothly. In the morning
you would go into the centre from wherever you were staying – bed and
breakfast – and would be allocated work for the day. If you were fairly
experienced you were given report cases to deal with, going on to farms with
suspect disease, and you would work on that farm until such time that it was
clarified negative. If it was positive then you would confirm the case with
Tolworth headquarters, and get on with valuation and slaughter. It worked
extremely well, but there was veterinary control in the centre. It was a centre of
reasonable size. 
Angus is quite right that we didn’t always obey the rule book. For those who know
me, I have some experience in using firearms, rifles in particular. For instance, we
had the use of a local knackerman in the Crewe centre, who used a high-powered
.22 rifle for putting animals down. That was frowned on by Tolworth, but
thankfully we carried on using this chap. He was superb and in his hands that rifle
was extremely safe and effective. A large number of cattle could be killed when
they stood facing you without any movement at all, no rushing round the pens or
getting frightened and stressed. It was extremely humane, very accurate, maybe
not perfectly safe, but it was safe in his hands. This is one example where we did
not follow the rule book and it worked extremely well. 
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31 Mr Angus Taylor wrote: ‘I can recall four centres simultaneously in Somerset in 1958. Senior
veterinary officers didn’t approve of large centres, but in those days we had about 70 field Divisional
Veterinary Officers (now Divisional Veterinary Managers) when in 2001 there were only 23. The
Somerset outbreak was relatively small. The Lebrecht management review of 1993–94 was responsible
for this cutback.’ Note on draft transcript, 19 May 2003. See Lebrecht and Corner (1993) and note 33.
I think there is a very important issue on the size of the centre and that it was
under veterinary control [in 1967].32 I worry greatly about what may be
happening at the moment, because at that time – Howard Rees can comment on
this later – I have no doubt that we were comparatively well staffed with
veterinarians in the SVS. As time has gone by there has been cutback upon
cutback, most recently following the Lebrecht Review.33 It simply means that
when a big emergency arose this year, there were insufficient staff available to
deal with it, and others had to be brought in, both from other parts of the UK
and from overseas. 
One other thing, I was talking to Jim Scudamore, the present Chief Veterinary
Officer, both at the weekend and also last night, who said that one big difference
between what happened in 1967–68 and what is happening now is that now
there is no internal administrative structure in MAFF. In those days there was a
parallel administration running in each county, a divisional executive officer with
his staff, who would deal with the routine administration within the centre. That
structure has gone. Jim Scudamore was not able to call upon that parallel support
that we had back in 1967–68. 
Soulsby: I can confirm that. I was in the USA at the time of the 1967–68
outbreak and I happened to be on the Animals Committee of the National
Science Foundation. The Americans sent over quite a number of their
veterinarians from the US Department of Agriculture (USDA) and they were
highly complimentary as to the way FMD was handled in the UK.34 They built
a lot of their planning for what they should do in the event of an outbreak on
the experience that they got over here at that time. I understand they also sent
some veterinarians over this time, didn’t they? I wonder if they formed the same
opinion this time compared with the 1967 outbreak.
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32 Mr Keith Meldrum wrote: ‘During the 2001 outbreak non-veterinary directors were brought in to
manage the control centres.’ Note on draft manuscript 17 June 2003. 
33 The 1993–94 Lebrecht management review (Lebrecht and Corner, 1993) looked at MAFF’s Animal
Health and Veterinary Group, which included the SVS. The Hon. Mr Nicholas Soames for MAFF told
the House of Commons in a written answer on 16 February 1994 (Hansard 237: Col. 851w) that it
was not appropriate to publish its recommendations. Mr Andy Lebrecht was Principal Private Secretary
to Mr John Gummer, the Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, from 1990 to 1993.
34 The Northumberland Committee visited and took evidence from Denmark, the Federal Republic of
Germany, France, The Netherlands, Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay and the USA, including the past and
present directors of the Plum Island Animal Disease Laboratory. See Northumberland (1969a):
Appendix 1, 110–111.
Meldrum: There was in fact an arrangement set up when Howard Rees was CVO
for obtaining staff from six or seven overseas countries on an exchange basis, if there
were to be an outbreak of disease. It was Howard and Mick Loxam’s initiative.35
Rees: Yes, following the experience of the 1967 outbreak we did set up in 1984
an arrangement with CVOs in, I think, six English-speaking countries – the
USA, Canada, New Zealand, Australia, Ireland and possibly Denmark – so that
in the event of an emergency we could call on them to send us 20 senior staff
each. In the present outbreak, I think we had staff from everywhere, including
Hungary and Poland, where perhaps they had difficulty in speaking English. We
didn’t have that difficulty in 1967–68, because all the overseas veterinarians were
English-speakers. 
Richardson: I worked for four months in Cumbria during the present outbreak
with a large number of Americans and I think they have gone home mightily
impressed with British farmers, but they have also learned how not to control FMD.
Tyrrell: We were talking about how the Royal Army Veterinary Corps (RAVC)
were brought into this.36 Perhaps just for the record, I can itemize exactly how it
happened. Angus asked me to oversee infected places (IPs), disinfection and
disposal of animals, and I had the use of quite a few soldiers who were sent down
to help us. The problem was that the soldiers had done the disinfection, but
nobody [no veterinarian] had the time to go out and certify that they were clean,
so I spoke to an army officer called General Staff Officer Grade II (GSOII) up
in Blackpool, and he said, ‘Well, Mr Tyrrell, what else can I do for you?’ I said I
could do with some NCOs from the RAVC to go round and see that the farms
have been properly disinfected. They came down, but very quickly the RAVC
said, ‘Well, we can’t send down NCOs without officers’. Suddenly eight
veterinary officers from the RAVC arrived, and two or three were allocated to
Crewe, some went to Chester. The RVO in Chester rang me up and said, ‘What’s
this, general mobilization, Ken?’ That’s how they arrived on the scene.
Soulsby: In the commentary about this part of the outbreak, there was the
question of how the government vets, the MAFF vets, related to farmers, and
what the relationship was between farmers and stock owners, and the vets and
their superiors in London? Was there a good rapport between the divisional office
and the farmers, and the stock owners and the local vets and others at that time?
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35 Mr Howard Rees wrote: ‘Mick Loxam was Director of Field Services from 1984 until 1987.’ Note
on draft transcript, 2 June 2003.
36 See Auditor General (2002): 17, 26–27.
Taylor: Yes, there was excellent cooperation. We knew all the local secretaries of
the National Farmers’ Union (NFU). The county secretary had his office in
Crewe and at the height of the outbreak he was in my office every day and if we
had any difficulties with farmers, the NFU representative sorted it out. Relations
were not always cordial, it’s only natural in an outbreak of that description when
farmers are very worried and upset. I think the most difficult thing of all is when
you are slaughtering contiguous stock [from adjacent premises], which are
healthy. I usually undertook this if I could, as it was difficult to persuade a farmer
that we should slaughter healthy animals, but we only did it when there was a
connection between his animals and the infected farm, or perhaps because it was
next door to the infected farm. But on the whole, relations were extremely good
and I think Mary Brancker will remember an occasion at a meeting in Crewe
where the Cheshire Agriculture Society presented a silver salver to me on behalf
of all the veterinary surgeons who took part, which I still have. I don’t think any
silver salvers will be dished out for the present outbreak.
Rees: My impression was there was no great opposition from the farmers, but
Sherwin [Hall] mentioned the Oswestry market. When the decision was made to
disperse the animals, there was local opposition at that stage. I think you mentioned
that one of the MPs was going to raise a question in Parliament.37 But as the market
was all dispersed by 28 October, and nothing happened afterwards, that opposition
disappeared, but there was initial opposition to this dispersal of the market. 
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Figure 6:
Mr Angus Taylor
receives an
inscribed silver
salver from 
the Cheshire
Agricultural
Society in 
March 1968.
L to R: Lt Col.
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Mary Brancker.
The other point I think we should mention at this stage (my colleagues will correct
me on this) was, as far as I was aware, that all animals on infected farms on
contiguous premises were buried or burnt on the premises during this outbreak. I
don’t remember ever moving any animals from an infected farm. The only occasion
that I can remember this being done was during an outbreak in Aberdeen in the early
1960s when the disease broke out in the market in the middle of Aberdeen, and there
was no way of disposing of them in the town. The animals were transported
immediately outside the town on to council grounds and buried. That’s the only
occasion I remember in the past of animals being moved off an infected farm. 
Hall: Just a very quick example of a farmer who was not very cooperative. He
wouldn’t allow any veterinary officers on to the premises, so a stop was put on
his milk. He couldn’t send his milk to the creamery, so when his bulk tank
overflowed he suddenly became compliant.
Soulsby: I wonder whether there were any appeals at that time against the action
that was being taken, as indeed there are now. 
The Duke of Montrose: I was just wondering if you actually had to carry out any
contiguous culls without being able to convince the owner that it was necessary.
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Figure 7: Preparing a pyre for
slaughtered cattle and sheep.
Rees: Well, I think there’s a different terminology used now.38 I don’t think in
those cases we slaughtered out many contiguous farms. We slaughtered
dangerous contacts that might be part of a farm. It wasn’t always easy, as Angus
has mentioned, to convince the farmer with healthy stock that they should be
taken [slaughtered], but they were taken on the basis that they might have been
infected, but were not infective at that stage. So to cut the scale of the operation
down, dangerous contacts were taken, but then buried on that farm. They
weren’t taken miles away by road. I don’t know, Angus, if that happened in other
places, but that’s what happened in Oswestry.
Brent: I assume that farmers were compensated for animals that were culled, is
that correct? Were they given their full market value? I think I heard a ‘yes’ from
the audience.39
Meldrum: Just one point about burying on the farm. That is absolutely right, but
later on, Howard will remember this, we became increasingly concerned after
1967–68 that there were a number of pig farms with no land on which you
could bury or burn, and on an individual county and farm basis the DVOs were
encouraged, required in fact, to make contingency plans for the disposal of
livestock from those farms, should there be an outbreak of notifiable disease
there. Subsequently, by the way, in SVD in the early 1970s, we frequently took
pigs away from the infected premises for processing up at the de Mulder
rendering plant at Nuneaton in Warwickshire, but this was SVD and not FMD. 
Dr Walter Plowright: This is a small query. Were there any restrictions on
veterinarians going from farm to farm at that time? I think that arose later,
because people were shown to have nasal carriage of virus for some time
afterwards. Secondly, to what extent were strict precautions taken in moving from
farm to farm, the sort of thing for example that applied to the staff in Pirbright?
Tyrrell: Might I just clarify terminology? In 1967–68 we talked about
slaughtering out dangerous contacts, but we did not, repeat not, slaughter out
contiguous contacts. ‘Contiguous’ is a word that is used in 2001. We slaughtered
out dangerous contacts, because they were on the other side of the hedge, or
where there had been some means of contact. 
Soulsby: Any comments about Walter Plowright’s question about restriction on
movement of individuals?
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39 For details on compensation, see Northumberland (1969b): 59–66 and 130.
Mowat: A small piece of information. Experiments were in fact carried out with
staff at Pirbright. Members of staff were invited to stand in loose boxes where
infected animals were held. Air samples were taken to establish the level of virus
that was being excreted by the infected animals. I think the longest period in
which nasal carriage operated was about 48 hours or so, and this was done by
taking nasal swabs from the people who were exposed.40 Beyond that, I think, the
natural cilliary activity in the retro-pharyngeal area dispersed the virus.
Morris: Could I support that and say that every veterinary officer in the country
in 1967–68 had a steel box in which his FMD kit was kept and it was to be used
for nothing else. That protective clothing consisted of a heavy rubber coat, boots
with smooth soles that could be easily cleaned, a sou’wester and leggings, and it
was kept exclusively for FMD work, just as we had pistols that were supplied so
that we could dispatch the diseased animals at once without any delay. One
washed off [the kit] before going on [to infected premises] and before coming off
at every stage. When I say wash off, I mean literally wash off, so that any dust or
anything that might be carrying the virus was washed off that clothing. When
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40 Dr Bob Sellers wrote: ‘The FMD virus was recovered from the nose of one person at 28 hours after
exposure, but not at 48 hours. In nine other cases no virus was recovered at 24 hours after exposure.
See Sellers et al. (1970).’ Note on draft transcript, 15 August 2002.
Figure 8. Cattle attendants
decontaminating their protective
clothing by spraying with alkaline
disinfectant prior to leaving one of
the animal isolation units at
Pirbright, c. 1967.
the pressure was on us, when I was on report cases and would have to leave a
positive case and then have to go back, I would have had all my clothing
disinfected.41 You usually had a chance to send your suit to the dry cleaners and
you would have a bath or a shower or whatever. You would be back in action the
next day, because you had to be, the pressure was so great. When the pressure eased
off the veterinary officer would not go back immediately to another case. I was not
aware myself of any disease arising from us going to one report case to another.
Sellers: If you look in part 1 of the Northumberland Report, it gives the number
of outbreaks that were spread by veterinary surgeons or by people [Table 3].
Attributed to Number of outbreaks
Animals 1
Vehicles 18a
Veterinary surgeons 6
Other persons 4
Milk products 9b
Hay 1
Recrudescent outbreaks 12
Total 51
(a) 15 milk lorries (8 milk tankers, 7 churn collections), 2 stock lorries 1 slurry tank; (b) 8 skim milk, 1 churn washings.
Table 3: Sources of infection in FMD outbreaks during 1967–68.
See Northumberland (1969a),Table 5, 54.
Noel Mowat has mentioned the nasal work and we didn’t do this until after the
1967–68 epidemic. I myself don’t think the nose is important, far more important
is the other experiment we did when we got virus off samples from clothes. My view
would be that the danger is more of a vet or anyone else going from contact with
one animal to contact with another animal, without any disinfection in between. 
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to use a detergent Teepol, which we used for fowl pest work, because of its cleansing effect.’ Note on
draft transcript, 23 May 2003.
Rees: Taking up Walter’s point there were no particular restrictions on private
veterinary surgeons being on farms. Obviously they were instructed to disinfect
properly when going on and coming off, [Figure 8] but there was no stopping
them going on for emergency purposes. Maybe Mary will join in on this. The
question of infections through the nose wasn’t something of concern in field
operations at that time. I don’t know how dangerous it would be. I can’t remember
how many times you had to blow your nose at Pirbright after coming through the
showers, but certainly it wasn’t an issue at that time in the 1967 outbreak.
Soulsby: I didn’t get an answer to my question whether there was any appeal
against action that was supposed to be taken at that time, compared with now. 
Rees: Farmers could object, but we could carry on and slaughter. If they disagreed
with the valuation of the official valuer, they were allowed a certain amount of
time – a matter of hours – to bring on their own valuer, but they didn’t need to
sign the valuation form. We could carry on with the slaughter, and they could
appeal later if they wished. It would go to arbitration, but there was no delay. It
was left for a couple of hours if they objected to the valuation, but they didn’t have
to sign this form necessarily and we carried on with the slaughter.
Meldrum: I am sure you are thinking about something else, and that’s to do with
the Animal Health Bill.42 This Bill, as I read it, Lawson [Lord Soulsby], would
give the Ministry far wider powers than they have at the present time to slaughter
contiguous stock over a very wide area, while as a number of people have said in
the cases we are discussing in 1967, the cattle or stock on the farm were either
on infected premises, the owner’s other premises, or there had been a close
contact, and in the view of the veterinary officer, the other stock had been
exposed to the virus or may have been exposed and they should be taken out
[slaughtered] as a precaution. But they were not normally some miles or
kilometres away unless they were on the owner’s other premises.
Soulsby: Well, we are just about coming to the end of that bit of the programme.
Are there any other points before we move on?
Taylor: Just one thing occurs to me about disinfection. In Cheshire we employed
the local fire brigade, who went on to farms and disinfected vehicles and
strengthened their straw pads at the end of the road. They were very useful. In
fact, the most recent Chief Fire Officer in Cambridgeshire often reminds me that
he was at Crewe during the 1967 FMD outbreak. It was a very satisfactory
method of getting preliminary disinfection done. 
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I will just mention one other thing. We don’t want to give the impression that
everything was perfect in 1967–68, it certainly wasn’t. We soon ran out of
contractors, particularly during the third and fourth weeks of the disease. We
had over 50 outbreaks in Cheshire on the day 81 cases were reported in the
whole country. We were certainly getting a bit behind with the slaughter and the
disposal of animals, but nothing like what’s been happening recently. Eventually
we called in national contractors, Wimpeys, who I think were used in Shropshire
as well as in Cheshire and that decision certainly increased the efficiency of the
job we were doing.
Soulsby: The message that seems to be coming over to me, apart from the odd
shortage of facilities like transport, is that there was good collaboration between
vets, farmers, the army, police and the fire brigade. Is that a fair conclusion?
Tyrrell: May I just correct what Angus said about the national contractors.
Wimpeys were used in Cheshire, but in Crewe we initially used a contractor who
was an engineer from the Mersey and Weaver water authority and it was Mike
Doody who subsequently was given an MBE for his work there. He was a man
of vision. His diggers (used for excavating streams and rivers) were lying idle
because of FMD, and he offered them to me. With some hesitation I took them
on, and he took over the whole business from there on. Because he was a man of
vision he had parks in Middlewich filled with contractors’ plant that could move
off within half an hour, and he had diggers, bulldozers, sprayers, all [types of ]
equipment. His was a wonderful expertise that was subsequently recognized by
the Queen [Figure 9].
Rees: May I just add to that, Chairman. One of the problems was that most
animals were buried and when you have 81 outbreaks in one day and 80 the next
day and another 80 the following day, there was difficulty in keeping track of
where the diggers were. One DVO at the time, George Taylor (unfortunately he’s
dead now), had the initiative to hire a helicopter to locate the diggers, and for
his efforts he was given a real telling off by head office for the cost of the
helicopter.
Dr Maurice Allen: I was in the research service and joined in the Cheshire
investigations. I am the third admirer of Angus Taylor’s set-up in Crewe. I think
the conclusion that we perhaps haven’t identified clearly is that the whole success
was due to the education and up-to-date experience of all the veterinary staff
involved. Having been involved myself in this current outbreak I think there’s an
abysmal shortage of education and up-to-date experience [of the sort] that
existed in 1967. 
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Taylor: Howard mentioned the helicopter. I eventually got the bill for it from
headquarters and they said, ‘Can you please account for all these journeys made
during the outbreak?’ I can’t remember what the sum was. I simply wrote, ‘I am
sorry I have no record of this, you have probably sent it to the wrong Taylor.’
Meldrum: The helicopters were also used for carrying chains. Why? One thing
we ran out of in Cheshire was chains to pick the cattle up on the diggers and
drop them into the holes. Chains were in great demand and the helicopters were
used for transporting them from farm to farm. It was a very effective and fast
method of movement. 
Hall: I have a note here that the helicopter cost £75 per day and you had to
guarantee three hours flying at £27 an hour.43 Mike Doody, the chap from the
Mersey and Weaver River Board, was in charge of the plant, which was the
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Figure 9: JCB backhoe loader, an example of the machinery used to prepare
burial sites in 1967.
largest plant hire operation in the country at that time. The kind of thing that
happened was that the officer in charge of an IP would see a low-loader coming
along the lane with a digger and he would say, ‘In here, in here’, and of course it
wasn’t meant to be there at all. But he waylaid the plant in order to get his job
done. The people back at base didn’t know where the equipment was and the
only way to find out was to have a helicopter to see what was going on. 
Tyrrell: George Taylor had his helicopter and Doody wanted one. I spoke to my
GSOII in Blackpool and said I wanted a helicopter and he said, ‘Why not, Mr
Tyrrell’. But Tolworth sat on us so Doody said, ‘Well, that’s no good’, and he
went off and hired his own. It was wonderful – I had 11 trips in it! 
Morris: If I may, I think I am correct in saying that I was the first one to use a
helicopter or helicopters in that outbreak. That was because, and it’s a very
important point, we were desperate. We would not move infected animals, dead
animals, or livestock, off an IP or put healthy places at risk from the movement
of livestock. Quite early on I had an infected premises on a hilltop, and although
there weren’t a large number of animals, a mixed collection of sheep and cattle,
the only way we could get things to it was through another farmyard. The lane
came up through another farm. We couldn’t bury on this hill, so it was decided
to burn, and the only way we could get the material there was using an RAF
helicopter, or two RAF helicopters, I think. They took it in turns flying up a
supply of sleepers and coal, and all the necessary things to the top of the hill for
me. We had a fire right on top of the hill. But that was very early on and I don’t
think these other chaps had really got on to choppers by then. 
Professor Alan Glynn: How many viruses were carried on these helicopters?
Morris: They did not touch down, they hovered and dropped the stuff from a
big net underneath. As long as you weren’t standing underneath it, all went well.
They actually did not land, but were able to release the nets, go away and return
with another full net.
Soulsby: Can we now move on to the next topic, that is the farmers’ and the
veterinarians’ response. Mary Brancker is going to deal with vets in practice and
the contrast in the response of farmers who were slaughtered out, and the farmers
under restricted movement. 
Brancker: There was very good organization in those days, practically all
veterinary surgeons after they had been qualified six months were made local
veterinary inspector (LVI), or whatever you called them in those days. We of
course thought that the whole-time people [SVS] were pretty idle and useless,
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and they were quite sure that we were of no value at all, but we all knew each
other. Once there was a common cause then we could all work together, because
we knew each other’s weaknesses and strengths. I would like to endorse what
Angus said that it made a tremendous difference to have a team like that. 
I am going to look at the farming community and the veterinary profession from
the social point of view. We have heard a lot of technical stuff about machinery
and so forth, but I think we need to look at what the outbreak did to the social
life of the farming community. It was a very rough time for both groups, the
veterinary and the farming, but they had a disagreeable time for different
reasons. The farming people, whether they were in the infected area or anywhere
in the country, lived with fear. If they were actually in the infected area, the fear
was worse, but it was all over the whole country. No one knew for certain
whether they were going to get the disease. Now that is a pretty unpleasant way
of living, if you think of it. Then they had the loss of income, varying in amount,
but there was a certain degree of loss, I think, on every farm. They also had no
social life and, if you are feeling pretty low, you can’t even have a night out. So
we have got to look at the farming people from that point of view, and realize
that considering how we usually regard them – they complain like mad and are
always miserable – but in this case they rose to the occasion, and, though they
were miserable, no more so than usual – or at least they didn’t appear to be.
The veterinary people, the whole-time people as we have heard, were well
trained, experienced and went into superb action. The veterinary people had this
crowd of farming people who they had regarded as useless, and discovered that
when the farmers put their minds to it they weren’t too bad. From the point of
view of the veterinary volunteers, they were away from home in fairly
uncomfortable situations, and usually working long hours. One thing that we
have got to remember is that there were no mobile phones in those days and if
you wanted to talk to the wife or to a partner, you had to queue for a public call
box, and if you took too long over a call, the people in the queue behind them
got irritated. So that is a small thing, but I think it should go on record, because
it was from a social point of view, quite important. I would ask you also to look
at the wives who were left behind to cope with life for weeks on end, because
once anyone got into the infected area, well, that was it. If you asked, ‘Where’s
so and so? Oh, he’s in an infected area, oh, I see, yes. Well, when he comes out,
tell us.’ It was almost as though he had gone to the North Pole. And the
veterinarians were also doing a job that was not theirs by nature or by training
really. Diagnosing disease and therefore death was a very depressing way of
living. Can you picture what it was like living on a farm in an infected area, a
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ghost farm, because it had no animals? I think that needs to go on record and
needs thinking about. 44
I have spoken about those at what you might call ‘the coal face’, but higher up
there was good cooperation as well. There was Henry Plumb as Vice-President
of the NFU and I was President of the BVA and we have been fast friends ever
since. That, I think, tells you something about the relationship that developed
among a lot of other people as a result of the epidemic in the 1960s. 
Soulsby: Thank you, Mary. May I just ask the first question. Was there any
concern on the part of the vets who volunteered at the large-scale culling that was
taking place? Was there any feeling that this was not the right way to go?
Brancker: No, I think if there had been they went to see the DVO, had a
discussion on it, and were satisfied. I don’t think there was any problem like that.
One thing if I can just add it on, was that, of course, in the practices, if they were
entirely agricultural, there was probably only one veterinarian left. Their livelihood
had gone, because there was no routine work, and the one person who was left had
to do 24-hour emergency service for weeks on end. It was pretty miserable there.
Both the farmers and the vets, to my mind, did a good job in those days.
Richardson: Could we say a bit about the culling? I think there were particular
criteria in 1967; animals that were killed were diseased animals or were
reasonably expected to become diseased within a short period. There was a very
different feeling about it, compared to killing at the behest of a computer model
that took no account of local circumstances.
Lord Plumb: I think what Mary has said presents the picture that existed in those
days and even more so now. One of the problems I think we face now – it may
be out of order if I talk about the present outbreak – is that there are no men on
the farms. In those days at least there was a gang and if they had to stay on the
farm, then at least they were all together and could share their thoughts, and talk
together about the problems. Now there is no one to talk to. Another major
difference now, which Mary quite rightly referred to, is the camaraderie we
farmers used to have with each other and the veterinarians. In my own area for
instance, living in Warwickshire, the two large [veterinary] practices, as far as large
animals are concerned, have both gone and there are no [veterinary] people on the
ground. This, I think, is one of the major differences we are facing today as
opposed to then. We had those [supportive] relationships, it was quite excellent. 
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Soulsby: Mary has mentioned the loss of social life. I have some stepbrothers
who lost a lot of sheep in a contiguous slaughter in 2001. They hadn’t been off
the farm for weeks and they were beginning to get a bit itchy. One of my
brothers said, ‘I would give anything just to go along to the pub for a pint’, but
they couldn’t leave the farm. There are an enormous number of things that don’t
seem to come out, except possibly in a session like this. They never get on to the
news or in the newspapers. Any other comments?
Meldrum: When I was in Cheshire I thought the farmers were absolutely
fantastic, the way they responded, in the way they cooperated with us, and I cannot
recollect any problems at all in that respect. But I wonder whether Angus or
Howard would take the view that we seem to have gone downhill since that time. I
certainly have a very distinct feeling that farmers nowadays are less willing to comply
with the disease control regulations that are laid down for their benefit. Certainly
that has been my experience through BSE and I think it is still the situation now.
In those days [1967–68] I had a feeling both during the FMD outbreak and
elsewhere that farmers were trying to comply with the laws, not in every detail –
their records may not be fully up to date – but in general terms. I don’t think we
had the problems that we have at the present time, where farmers seem to go out of
their way to try to evade controls that are laid down for their benefit. 
Brancker: I was thinking that I haven’t been controversial enough. Perhaps I
should have said something that you would all contradict.
Soulsby: May I ask the Duke of Montrose about such issues in Scotland. Any
comments about the Scottish situation, farmers and collaboration?
Montrose: Certainly, the control measures were more readily accepted in
Scotland this time round. We certainly had memories of the 1967 outbreak in
Scotland and that slaughter and compliance was required. My view on the
comments that Keith Meldrum made about farmers’ attitudes is that I would only
say that it is possibly an outcome of the mass of regulations that are now included
on almost anything that you try to do. Farmers have gradually adopted the idea
that they can’t do them all [the regulations], and they are going to skip some of
them. You begin to have so much less respect for the regulations that are offered.
Soulsby: Well, we are doing well. If there are no further comments about that
part of the programme, we can turn to the media’s response and someone who’s
quite happy with media and media participation is Keith Meldrum.
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Meldrum: A very odd introduction, my Lord Chairman, but I will take that up
with you later privately. OK, I have had my fair share of media exposure in the last
few years, but going back to 1967–68, as a veterinary officer working entirely on
farms, I was not exposed to the media at all. They didn’t impinge in any way on the
work I was doing. The press were not intrusive in the way that they have become in
more recent times. Indeed I can’t recollect seeing photographers at the [farm] gate
with long-range lenses, trying to get pictures at all. As far as a veterinary officer was
concerned on the farms, and I dealt with a fair number of farms in Cheshire, I guess
we had no problem. I don’t know whether Angus was doing his normal job and
protecting us from the outside forces, be they Tolworth or ministers or be it the
media, but I think everything has moved on apace since that time. 
I looked specifically at the Northumberland Report and the section of that
report entitled ‘Information Services’, and it’s quite clear that they were looking
specifically at providing information to the media, and in particular to the BBC,
to advise farmers in particular. There’s one lovely piece in here, in one particular
paragraph, where the Northumberland Committee concluded that they agreed
with the recommendation put to them that an appropriate time to have bulletins
available to the press would be at half-past six in the morning and between six
o’clock and half-past six in the evening, indicating that the press were somewhat
more malleable than they are at present. But, as I say, things have moved on
apace. During the early 1970s, when we were dealing with SVD (later on I will
talk I hope about the waste food controls), I don’t recollect any particular
problems with the press at that time. I do, however, remember very clearly that
there were problems with the press later on in 1981. The amount of press
attention for the single case [of FMD] in 1981 on the Isle of Wight seemed
unbelievable. I had just moved to Tolworth – my last round of working in
Tolworth – I remember thinking: ‘Golly, if we ever had a major problem, the
press would be here all the time on our doorstep, not only that but they would
be on the doorstep of farmers and everywhere else, trying to get their own
stories’. Maybe I can put this into perspective. I know that Alec Brown, Howard
Rees’s predecessor [as CVO from 1973 to 1980], told me on one occasion that he
had only one agriculture correspondent, Mr Peter Bell, that he [as CVO] ever
spoke to. While I, on the other hand, had a different experience. I seem to recollect
that at the turn of last year when the BSE report was coming out, I had in excess
of 50 approaches from television, radio and the media in general for interviews and
to comment. That is the sort of activity that you now get involved with, they soon
find your name, your phone number and they will make approaches. 
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Putting the Northumberland Report into context, if you look at Lord Phillips’s
Report on the BSE Inquiry,45 there is neither substantive comment nor
recommendation made about government relations with the media. Yet that is
absolutely critical. I can understand why the Northumberland Committee
commented the way they did on information services.46 In that context I guess
you can understand why the spin doctors are now on top of the pile, very
important people so far as government and ministers are concerned; they make
sure that what information is provided to the media, the press and so forth, is
used sensibly. One of the major problems I think anybody who is working in
government now faces is how to inform the public, the consumer, in a neutral
way, without the information being spun out of all existence by others,
particularly by tabloid papers that make their own headlines, and have no real
interest in the facts. I have felt that since I retired four-and-a-half years ago,
because I wanted to keep up to speed, to know a little more about BSE. 
It’s very difficult indeed to get the facts. You are always told, ‘Go and look at the
website’.47 OK, websites weren’t in existence in 1967–68 and they are now. How
many times in a week would one be advised to go and look at a website? You
could spend all your time looking at websites and I don’t find them all that easy
to find, then identify and extract the information that I want, and I certainly
don’t want to spend all my time on my computer. Things have moved on
tremendously since 1967–68. I would be interested in the views of Angus
especially, and Ken and Howard, on whether or not they saw the situation at the
time differently to me. Then it was very easy by comparison with what it is now. 
Sellers: I was at Pirbright in the 1967–68 epidemic, because we were then, as
now, separate from the Ministry of Agriculture. All the press would get at us, to
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46 Northumberland supported the use of communications, particularly when locating an FMD control
centre. At that time full services included telex, car and pocket radio telephones, walkie-talkie sets and
radio links with observers in helicopters. Other recommendations included trained public relations
officers, informative films and leaflets and large durable signs. Northumberland (1969b): 66–71. See
also Anon. (n.d.b). for comparison with 2001. For internal working party’s discussion on information
and advice, see TNA(PRO) MAF 287/494.
47 Websites sometimes change locations, but more often a link remains, although the original page has
been removed. In March 2002, the Wellcome Trust and the Joint Information Systems Committee
(JISC) undertook a feasibility study into web archiving, including the legal implications of copyright,
data protection, and defamation. The reports were accepted in December 2002. For further details, see
library.wellcome.ac.uk/projects/archiving.shtml (visited 29 May 2003).
try to get round the backs of the Ministry, and you had to watch how you dealt
with them. One thing I noticed, and I would agree with Keith Meldrum, was that
the agricultural correspondents were very helpful. One used to live four doors
along from me in Guildford, and I was able to discuss what was going on with him.
He made a very good point, which was that he used to write his bit for the paper
and then the subeditor used to come along and shorten and alter it so as to put a
different slant on it. And it was important how one was reported in the papers –
you had to learn what to say. There had been criticism in the press from the
medical profession about the disinfectants being used in the field and I was testing
disinfectants. I said that a certain disinfectant was less effective, and later on I read
in a paper that the disinfectant was not effective! That was the difficulty. The same
happened again in the 1972 swine vesicular disease (SVD) epidemic. When I saw
work on disinfectants reported in the House of Commons – I read what was there
– it was completely wrong. It made me wonder whether you can believe anything
that goes on in the House of Commons or even in the House of Lords.48
Soulsby: I have some queries here: did the media understand the problem? did
they get in the way? I think you have partially answered that question, [Keith].
Agricultural correspondents did understand the problem I presume, but the
more general press might not have done so.49
Sellers: I’ll just add another point. I thought they set up a separate parallel
dummy operations room at Tolworth to deal with the press. This was, I think,
during the swine vesicular disease outbreak, so the press could come along and
watch what went on, because of all the trouble the Ministry had at Tolworth in
the 1967 outbreak. 
Unidentified member of the audience: An amusing little anecdote from 1967
shows that the press could also be difficult then. One of my colleagues wouldn’t
allow a newspaper reporter on to an IP. Shortly afterwards he had to eject a
drunken workman from the premises. This man was photographed and appeared
in the local press with the caption: ‘Ministry Vet leaving property’.
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spread of the disease, including names of farmers, which MAFF did not. See Northumberland (1969b):
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Rees: On the question of the difference in the media coverage for 1967–68 and
at present, it was certainly my impression that the media acted very responsibly in
1967–68. We didn’t have the problem that they had recently where the press tried
to sensationalize everything. They did show photographs of burial pits and
burning etc., but in general they were fairly responsible in their reporting. I
noticed a big difference in the 1981 outbreak, as Keith has mentioned, where we
only had one case on the Isle of Wight. As soon as it was confirmed and we were
burying animals the next day, the press had a helicopter over the farm taking
pictures. We didn’t want this, because all they wanted to do was sensationalize this
burial. We had the Ministry of Defence declare it an exclusion zone, so they
couldn’t fly over the farm. Even with one case, we had to have morning meetings
with the press and television to explain the circumstances. There was a big change
from 1967–68, even to 1981, in terms of the media involvement in outbreaks. 
I went up to Oswestry about two or three weeks after the 1967–68 outbreak
started. I had been given the task of investigating the origin, because up to that
point there had been no time to investigate the origin, as staff were fully
occupied in dealing with [new] outbreaks. When I arrived the RVO told me that
some press people wanted to come in that afternoon to discuss the origin of the
case, and would I talk to them? I said, ‘Well, I have only just arrived and haven’t
started the investigation yet’. He said that it didn’t matter, ‘Just go and tell them
what you are going to do’. I had to explain all the possibilities we were going to
explore, and they were quite satisfied with that. We had no antagonism from the
press in those days.
Dr Tony Garland: My Lord Chairman, I am here as an imposter. During the
time of the 1967 outbreak I had been seconded from Pirbright to the regional
laboratory for FMD in East Africa. We did have some problems of our own with
FMD there. I have been back at Pirbright during the nine months of this present
outbreak. I would like to make some comments on the media, who have been
extraordinarily intrusive at Pirbright, taking up an inordinate amount of senior
staff time. Of course there is the dilemma of wanting to give people factual and
correct authoritative information on the one hand, but also to spend time on the
important scientific work at a time when there are far too few people at Pirbright
to cope with a crisis of this type. 
On another aspect of information, we are often asked to comment on
parliamentary questions at Pirbright and it is just as well that we are, because
some of the information in the draft answer would have been a masterpiece of
misinformation had not somebody who knew something about it had a chance
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to comment. Finally, concerning the websites that Keith mentioned, I think that
the MAFF/DEFRA website that was in action during this recent epidemic has
been an exceptional example of a website giving authoritative information, quite
exceptional. But I remember manning the hotline one day and a farmer’s wife
was asking for information on disinfectants and I said, ‘Well, if you go to the
MAFF website you will find an enormous amount of helpful information there’.
She said, ‘So, what is a website?’ I think that’s quite typical. It is wrong to assume
that everybody has access to modern information technology.
Soulsby: I think you make a very important point, because not necessarily
apropos of the 1967 outbreak, but in animal disease and in agricultural
information in general, many officials just assume that everybody has a
computer, that everybody is computer literate. One day I mentioned in the
House of Lords that marginal farmers, for example, may not be able to afford a
computer and, if so, they can’t get the information that other people would
normally obtain. I think that’s an important point. Any other points?
Mowat: Thank you, Chairman. I can’t resist the temptation to tell you a short
and, I think, amusing anecdote about some things that have already been
mentioned – disinfectants, air transport and the Isle of Wight. In the 1981
outbreak we used to get letters from various people offering amateurish advice. As
you know already the FMD virus is extremely sensitive; if you change its
environment, make it acid or alkaline, the capsid50 of the virus falls apart and it
becomes noninfective. We had a letter on one occasion from a chap who said, ‘I
am a chemist and I understand that the virus of FMD is very susceptible to pH
changes. It seems to me that the answer to your problem is very simple with the
Isle of Wight. All you have to do is hire a small fleet of light aircraft and spray the
whole of the island with weak vinegar, the virus will fall apart, end of problem.’ 
Soulsby: Can we just conclude this section on the media’s response, that indeed
the press didn’t get in the way and, if I am not misinterpreting what Keith said,
that they did help rather than hinder the MAFF effort. They did understand the
problem 30 years ago. Indeed, they helped much more than they hindered.
Hall: Another quick one on that. The press and information services was one of the
topics that I was specifically examining, and almost without exception they did say
that on the whole the press were very good, as was the BBC. The Towcester centre
had some problems, and they recorded the fact that a cameraman from Anglia TV
forced his way on to the premises and had to be evicted, but not before being
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thoroughly soused in disinfectant. They also had a freelance television cameraman
with a telescopic lens, so press intrusion was beginning, even in those days.
Meldrum: Coming back, if I may, Chairman, to the Northumberland Report.
Quite clearly the report saw information dissemination at two levels. One was at
headquarters level. They commented that there was a difficulty because
Whitehall was obviously many miles away from the SVS headquarters in
Tolworth, Surrey. I think, Howard, when we had the outbreak on the Isle of
Wight in 1981 a press officer, Tony Colmer, was seconded to Tolworth. Of
course, that didn’t arise at the present time, because Tolworth is no more; all the
Animal Health and Veterinary Group are now in Page Street, London.51
Northumberland also recommended in the report that there should be a local
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Figure 10: ‘The components of an intact virus particle (a) are illustrated in the drawing (b).The
particle consists of 60 copies of four proteins and a single molecule of RNA (ribonucleic acid)
8000 bases in length – the infectious component.The RNA is the blueprint for replication and is
located within the capsid or empty outer shell which therefore protects the infectious element of
the particle.The capsid is constructed from subunits (12s) – the latter value being the sedimentation
coefficient of the subunits in a sucrose gradient. Each subunit is made from four polypeptides 
(VP1 – VP4).The intact particle is approximately 27 mu in diameter, has a sedimentation coefficient
of 146s and is very similar in size to particles of poliovirus.’ Dr Noel Mowat, 6 August 2003.
a. b.
network of information officers, which was done subsequently, and ran for many
years. I don’t think that network did any national briefing, but they were
extremely valuable for local television, local radio, and local dissemination of
information, because farmers need to know what is going on. I have heard that
recently. Farmers need to know what is going on, have details of outbreaks,
details of infected areas, and I think there is a major issue here that was picked
up post-1967–68 and dealt with, I think, adequately, if not very well. That has
now fallen apart and is an issue that has to be addressed at the present time. May
I just ask Angus to comment on his experience in Crewe, because he would have
picked up the press if they were hammering on his door, so to speak.
Taylor: Funnily enough I don’t remember a lot about that, except I had an
agricultural correspondent from the Cheshire Chronicle, who frequently came to
see me. He was extremely good. He never altered what I told him, and that was
very unusual for a reporter. One other thing, a lot of the presswork was dealt
with by the RVO at Oswestry, because I remember reading complaints from the
local papers that when they tried to get through to Oswestry it was very difficult,
and therefore it would have been much better if we had dealt with it locally. I
don’t remember any problems. 
Soulsby: I must say I always feel that if you can keep the local press informed,
you have them on your side; they can do an awful lot of good in the local area,
compared with the national press that are out for a different sort of story with
dramatic headlines. 
Mr Gareth Davies: I was just reflecting. I was in East Africa at the same time as
Tony Garland, and as he said we had some problems out there. He omits to
mention that in his vaccine trials in Embakasi, Kenya, he lost one vaccine trial
because the control cattle were eaten by lions that had got underneath the fence
from Nairobi National Park.52
Tyrrell: Might I make one comment that hasn’t been covered in our discussion
so far this afternoon? That concerns the action of the local authority and the
police during 1967–68, particularly licensing for welfare movement and
licensing within [the restricted area] from farm to farm. The police played a very
valuable part in this exercise and they really did a splendid job. The farmers came
into a central point, explained what they wanted, looked at the maps, and were
given a licence, either supervised or unsupervised, depending on the necessity.
Foot and Mouth Disease:The 1967 outbreak
43
52 Dr Tony Garland wrote: ‘The incident of the lions from Nairobi Game Park was reported by the
BBC.’ Note on draft transcript, 8 May 2003.
There was none of this ‘three-weeks’ notice’, sending letters off to Leeds, looking
for a licence, as they have done in 2001.
Taylor: Ken Tyrrell has raised a very important point. I do remember that we had
a police officer in the office at the Crewe centre full time, and he issued all the
licences for welfare and abattoir movements following a veterinary inspection. 
I would like to make one other point. I think when we declared infected areas,
we always tried to have an abattoir within the infected area, so that farmers
outside the five-mile area but within the infected area could send animals for
slaughter. This doesn’t seem to happen nowadays. Of course we haven’t nearly
the number of slaughterhouses now that we had in 1967–68 and that probably
accounts for it.53
Soulsby: Well, if there are no further comments, we now go on with our last four
sections, three major points, and then a general discussion afterwards. The first
one is vaccination and Pirbright, and Noel Mowat is going to lead the discussion.
Mowat: Thank you, Chairman. I would like to take this opportunity to do a
little flag waving, if I may, on behalf of Pirbright, the place I used to work. It
seems to me that the first question that might be asked about Pirbright and
vaccination is, ‘Why should a country in which FMD is not constantly present,
that’s not endemic (enzootic), invest much money and time and effort in
supporting a sophisticated high-security laboratory and also in research on
vaccines and vaccination procedures?’ The answer, which I think is rather far-
seeing, is that this is done to gain reflected benefit. Over 50 years ago it was
thought that if the Institute for Animal Health at Pirbright could develop
improved or new vaccines and control methods, and promote their use in the
countries from which the UK obtains its supplies of meat and meat products, the
reduced incidence of disease in those countries should result in a much lower
likelihood of importing the virus and subsequently the occurrence of outbreaks
in this country. In general I think this has proved to be the case. In comparison
with the sporadic episodes of FMD in earlier years,54 it’s worth noting the
absence of outbreaks from 1968 until the small episode in the Isle of Wight in
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closure of many small efficient abattoirs because the owners couldn’t afford to carry out the alterations
demanded. Hence the necessity to carry cattle long distances for slaughter, thus increasing the risk of
spread of disease if an FMD outbreak occurred.’ Note on draft transcript, 19 May 2003. See also note 15.
54 See Figure 12 on page 47.
1981, and the gap between that outbreak and the recent one starting in February
2001. Now I am not taking the credit on behalf of vaccination entirely, clearly
there were changes in the policies about the type of meat products that could be
imported, and that was significant, but I think that vaccination has made a
major contribution in reducing the weight of infection in these countries. 
It’s widely accepted that the Institute has long been at the forefront of
developments in the understanding of the epidemiology and the pathogenesis of
the disease and also in major improvements in vaccines and this has resulted in
the Animal Virus Research Institute, as Pirbright was called at that time, being
officially appointed by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United
Nations (FAO) as the World Reference Laboratory for FMD.55 It was thought in
the 1950s and 1960s that with many parts of the world constantly affected by
FMD, what was needed was a cheap and effective vaccine, and by analogy with
yellow fever and smallpox, the answer to the FMD situation was a live attenuated
vaccine.56 After about ten years of blood, sweat and tears, involving much lab
work and field trials in various countries, it was clear that the inherent high rate
of mutation in the FMD virus genome was an insurmountable obstacle in the
development of reliably safe (I emphasize that word ‘safe’) and highly
immunogenic vaccines. However, results in Holland with the Frenkel-
inactivated vaccine,57 prepared from healthy cattle tongue tissues obtained from
abattoirs, showed that successful vaccines could be made. However the extent of
production was limited by the amount of tissue available. The emphasis on
vaccine development at Pirbright changed then from live attenuated strains to
inactivated preparations, following our fortuitous finding that a continuous cell
line called BHK2158 was highly productive of virus and this in turn led to the
development of technology and methods necessary for the large-scale industrial
production [Figure 11] and manufacture of vaccines, and made possible the very
large amounts of vaccine needed for national mass vaccination campaigns.
Another important development at Pirbright was the demonstration that totally
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55 See note 8. 
56 Brooksby (1967).
57 See also Brown (2003); Frenkel (1947).
58 Dr Noel Mowat wrote: ‘There were also limitations on the total amount of vaccine that could be
produced. These problems have been overcome by the introduction of virus production in a continuous
cell line (baby hamster kidney, BHK21) [Mowat and Chapman (1962); Capstick et al. (1962)] and by
the use of one of the aziridine compounds, such as acetylethyleneimine [Brown and Crick (1959)].’ 
E-mail from Dr Noel Mowat, 29 April 2003. For further details, see Mowat et al. (1978).
safe vaccines could be made by the use of one of the aziridine compounds such
as acetylethylenimine, known as AEI, or BEI, substituting that for
formaldehyde, the inactivation agent which was traditionally used in the
preparation of many killed vaccines. At that time59 some of the outbreaks in
continental Europe were clearly attributable to the use in the field of vaccines in
which there were still small amounts of infective virus. The studies at Pirbright
on virus inactivation and the production of safe vaccines made a significant
contribution to the reduction in the numbers of outbreaks and the eventual
control of the disease in Europe. 
With the availability of large amounts of safe vaccine, national mass vaccination
campaigns became possible. The need for this becomes obvious when one looks
at the numbers of outbreaks occurring in some European countries at this time.
In Figure 12 you will see that in France in 1952 there were some 320 000 ‘foyers’
and the translation from French is foci or nucleus, that is, small outbreaks. Also
in Holland, and Germany, the disease was frequently, if not constantly, present.
It was only after the introduction of mass vaccination which you will see
indicated by the letter ‘V’ (see Figure 12) that the situation improved
significantly. The policy of national vaccination was then espoused and promoted
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Figure 11: Industrial-scale
equipment for the manufacture
of FMD vaccine, c. 1966.
by the European Commission. The object of these national campaigns was to
reduce the weight of infection to the point where a policy of zoo-sanitary
measures, such as slaughter, movement controls, disinfection, etc., and, where
necessary, ring vaccination,60 could be introduced. 
It will be obvious that the costs of these campaigns in terms of materials, time
and labour were very large, but they continued to the point at which the total
number of outbreaks in Europe annually were either nil or in single figures, and
cost–benefit analyses of the policies by the Commission in Brussels61 clearly
indicated that a change to zoo-sanitary measures was warranted. Consequently
in 1989 compulsory vaccination in the countries of the Common Market was no
longer required by the European Commission.62 During the same period, from
the mid-1960s onwards, some of the major international [pharmaceutical]
companies, who I won’t mention, who had been producing FMD vaccines in the
meat-exporting countries of South America, started production using the new
technologies and since then control of the disease has been much improved as
can be seen in southern Brazil, northern Argentina and Uruguay – the so-called
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60 See Glossary.
61 For further details of EC cost–benefit analyses, see European Commission (1989) and Glossary. 
62 EC Council Decision No. 90/423/EC of 24 June1990 fixed the deadline of 1 January 1992 for FMD
vaccination in EU countries to cease. For background details of vaccination in the EC, see Glossary.
See also Donaldson and Doel (1992); Leforban (1999); Leforban and Gerbier (2002).
Figure 12: The results of mass vaccination campaigns on the annual incidence of FMD in three
European countries, 1950–1990, provided for the seminar by Dr Noel Mowat.
V
V
V
V
France
Federal Republic of Germany
Holland
Start of mass vaccination100 000
10 000
1 000
O
ut
br
ea
ks
 (
lo
g 
sc
al
e)
100
10
1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990
1 000 000
tripartite area. In conclusion, I feel it has to be said that the work of the Pirbright
Institute in the development of a safe, modern, industrially produced vaccine,
has contributed significantly and made possible the ultimate success of the
control policies based upon the use of vaccine. 
Sellers: I would like to add to what Noel has said. One of the reasons why the
live attenuated vaccine failed was that it caused lesions and the virus in the vaccine
used in Israel at the time, was completely different from the A22 virus that was
sweeping the Middle East.63 One of the main developments64 since has been the
choice of a strain for the vaccine by its relation to the strain circulating in the field
and this is a very important point. I myself am quite old, and I get my flu jab
every year, and they tell me that they put in the strains that are most current at
the time in the vaccine. We have been doing the same at Pirbright since about
1967, so we have been prepared for the outbreaks that were likely to occur.
Mowat: May I support what Bob has been saying. Perhaps I should have
emphasized that with a live attenuated vaccine, the time, and the amount of
effort necessary to achieve a virus strain which is attenuated and usable, is
virtually unpredictable, whereas with inactivated preparations, provided you
have a method for producing lots of new infective viral antigen, the time is much
more predictable and is much shorter than that which would have to be devoted
to the development of new live vaccines.
Plumb: Chairman, naturally I would like to come in on this, if I may when we
deal with the Northumberland Committee Report. I think vaccination was the
biggest issue and certainly we spent more hours talking about this subject in that
committee of inquiry than we did on anything else. I seem to remember at the
time that we were concerned that there were some 77 different varieties or strains
of the virus. If that is so, how can we prepare for a strain such as we apparently
have at the moment compared with that which came from South America?
Secondly, the argument recently has been on the question, if the animal is
vaccinated, whether it has to be destroyed? And, does the product [the meat]
from that animal also have to be destroyed? It seems to me that there’s quite a
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63 Dr Bob Sellers wrote: ‘A22 was a new subtype that differed from A5 subtype used at that time in
inactivated and live vaccines. A22 first appeared in Iran in 1964 and was found later in that year
throughout the Middle East and in the Soviet Union republics north of Iran.’ Note on draft transcript,
22 May 2003. See also Northumberland (1969a): ‘The nature of the disease’, Memorandum submitted
by MAFF, Appendix 2, 112–114.
64 See page 70 on A15 Thailand.
muddle as far as people are concerned in today’s terms on the possibility of both
long- and short-term use.
Davies: May I come back to the European situation? I was involved in the
cost-benefit analysis that led to the nonvaccination policy and the decisions
taken in the late 1980s.65 The true situation in Europe over the 1980s is not
widely known. From 1968 onwards, I believe there were only two outbreaks of
FMD in the European Union (EU) which came from outside. The big
breakthrough was that we stopped importing meat on the bone, and the two
outbreaks in Denmark were both due to an accident at the Insel Riems FMD
Laboratory near Greifswald, in what was East Germany. Apart from that, all the
outbreaks were home grown, and by that I mean that they were all leaks from
vaccine laboratories, or as in the case of Italy, they were due to the production and
distribution of vaccine from government laboratories which contained live virus.
The big effect of the nonvaccination policy was to shut down a lot of these plants,
to reduce the sources of live virus in Europe; and that policy paid dividends up
until now, when we have had viruses bought in from another part of the world.
Mr Chris Schermbrucker: I want to give an answer to Lord Plumb’s first
question about how to cope with 77 threatening strains of virus coming from all
round the world, with increased air travel and people travelling around the place,
and the sort of difficulties of the kinds of undesirable meats coming into the
airports of this country these days. From the vaccination point of view, the 77
problem was resolved a long time ago at Pirbright. It’s an unfortunate fact of life
that one of the characteristics of FMD is that it produces these variant strains.
One of the main jobs of the vaccine producer is to keep on top of the field
situation in that respect, and the UK is in a prime position, in having the World
Reference Laboratory for FMD based at Pirbright in the government part of the
Institute, so that the monitoring is going on all the time. The other fortunate fact
of life is that among the strains of FMD one finds the strains that protect really
very well. Of course we also find a lot of other strains that don’t protect so well.
The vaccine-producer’s job is to find the ones that do protect well, with good
vaccinal properties. Here is a good example to give you, the recent Pan-Asian
Type O that unfortunately arrived in this country [in 2001].66 By the time it had
arrived here it was very well characterized and there were very effective vaccines
available for it. 
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I would like to just add a little bit to what Dr Mowat said about the vaccines. 
I can assure him and others here that the development work on the vaccines goes
on apace and that the vaccines available at Pirbright are completely safe, and they
are appropriate, in that the strains for the vaccines are prescribed nowadays, and
they will do the job, as they have done in the other countries of Western Europe,
which acquired the same status as the British Isles, as Dr Mowat said, from 1991
onwards. Many countries in South America have also recently brought the
disease under control and eradicated it. There has been recrudescence in South
America and those countries have had to go back to vaccination again.67
Rees: I think we are very fortunate in the UK in having Pirbright at our disposal,
giving us the expertise that we need on occasions like this. So much so that we
are the envy of all the other countries in Europe who have tried desperately to
get us to close it down.68 And Chris will remember the battles we had with other
countries in maintaining Pirbright as an FMD reference laboratory. They argued
that we were dealing with exotic viruses and this was a danger to the whole of
Europe. We managed to overcome this and Pirbright continues. 
Looking at the inactivation of vaccines, the 1981 case with us was due to the use
of improperly inactivated vaccine in France, where they were vaccinating pigs69
in Britanny with improperly inactivated virus in the vaccine. This was the origin
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67 Mr Chris Schermbrucker wrote: ‘Chile, Uruguay, Paraguay, Argentina and three southern states of
Brazil – Rio Grande do Sul, Santa Catarina and Parana – all managed first to control and then eradicate
FMD using vaccination programmes with good zoo-sanitary measures. They all achieved recognition
by the OIE as “Free of FMD without vaccination”. Unfortunately a few years later there was
recrudescence of the disease in Uruguay, Paraguay and Argentina, and they had to reintroduce
vaccination. The disease was eradicated once again, but Argentina has declared that they will continue
the vaccination for four years in the first instance and will then reassess the situation.’ Note on draft
transcript, 29 May 2003.
68 Another review of Pirbright was conducted in July 2002, which concluded that given the ‘continuing
danger of known and novel exotic diseases of large farm animals entering the UK, increasing international
travel, population (and livestock) movements, removal of international borders to trade, climate change
and threats of agricultural bio-terrorism lead us to the view that the UK has an absolute requirement for
[such] an Institute’ (page 24). The Committee members were: Professor Keith Gull, Dr Richard
Cawthorne, Dr Nick Coulson, Professor Tony Minson, Professor Tony Nash, Professor John Preston, and
Dr Paul Burrows for the Biotechnology and Biological Sciences Research Council as Secretary. For the
report, see www.bbsrc.ac.uk/news/reports/pirbright17_7_02.pdf (visited 26 June 2003).
69 Dr Bob Sellers wrote: ‘Pigs were not vaccinated prophylactically in France in 1981. The vaccine was
given to cattle in the area at the same time as Brucella vaccine. FMD virus in the improperly inactivated
vaccine infected cattle and spread by some means to pigs.’ Note on draft transcript, 15 August 2002. 
of the 1981 outbreak. All I can say is that we are tremendously fortunate in
having this expertise at our fingertips here. 
Meldrum: Can I just pick up a comment from Gareth [Davies]. I am not sure
whether I heard him correctly. He was talking about outbreaks of FMD in
Europe between 1978 and 1988. I have some notes here, because and I think
between 1978 and 1988 there were 31 primary cases of FMD in the EC. Of
these, eight were from sources outside the EC and of the 23 that were home bred
inside the EC, in 13 of those 23 cases there was an association with vaccination,
either leakage from a laboratory or failure to inactivate vaccine. While talking
about Pirbright, I would like to put something else on the record, and I totally
support all the comments made about the eminence of Pirbright and that we are
very fortunate to have a laboratory of its excellence in the UK. Yes, there were in
fact many people who suggested that Pirbright should be closed and that we in
the UK should use reference laboratories outside the UK; luckily sense prevailed
and money was found to upgrade Pirbright.70 But to put this in context,
Pirbright did have problems in earlier days. I remember in 1970 that there was
a leakage of virus outside the high security area71 into some cattle, it didn’t matter
very much and nothing really happened. The cattle outside the high security area
went down with FMD and VOs in the south-east region were rushed into Surrey
under Eric Hendrie’s command. We were chasing our tails around Surrey, round
Pirbright, for a few days, but of course, there was no spread. But what’s more
important, is that thereafter, I believe, Pirbright upgraded its security arrangements72
to have double high efficiency particle abstractions (HEPA) filtration and there has
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70 Mr Keith Meldrum wrote: ‘The Pirbright laboratory was subject to a series of fundamental reviews
in the 1980s. A large capital investment programme took place at that time and ran for ten years or so.’
Note on draft transcript, 17 June 2003. The amalgamation of Compton and Pirbright in 1986 into the
Institute for Animal Disease Research was part of the Agriculture and Food Research Council (AFRC)
strategy to reduce expenditure on institutes in order to increase funding to universities. See Professor
John Bourne’s statement of evidence (no. 107) to the BSE inquiry, available at
www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/ws/s107.pdf (visited 8 April 2003). See also Anon. (nd.c).
71 Dr Bob Sellers wrote: ‘There were two incidents in 1970. The first involved a package from Tunisia
containing an FMD sample that had leaked in the local post office and the farms on the postman’s
rounds had to be checked. There was no disease. In the second, virus spread from an isolation unit to
a holding unit at Pirbright and the cattle developed FMD. Precautions were taken within a radius of
two miles around the Institute, but no case of the disease was found. See MAFF (1970).’ Note on draft
transcript, 15 August 2002. 
72 Dr Bob Sellers wrote: ‘The extra filtration had been introduced in 1960 after transmission of FMD
from Pirbright to a local farm.’ Note on draft transcript, 15 August 2002.
never been any suggestion of any problem or any leakage of virus from that
laboratory since that time [1970]. The same standards are now being applied to
other laboratories in the UK that are handling particularly virulent viruses.
Sellers: One of the leakages from the laboratory occurred in 1967, just before
the big outbreak, and we learnt a lot from that, especially on the pathogenesis
and spread of FMD. We had pigs in one isolation unit and sheep and cattle in
another unit nearby, that wasn’t under filtration. What happened was that we
had been supplied with duff filters, so air containing virus was blown out by the
extraction fans straight across into the unit with the sheep. We didn’t find any
disease until the cattle went down. Now if Pirbright can miss a disease in sheep,
if there was disease in sheep in this instance, I have every sympathy with the vets
in this present outbreak who are trying to look for lesions in sheep. When we
analysed what had happened, we found no disease in the sheep. There were some
that had nothing – no virus, no antibody – although they had been there for
several days; some had virus in their throat; some had virus in their throat and
antibody; and some had antibody alone. So a virus escape can be of help as well
as a problem, provided the conditions of escape are analysed. 
Davies: Can I come back to the discrepancy between Keith’s figures and mine? I
said there were two outbreaks that I believed originated from outside Europe and
he has eight. When we got the heads of the various FMD laboratories around the
table in Brussels, and put the data to them, some of them [laboratories] resolutely
refused to concede that in fact the outbreaks they had in their countries were due
to their own vaccine laboratories, notably the French. We weren’t going to die in
the ditch over this, we knew we had won the case in any case, so I think when the
figures came out, we allowed them. They couldn’t tell us where the outbreaks had
come from, but we put it down that they had come from outside. 
Plowright: Could I just ask our friends from Pirbright what the time interval was
from resistance to contact challenge after inoculation of the vaccines available in
1967? And, what was the duration of immunity thought to be? In what species
were they effective? While others are thinking about the answers, I will tell you
about another interesting outbreak illustrating the dangers of introduction of
FMD virus in research materials. In the 1970s we were looking to produce an
antibody, a serum, against classical swine fever, and using pigs in gnotobiotic
isolators. We imported an attenuated swine fever virus from a French institute
and put it into these pigs and they developed FMD very quickly.73
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73 Dr Walter Plowright wrote: ‘This outbreak was never publicized but confirmed.’ Note on draft
transcript, 18 May 2003.
Mowat: I am not sure that I can remember all the details, but certainly at that
time the era of concentrated purified vaccine had not arrived and I seem to
remember that the conventional wisdom was that one had to wait something like
seven to ten days for demonstrable protection to be available.74 You got a broad
type of immunity, IgM antibody being formed, and then subsequently the
specific IgG which was much more related to the antigenic identity of the
vaccine. I think at the time it was regarded that in cattle you would have to wait
something like ten days for a useful protection and it would reach its maximum
at about 21 days, and it would wane subsequently and you would have to
revaccinate again in six months in order to push the level of immunity up for
continuing protection. 
Dr Hugh Platt: As regards the use of vaccine for control of an outbreak situation,
how much of a risk is the carriage of virus in vaccinated animals going to be?
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74 Dr Bob Sellers wrote: ‘In the Northumberland Report, Part 1 [Figure 13 above] the antibody
response to FMD vaccine in cattle is given. This shows a level of protection six days after primary
vaccination with the vaccines available in 1967–68. In another experiment at that time vaccines given
four days before challenge with FMD virus gave protection.’ Note on draft transcript, 15 August 2002.
Figure 13. Neutralising antibody response of cattle to inactivated FMD vaccine.
Antibody level is given as Log10 of the geometric mean titres of a number of sera.The broken
line indicates the level at which protection may be expected. See Northumberland (1969a),
Figure 4, 66.
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Sellers: When we did experiments exposing cattle to infected pigs, we found that
there were three stages. The first stage was when people came into contact with
infected pigs, the virus got on your clothes, and so cattle got virus on their hide
and skin. In the second stage virus that had been taken in through the nose to the
throat, multiplied there and virus was exhaled in the breath. The third stage was
after 28 days – when the carrier had virus present in the throat. I don’t think there
has been any proven case of a vaccine carrier passing it on to another animal,
either from a recovered animal or a vaccinated animal.75 The only thing people do
worry about is, if the animal has the virus in its throat and it goes to the abattoir,
whether there will be virus around that area that might get passed on.76
Woods: Going back to 1967, I would like to know where the impetus to
vaccinate came from? Who was in favour of vaccinating? Which sort of
vaccinating was discussed, and who set the time-scale for vaccination and made
all the plans for vaccination?
Rees: It certainly wasn’t me. As I mentioned earlier, while the disease was
escalating in 1967 there were fears that it was getting out of hand, and the
possibility of vaccination came up as a means of controlling the disease and
stabilizing the outbreak.77 I don’t know if Mary was involved at this end, but as I
mentioned a group met in Oswestry control centre on the 2 December to devise
a plan for vaccination and they went into all the pros and cons of how many
veterinary surgeons would be available. I think they did highlight how many were
available to carry out the vaccination, and it would have to be completed within
ten days and vaccine was purchased at that time. The disease incidence then
peaked and started coming down, so vaccination was abandoned, but the
initiative came from the Tolworth end. They wanted to consider the pros and
cons of vaccination, the consequences, if they had to carry it out at that stage.78
Sellers: I don’t remember who made the decision and so on, but I remember at the
time Noel said to me, ‘We are living in history, the Ministry are going to vaccinate’.
Mowat: In answer to your question I think it’s worth emphasizing that in the
first half of the last century there was a culture that couldn’t think beyond the
fact that the principal method of controlling this highly transmissible infectious
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75 Thomson (1996).
76 See Anon. (n.d.a): 13.
77 See notes 16 and 20.
78 See Northumberland (1969a): 72, and note 20.
and contagious disease was to stamp it out, to slaughter animals. I don’t think
people ever thought that they would deviate from this, because in all the episodes
in the first half of the twentieth century every outbreak was eventually controlled
and the disease never became enzootic in this country. Each episode was
controlled by the slaughter method, so this was the accepted, successful method
of dealing with the disease, and consequently vaccination was very much at that
stage a fall-back position, in case this became a disaster not previously
experienced. I think it was a cultural thing in many ways.
Tyrrell: It’s perhaps worth recording that after 1967–68 all Ministry veterinary
staff had instructions on how to arrange vaccination programmes, as regards
recruiting staff, hiring cold storage, distribution centres, etc., so the plans were
all there ready to be used if the eventuality arose. I think they must have got lost
in the meantime!79
Soulsby: Keith says they are still there, but obviously they haven’t been dusted
down. I suppose Fred Brown’s work on subunit vaccine started sometime after
the 1967 outbreak. [To the audience] When did he start looking at the subunits
and trying to make a vaccine out of that?80
Rowlands: We started doing that work in 1981.81
Soulsby: Some time after the 1967 outbreak. 
Rowlands: There is one point I would like to make. We have heard from Noel
that there have been enormous strides in vaccine development, pioneered at
Pirbright, but I wonder to what extent this has fallen off. Obviously the incentive
to work on vaccine tends to disappear if vaccination is stopped in Europe. We
have heard a lot about some of the disadvantages of current vaccine technology,
the delay between vaccine and induction immunity, and perhaps even more
important the lack of current vaccines in developing good secretory immunity. I
think there is a number of ways in which we can envisage better vaccines yet and
I would hope that this year’s experiences will prod the funding of further
developments of vaccines for this disease and perhaps even encourage the
contemplation of the possibility of global eradication in the future.
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79 Mr Ken Tyrrell wrote: ‘Which is a polite way of saying NFU and EU opposition to vaccination.’
Note on draft transcript, 20 May 2003.
80 See Brown (1999, 2003). 
81 Bittle et al. (1982). See also Boothroyd et al. (1981); Brooksby (1981a, b).
Soulsby: Some people in the audience will remember the cost–benefit evaluation
of Power and Harris,82 where they conclude that slaughter policy is more acceptable
economically and more realistic than vaccination. Any comments on that?
Rees: I think it came out of the Gowers Committee Report as well, they looked
at this and said that the preferred policy for Britain would be a stamping-out
policy without vaccination. That was their sound view. On this question of
carrier animals, may I just read a quote here from the delegation that went to
renegotiate the 1928 Bledisloe Agreement83 in Argentina. Sir Gregor Henderson
was one of the three people there and I presume this quote is from Gregor:
If, however, a vaccinated animal has been exposed to infection at an
earlier date, it may have become a carrier with persistence of virus
in the tissues of the pharyngeal region. The fact that virus may be
present at this site in apparently healthy cattle is beyond doubt, and
the possibility of contamination of the carcass, and in particular the
tongue, from this site cannot be dismissed.84
Whether this contradicts what was found later I don’t know, but this was Gregor
Henderson’s view in 1968.
Soulsby: Difficult to confirm.
Sellers: I think that if the virus remains in the pharyngeal area, as I said, it may
be there at slaughter. Certainly no one has shown for certain in the live animal that
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82 Power and Harris (1973) conclude that ‘on the basis of purely quantifiable factors, and on the
assumptions used, a traditional slaughter policy would be less costly for the community than a
vaccination policy. But it needs to be emphasised that there are many non-measurable factors that
ought to be considered in arriving at a final assessment, in particular the cost to farmers of greater
uncertainty and stress under the slaughter policy.’ Quote on page 594.
83 The agreement imposes measures to reduce transmission of FMD virus from the South American
countries of Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay and Chile, where FMD is endemic, by stopping the import of
the virus in fresh meat or meat products. A report from A G Beynon, W D Macrae and W M
Henderson following a veterinary visit to these countries in April 1968 recommended that the
agreement be revised in light of improved knowledge and, in particular, to restrict bovine imports to
fresh boneless meat and to introduce a ban on tongues and offal. See a summary of the Bledisloe
Agreement of 1928 in Northumberland (1969a): 70, and Appendix 6, 128.
84 Anon. (n.d.b): quote on page 13.
it comes out and infects other animals, and that’s in the field or in the laboratory.85
Schermbrucker: Continuing the theme of the so-called carriers, there’s no doubt
that following the discovery by Dr J G van Bekkum in Holland in 1959,86 cattle
that have recovered from natural infection with FMD may have recoverable live
virus in the oro-pharynx. That applies whether the cattle have been vaccinated
or not. Tony Garland, Gareth and myself were in Kenya, at an interesting time
when the vaccine lab was owned by the Wellcome [Foundation] based within the
headquarters in Pirbright. A very successful vaccination campaign was initiated
there,87 compulsory vaccination, not for the whole country, because our limited
resources started in the high-production, high-rainfall central areas, and was
expanded outwards as the resources became available. British scientists working
there with the Overseas Development Administration (ODA) carried out an
interesting survey where they assessed the rate of carrier animals in the vaccinated
cattle in the programmes and the rate of carrier animals in the unvaccinated
naturally infected cattle in the nonscheme areas. From that one piece of work
there was an indication of a much lower rate of carriers in the vaccinated cattle
than in the unvaccinated cattle. My own view, having worked with several
overseas governments in control programmes for FMD, I think there’s a human
psychological problem at work here, that because there’s live virus obtainable,
people are worried to death about it. As several of my colleagues have already said,
we don’t know of a good case where a national programme has been damaged in
any way by recrudescence of this carrier virus. I discussed this subject at some
length with Professor Gordon Scott in Edinburgh and Gordon said, ‘Where
there’s no disease, in a strictly epizootiological sense, where there’s no disease,
there’s no actual carrier’. The word ‘carrier’ in FMD should be used in inverted
commas. His definition of this kind of animal who will have virus there for only
a limited period of time afterwards, he calls it the ‘inter-epizootic host’ of the
virus.
Garland: Just one or two comments which really don’t relate too closely to
history. I would like to endorse what has been said that there isn’t much in the
way of hard evidence to show that the carrier animal poses a risk of transmission
of disease to other susceptible animals. There is some evidence from the field. 
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86 van Bekkum et al. (1959). 
87 Mr Chris Schermbrucker wrote: ‘See the Government of Kenya Veterinary Department annual
reports for 1968–79. See also Berger et al. (1975).’ Note on draft transcript, 29 May 2003.
I know of two in Europe and several in southern Africa, but they are anecdotal.
Whenever people have tried in the laboratory to transmit from a known carrier
to a known susceptible [animal], those experiments have been unsuccessful and
various types of stress have been applied. I remember when we were first shown
the carrier state by van Bekkum88 and probably didn’t believe it very much at
Pirbright, he asked if we’ve had some recovered animals, ‘I will show you’, and
he did. We then thought, ‘Ahh, this explains everything’ and we better just do
some confirmatory work. Lo and behold we couldn’t transfer it, and other people
have found the same. My comment, however, and this is not a point that’s very
often made, is that these experiments necessarily involved extremely small
numbers of animals and my own view is that the work that we have done proves
pretty well that if transmission ever occurs, it’s a very rare event, but not that it
can’t happen. The significance of this, if it does happen, of course, is very, very
serious. So I don’t think we can dismiss it. That’s my personal opinion.
Plumb: Gentlemen, we are all searching our memories. Just for the record, work
on vaccination was going on in the USA between 1967 and 1969, whether it was
under Fred Brown89 or his predecessor. I remember the Duke of
Northumberland and Bill Weipers going there, because, in particular, I
remember complaining because the whole research station is on Plum Island, so
therefore I thought I had a right to go with them. Nevertheless, I do remember
them coming back with quite a favourable report of what was being said.
Rees: To put the statement in the Bledisloe Report in context, what they were
looking at was the danger of importing tongues from Argentina, with the possibility
that there could be virus in the tongues. The issue was whether the tissue would be
dangerous, not so much from animal to animal, but if we imported raw tongues.
Davies: I think the big difference between the 1967 epidemic and this present
epidemic is that the 1967 epidemic was a matter for the government, the
profession and the industry. I think in the present epidemic, the public have a
considerable interest, because of the vast amounts of money that have been
spent, and also because slaughter is up there in front of you on the TV. I have
been working with DEFRA recently on what might be called ‘political trigger
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points’ at which they [DEFRA] might trigger vaccination. One would be when
the resources for culling are overwhelmed; the second one is that the public
simply won’t have it. I think that’s the big difference between now and then, and
that if this happens again the public will turn round and say, ‘We are not going
to have this’. I remember when the committees in Brussels approved the
nonvaccination policy in Europe in 1988,90 a Frenchman turned to me and said
‘Wait until you have two or three outbreaks, the public won’t wear it’. Well, they
have worn it actually, but I don’t think they intend doing so forever.
Soulsby: Any further comments on vaccination? We have run a little over time
on that issue. I wonder if we can now turn to the meat question and Howard
Rees is going to introduce that.
Rees: I was despatched to Oswestry, probably two or three weeks into the
outbreak in 1967 and was told to investigate the origin of the infection. My first
task was to look at what we called the FM1, the report of the actual outbreak.
On that form there is a paragraph asking for the name of the farmer’s butcher.
The name of the butcher was given, and someone from the centre had then rung
up this butcher and asked, ‘Where do you get your meat from?’, ‘What imported
meat do you handle?’ And he replied, ‘Only New Zealand lamb’. That was
written down on the form and was the end of the original origin inquiry. Having
been involved in inquiring into origins in the past, I never believe what I am told
the first time round, particularly by butchers. I didn’t go to see the butcher, but
I did visit the farm and discussed it at length with Mr Ellis. As usual, people are
so upset in those first days that they can’t recall everything that happened. But
looking at all the immediate outbreaks following, it was obvious that the Ellis
case was a primary. The disease in other cases was not as old as the Ellis case, so
it was quite clear that this was a primary, and not a secondary from any
undisclosed infection. We looked at the possible links with the two other
outbreaks that had occurred in Hampshire and Warwick earlier in the year and
there was no connection at all. There was no connection with the 1966
Northumberland case, where Pirbright said there was an antigenic difference in
the strain of the O1, so there was no connection there.
91 We established no
connection at all with previous outbreaks, and were satisfied this was a new
outbreak and that there was an origin somewhere. I enlisted the help of the meat
division at Tolworth, who traced imports into this country from Argentina. We
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had a veterinary attaché in Argentina, and we knew they were having problems
with FMD at that time and it was an O1. They identified a consignment of 770
sheep carcasses that had come into Tilbury [docks, London] in late August 1967,
which had been dispatched to the Fatstock Marketing Corporation (FMC) in
Wrexham. At that time there was a dock strike as well in Southampton, so there
was a disruption in the supply of New Zealand lamb, which resulted in a
disproportionate amount of Argentine lamb going up into the countryside,
when in the past normally most of the Argentine lamb was distributed to urban
areas. This was an exception, and this consignment had gone to an FMC depot
in Wrexham. I still didn’t go near the butcher. 
I went up to Wrexham, and went through all the invoices of this consignment, as
to where it had been dispatched to, and there was a name of a butcher in Oswestry,
but it didn’t tie up with the name of the butcher that was involved with Ellis.
Luckily some of the workers at the depot knew that this particular butcher was
having financial problems at the time, and didn’t trade in his own name, but used
the name of one of his employees. So all the invoices were made out in the names
of his employees. So then I had details of 107 carcasses that he had received out of
this 770. Armed with this information I then went to see the butcher and again
asked him what meat he handled and he again told me only New Zealand lamb. I
asked ‘Are you sure of that?’ He said, ‘Yes, only New Zealand lamb’. So I then
showed him the invoices for 107 carcasses he had received of Argentine lamb. He
didn’t blink an eyelid and said, ‘Oh, yes, well, that must be true then’, and didn’t
demur at all that he had this Argentine lamb. Unfortunately all the 770 carcasses
had been distributed by that time and used up. This particular butcher supplied
Ellis with Argentine lamb. Ellis, thinking it was New Zealand lamb, used the bones
for his dogs. The bones were fed to the dogs in the yard, outside the piggery. Sows
were turned out from this piggery to be serviced on 17 October, and obviously
were in contact and probably crunched up these bones. They showed symptoms
on 21 October, and I think it was mentioned they were treated for arthritis. I don’t
know if a private veterinary surgeon was called in then, but on 25 October other
pigs showed symptoms and that’s when the disease was notified. So all you could
say is that we had strong circumstantial evidence of the tie-up between
establishment 1408 in Argentina, where we knew they had problems with diseased
animals, and this particular Ellis case. Now an important, or interesting, factor of
this consignment of 770 is that Argentine lamb was graded, in terms of quality,
into three grades, designated by the colours of black, red and blue, (and I can’t
remember which is which). We looked at previous consignments, and normally
there was 5 per cent of the lowest quality in a consignment. 
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This particular consignment had 16 per cent of low-quality carcasses. You can
speculate that this particular butcher, with his financial problems, would probably
have taken most of the lower-quality meat, and he also had a van delivery service,
going round farms in the area, where he was in the habit of throwing bones out
for dogs as well. In looking at all of these cases we went back over the subsequent
cases in that area and there was pretty strong circumstantial evidence that up to
19 of these cases could have arisen from contaminated lamb bones from this
butcher. We concluded there were probably 19 primaries immediately from this
particular consignment. This report went to Tolworth, in December 1967, and
was the subject of a White Paper that the CVO presented to Parliament.92
What we couldn’t establish in questioning Ellis was whether he was committing
an offence by using these bones, which had been exposed to pigs, unboiled.93 He
asserted, of course, that he had boiled them before feeding the dogs, which we
had to accept, because we had no evidence to the contrary. In the report we could
only say that the owner alleged that the bones were cooked before being given to
the dogs. However, it was pretty obvious that they were not. In our opinion this
was the origin of the infection and we probably had another 18 primary cases in
the same area from the same consignment of meat. Then the whole meat
question was extended and we looked at other importations from Argentina and
from this establishment, and although the circumstantial evidence was weaker, it
was concluded at the end that there was possibly up to 40 primary cases in the
area and all the others were probably secondaries. 
An amusing thing arising out of this is that we banned the importation of sheep
meat immediately, of course, on this finding. The Argentines were up in arms
about this accusation that they had introduced infection into this country. They
sent a high-level delegation and sat in a hotel in London for three days. They
didn’t come near Oswestry, didn’t go near Tolworth, and had a press conference
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Commons on 21 December 1967 (Hansard 756, 1967–68, cols 1481–1491), that adequate resources
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where they said they had no evidence that the disease had come from Argentina,
and went home. And that was the end as far as they were concerned. But in
March [1968] they asked for a delegation to come from this country, and Gwyn
Beynon, Roger Macrae and Gregor Henderson94 went to the four countries that
had signed the Bledisloe Agreement with us in 1928, which gave conditions for
the importation of beef into this country. They renegotiated the conditions for
de-boned beef, refined later with the actual procedures for maturation and de-
boning, but they also looked at the sheep problem and they agreed, subject to
certain conditions, that we would allow the importation of sheep meat from Tierra
del Fuego, Santa Cruz, and a province in Chile, subject to certain conditions that
the sheep were born in those provinces. The notification of disease was a legal
obligation, the animals should be slaughtered in frigorificos (slaughterhouses) that
we approved, and the carcasses would then be kept for three months in deep freeze,
before being exported to us. In the meantime there mustn’t be any outbreaks of
FMD in the area. Those were the amendments to the Bledisloe Agreement agreed
at that time. I agree that there may have been a reduction in the incidence of the
disease from these countries, but from then on we haven’t had a case of FMD from
South America, so I don’t know whether it was the new arrangements for
importation or reduction in incidence which was a major factor.
Morris: Just very briefly, if I could clarify a point Howard made, which lifts the
responsibility [for diagnosis] from the practitioner. The farmer as I recall, had seen
the pigs being stiff, showing signs of what he thought was rheumatism. A previous
time he had the pigs treated with a salicylate by his vet and had asked the vet for
some of that magic powder that worked before. He had administered the magic
powder to the pigs, but of course they had FMD, and they didn’t get better. That’s
when he called the veterinary practitioner who came to see them, and the
practitioner actually reported it at once. The vet picked it up straight away.
Soulsby: In the 1967 outbreak there was no indication that any infection might
have come from other than imported meat from Argentina.
Rees: Yes, Chairman. We looked at all the other possibilities, and I think
somebody else has mentioned that you get letters from all sorts in these
situations, I wouldn’t like to call them cranks, but the letters suggested the origin
of the outbreak in 1967, and I might remember one in particular. We had to take
these seriously, on instruction of the Prime Minister [Harold Wilson, Labour]
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that we had to reply to all these sensibly, although some were actually ludicrous.
One of the suggestions was that the disease had come in from South America
with salmon migrating across the Atlantic and up the Welsh rivers. This was a
serious suggestion to us that this was the origin of the disease. We also had a look
at the situation where there was a lot of disease in Germany at the time, 4000
outbreaks in 1967, and troops had come back to a depot near Wrexham from
Germany around about the crucial time. We had to investigate the possibility
that they brought the disease from Germany, but found no link at all. We did
look at all the other possibilities, before we concluded that we had strong
circumstantial evidence that the cause was the Argentine lamb bones being fed
to dogs, going into pigs and triggering off the outbreak.95
Soulsby: One thing we haven’t mentioned, which is not directly related to the
meat question, but that’s the role of birds in the spread of the disease. Any
comments on that?
Rees: Yes. Another thing that worried us up at the Wrexham FMC depot was
that these frozen carcasses were being cut up with an electric saw and there were
piles of bone dust. The place was inundated with starlings, which were gleefully
devouring this bonemeal, and would then fly off. Whether they caused any
outbreaks around there, we don’t know, but it was a possibility that the bonemeal
could have been mechanically contaminated and taken out by the birds, but it
was impossible to identify specific cases. There was a danger from the depot,
because of the means used to cut up the carcasses. 
Sellers: In the Gowers Report, there was a lot of talk about the birds bringing
virus across from Holland and Belgium and so on.96 The Danes, Swedes and
Norwegians always said it wasn’t the birds, because the virus went from Germany
to those countries, but not at the time of the bird migration. The Meteorological
Office under G W Hurst did some work on the bird flights over the years up to
1967 and found that there were wind sources there.97 Later, after the 1981
epidemic, Alex Donaldson and I gave the Met Office a number of outbreaks on
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the south coast, which were said to be from birds. We also gave them some that
we knew were meat, and they managed to pick out the ones that were due to
birds as being caused by wind. Birds certainly can transfer virus, but it’s more
mechanical – on their feet, or by regurgitation of food that they have eaten.98
Richardson: One very quick, anecdotal point. The first case I saw this year was
in housed cattle, where the farmer claimed that a flock of starlings had roosted
in the first affected building seven days prior to the animals becoming sick.
Soulsby: I think there are two more sessions to do, but now we come to the
Northumberland Committee and we have a member of that Committee here
this afternoon, Henry Plumb.
Plumb: Thank you very much, Chairman. I think I can be fairly brief on the
details of the Northumberland Committee, because it has become apparent as
the discussion this afternoon has worn on that most of you here at the seminar
are completely au fait with the findings in that report, or at least the major
findings. May I therefore just pick up two points from the discussions that have
taken place so far? The first is a reference to imports, but in particular to swill
feeding. I would condemn it and I did at the time in 1967 and in 1969. Recently
I looked at my notes and over a ten-year period from 1954 to 1965, there were
200 cases of FMD and 110 were on swill-fed premises. At that time, of course,
there was no law that said that the product had to be cooked. It now does, but
is it?99 To suggest that you can’t get rid of the product that goes into the swill feed
is a bit of a nonsense, when you think that everything over 30 months of age goes
into an incinerator because of BSE, and therefore it should be possible to handle
it in a totally different way. 
The second thing is the question of the publicity, saying that there was no
adverse publicity in 1967. There was. The headline in the farming papers was
‘Sack Plumb said the butchers’.100 The reason for that headline was they [the
butchers] accused me at the time of being biased. I appeared before the butchers
and I told them I was, because that was the truth. I was put on the
[Northumberland] Committee and therefore served as an independent with the
rest of the marvellous team under the Duke of Northumberland. We were able
to come to a conclusion. 
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There was a minority report,101 and it wasn’t mine, I still have my minority
report. I had written it in the event of the introduction of blanket vaccination,
which was being discussed at the time. Had we come out with blanket
vaccination, I would have produced a minority report against it, for the simple
reason that had we vaccinated on an annual basis, and then inevitably a live
vaccine as we knew it then would be taken back into the hills, and there would
be 30 or 40 sheep left in crevices on the hills with the possibility that they would
immediately get it [the virus]. Ring vaccination is of course a totally different
thing. We naturally talk about the importance of maintaining a ban on the
import of meat, mutton, lamb and pig meat, particularly from countries, or areas
of countries where FMD is endemic. We said that a ban on the import of meat
coming from those countries should continue. It’s interesting to note at the
moment, if my figures are correct, that in the last two years we imported 37 000
tons of pig meat and over 100 000 tons of beef from 26 countries where FMD
exists. That, I think, speaks for itself. We have been sitting on a volcano, a time
bomb, call it what you will, over this period.
We said that there should be a complete ban on all imports from countries, or
areas of countries, where FMD is endemic, because of the high risk of introducing
FMD into Great Britain from imported carcass and beef offal on strictly animal
health grounds. As we have just heard, we said as far as the beef was concerned,
‘Take the bones out, let it come in a Cryovac pack102 and we believe it will be safe’.
That has been successful since we have had no further outbreaks that we can claim
have come from South America. The South American farmers were pretty
concerned at the time that this was so, and I and others spent quite a bit of time
in Argentina and Brazil, in Paraguay, Uruguay and so on. I had some doubts
about the efficacy of the vaccine that was being produced in some of those areas.
We did visit many stations and we did establish both in the frigorificos
(slaughterhouses) and on the estancias where the lamb had come from. It is quite
remarkable at that time we were able to establish the lamb’s origin. Incidentally,
on that point as the Duke himself said at the beginning, I think quoting views
that the virus had come in, or was alleged to have come in through imported meat
for swill fed to pigs, my understanding – my recollection – is that at that time we
did in fact find the family where the meat had been bought, and the bone
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presumably carried by a dog across a field of cattle in Oswestry. It was quite
interesting that we were able to trace it back to the estancia in Argentina. So the
recommendations were made and following the report we were very pleased to
note that the Government followed those recommendations almost to the letter.
I have to say that is what we haven’t done on this occasion and while you don’t
want to dwell on that, I know, nevertheless one Minister said to me fairly recently
the only thing we didn’t do was bring in the army at the right time.103
Well, I submit the only thing they didn’t do was take action at the right time,
which would have made a difference. But I’ll finish with one more point, because
it was the major point of the whole of the Northumberland deliberations and the
timings that we reached. That was if we continued to import products from
countries where the disease was endemic, or even where it exists, then we must
prepare for the possibility of another outbreak. In preparation for that possibility
we should prepare immediately for ring vaccination. Therefore, I think, as has
already been said this afternoon, if we did have another outbreak the public
wouldn’t wear it in the way that we have had to handle it in the past. On the
question of slaughter and ring vaccination I am pleased to note that in Pirbright
and elsewhere in the world, there are various preparations for a vaccine that
could operate on a ring-type basis. Certainly I would object most strongly to an
annual vaccination such as they have or have had in Argentina, and are now
having to revert to. We have a totally different situation here in the mix of meat
animals and different types of farming; it just wouldn’t work in the same way.
Chairman, one could go on for a long time on that Report, which took evidence
from 1000 people, with over 10 000 letters, some of them very cranky indeed.
Many letters were passed back to the Ministry. We had a marvellous team and I
just wish Bill Weipers and the Duke of Northumberland could be here to listen
to the discussion that’s taking place here this afternoon.
Meldrum: May I deal with the swill issue first of all. Following the
Northumberland Committee, I was given the job in 1972 of helping to revise
the arrangements. Quite clearly, at that time the swill plant standards were
absolutely abysmal, it was a local authority second-tier function and everybody
in the field knew that they were absolutely abysmal. This is from memory now
– we had about 6300 or so swill plants prior to 1973. The first tranche of
licensing [to tighten hygiene standards] in April 1973 cut down the swill plants
to 4500 and when full standards were imposed the number [of swill plants] came
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down at the rate of knots, so that the end result was a very significant reduction.
We are now down to about 90 swill plants at the moment, and although
standards were significantly raised, there were other instructions in place in the
field, such as checking on swill-fed pigs on a routine basis, particularly if there
appeared to be an FMD threat to the UK from overseas through importation of
meat. Not only did they have their pigs inspected, but they were advised of the
threat from overseas and that they should be on their guard, and were told what
to look for and to report any suspicions to the local DVO. Whether that
happened earlier this year, I do not know, and we shan’t know until that court
case is heard.104 Those were the plans in place. 
Quite clearly the importation issue that Henry Plumb mentioned, is very pertinent,
and it is quite clear that up until about 1993, I think, Jim [Morris], we did have a
very tight import policy on importation, probably the tightest in the whole EU,
particularly for lamb and bone-in beef. We had a very tight policy and that was
gradually eroded over time by the Standing Veterinary Committee (SVC)105 who
were more interested in a flexible approach to imports from developing countries,
which made it particularly difficult for us. When the EU expanded to 15 countries
[in 1995], to an extent whereby the UK, Ireland and Denmark no longer formed a
blocking minority in the SVC, things went downhill, and it is absolutely true that
we are now importing meat into the EU, sometimes without detailed border checks,
from areas that we would not have considered acceptable after the Northumberland
Report in 1969. There should be checks on meat coming in from developing
countries. I question whether or not these [checks] are thorough and certainly they
are not within the EU. One further point on post-Northumberland contingency
planning; we put in place not only contingency plans for trained staff in what to do
if there were to be an outbreak, but also the details were already drawn up for ring
vaccination. We had exercises in every division. We also worked with the Pirbright
laboratory, which had a mobile laboratory that would go to an area of high risk, so
that samples of milk could be taken from neighbouring dairy herds, tested overnight
for the presence of virus, so that if found the herd could be killed immediately.
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Those plans were already in place. I have heard nothing recently whatsoever about
testing milk, but those plans were in place earlier. 
Finally, one of the critical issues, and in the Northumberland recommendations,
is on staffing levels. For the record, it is obviously axiomatic that the problems this
year are partly related to the lack of veterinary staff in the SVS, not only veterinary
officers, but senior veterinary staff in particular, because the whole layer of deputy
regional veterinary officers, was abolished post-Lebrecht Report.106 I don’t
particularly want to get into that, except that it causes me a great deal of anguish
even now, but I do have in front of me a report that was put up to the Permanent
Secretary in February 1995 when the new staffing levels were being discussed,
post-Lebrecht – there had already been a significant reduction in veterinary staff
because of Treasury and ministerial pressures. I did say that if this report was
accepted and implemented that we would be short of senior staff in the field to
direct operations and senior veterinary staff at Tolworth would have to be drafted
into the field to take control. I was confident that we could deal with a minor
emergency, with the proposed new structure, but anything more serious could
present a significant problem to senior managers in the veterinary field service.
Rees: Thank you, Chairman. I will take up the issue of the vaccine bank107 that arose
out of the Northumberland recommendations. Before that I would like to read a
summary of a paper which was sent to Northumberland on the origin and the
characteristics of the virus we were dealing with in 1967. It makes interesting reading:
…this virus had an unusual capacity for spread, it was highly
diffusable, it had an unusual ability to persist, it was difficult to
disinfect against, early excretion before overt disease normally 24 to
48 hours, but Pirbright showed that it could be up to five days.108
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This is the important one – sheep showed typical fulminating disease in some
areas, in other areas they didn’t, but even when sheep were severely affected, there
was little or no spread of disease from that source. I think the Northumberland
Report mentioned that some serological surveys were carried out and positive
antibodies were found in some sheep,109 but it was decided to do nothing about
them and they were left and didn’t spread disease. The last point was that the
virus did not readily infect pigs. Of the 98 570 slaughtered only 327 showed
lesions. This puts the different importance of these species into perspective.110
Following the recommendation in the Northumberland Report, a vaccine
bank111 was set up containing 1.5 million doses of liquid vaccine of A, O and C
strains, ready to be used. It was stored in three cold stores scattered throughout
the country, but the difficulty was that this vaccine had a shelf-life of between 12
and 18 months. After 12 months it was tested by Pirbright to check the potency,
and if it deteriorated it had to be replaced. 
There were three storage depots. Equipment for vaccination was held at
Weybridge, so all the preparations for vaccination à la Northumberland were put
in place. This was a very expensive operation and by the time I became CVO in
1980 the cost to us was £700 000 a year to maintain this bank, and we, of course,
never used it, and hopefully never would use it. As Keith mentioned, we were
being pressed, as usual, to cut our staff to save costs, so rather than cut staff I
wanted to do something about this bank of vaccine. I discussed it with six other
countries – Australia, New Zealand, Ireland, Finland, Denmark, Norway and
Sweden – who all maintained a stamping-out policy without vaccination, a
similar policy to ours, and we agreed to set up an international bank of
concentrated antigen held under low temperature over liquid nitrogen. This was
agreed by the seven countries to share the costs. We then went out to tender to
all the manufacturers with the protocols and I think, Noel, we stipulated that
you had to have a PD50 of at least 10 at that time. We introduced four strains
initially, the A22 Iraq, A24 Cruzeiro, O1 Lausanne and C1 Oberbayern, stored at
a specially renovated building at Pirbright,112 which cost us £170 000 to
renovate, and the vaccine initially cost us about £240 000. We, along with
Australia, had a drawing right of 500 000 cattle doses. New Zealand had
300 000, and the other four countries had rights of 100 000 each. Each country
paid for the bank pro rata to their drawing rights, which brought our annual
costs down from £700 000 to £30 000. However we didn’t really get much
credit from the politicians for this saving, but at least they didn’t reduce the
staff. This bank has been in existence since 1985, when we signed the
international treaty establishing the bank. We had difficulties with the treaty
because unfortunately the lawyers in all seven countries were involved in
discussing the drafts, and every time we sent it round somebody would change
one or two words which meant that it all had to be sent round again. So after
about five circulations, we said, ‘That’s enough, it’s not going around again, you
either agree or get out of it’. So they agreed and it was signed by the Ministers
in 1985. Now as far as I know the potency of this vaccine has been maintained
and is tested regularly – it used to be tested every three years through cattle and
every year through guinea-pigs. It has proved to be a valuable and cost-effective
bank which is there for emergency use when necessary and hopefully, in our
view, it would never be used. It satisfied the Northumberland recommendation
that we have a bank of vaccine available.
Soulsby: Can I just ask you one thing on that, Howard? Is there a hierarchy of
potential strains of virus that you might anticipate and hence make vaccines
from, and others that you would not bother with?
Rees: Yes, we had this facility at Pirbright, who were taking samples from all
over the world, so we knew exactly where the dangers existed, and although we
used four strains to start with, we added an additional one in 1986 and some
others have been added subsequently, such as A15 Thailand, based on the
advice from Pirbright, and also of interest to Australia, who are particularly
concerned in the Far East. So the range of strains to be held would be
determined by Pirbright.
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Mowat: Economically, it’s a very good proposition, because what is in fact stored
is the purified viral antigen and there is provision also for rapidly formulating
this antigen into the finished product that can be used in the field. The storage
life of liquid nitrogen-stored antigen is extremely long, so it’s very economic
from that point of view. 
Garland: A couple of comments on that. A number of other vaccine banks have
been set up since that time. The European vaccine bank, of which we are also a
member, the North American vaccine bank, and there’s one in South America.
Strains have now been tested for at least 13 years and shown to maintain potency,
that is the antigen stored over liquid nitrogen, so I think one could say that their
stable shelf-life would be indefinite. The most recent recommendation from the
World Reference Laboratory includes 17 different vaccine strains, classified into
three levels of outbreak risk: high, medium and low. The vaccine bank is able to
formulate either aqueous aluminium hydroxide saponin vaccines, which are
good for ruminants, but also oil vaccines that are good for ruminants and pigs.
An emergency vaccine would almost certainly go for an oil vaccine if one was
able to do that. There are however some complications in terms of liability, and
particularly in terms of deciding when to activate that bank.113
Soulsby: Any other comments? I have an anecdotal comment about sources of
the infection coming from overseas. I mentioned that I was on an Animal
Committee of the National Science Foundation in the USA and we were
concerned with the importation of dangerous pathogens, both human and
animal. We went round many institutions, including the US Customs. We got
to Chicago, where of course there were many illegal importations of meat and
meat products from central and eastern Europe. As you know as you go into the
USA the customs declaration form says you can’t import meat or meat products.
So we asked the customs officials how many illegal importations they had and
they said, ‘Oh, we get lots and confiscate the whole lot’. Then we asked, ‘What
do you do with them?’ They replied, ‘We put them in the ice box and keep them
there’. I asked, ‘What do you do after that?’ He said, ‘Well, we get rid of them’.
I said, ‘Into an incinerator?’ He replied, ‘No, we put them in the garbage’. And
the garbage goes to pigs. I think that merely points out that the mystery is not
that we get these highly infectious diseases, but that we don’t get many more of
them. Let’s now go on to our final point, the aftermath, and Abigail Woods is
going to wrap it up.
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Woods: We have already discussed various points I was going to raise here, so
I am not going to speak for very long. The main problem after the
Northumberland Committee, of course, was for MAFF to decide how much
of that report it was going to accept, for, of course, MAFF reserved the right
to look at the political and economic questions of FMD itself. I think part of
that consideration arose from a political sensitivity in blaming Argentina for
the outbreak. I got that impression from looking at the sources [at the Public
Record Office, Kew] that MAFF was very concerned that the Northumberland
Committee might come out and say, ‘Ban all Argentine meat’, and then it
would have had to answer to Argentina, which, of course, responded to the
three-month meat ban by stopping the purchase of all British export goods –
apparently about £20 million was lost.114 There was also the vaccination
question: how much of the vaccination recommendations were MAFF going
to accept. And I have seen the draft of the Minister’s speech to Parliament, how
he was going to respond to the Northumberland Committee Report. One or
two of these drafts has actually omitted to accept ring vaccination and one or
two little comments in the margin say, ‘Well, I think if we have a proper
import policy we don’t need to bother about vaccination’.115 Obviously the
suggestion was thrown out, because the final draft did accept vaccination,
although I think at that time it was actually estimated that it would cost 
£1 million a year and the Treasury was not happy about that one. So it’s
interesting to hear from you about that the actual outcome was the vaccine
bank. From the farming perspective, it seems that various schemes were
launched on a nationwide basis, to try to help the affected farmers to restock,
but again MAFF’s scheme that was introduced was to try to prevent them
restocking all at once, which of course would push the prices up, as there
weren’t enough cattle to go round. There were various subsidies to farmers to
delay restocking and to plough up instead, although I believe there were
problems getting farmers to accept that, simply because in Cheshire it wasn’t
always possible to plant arable crops instead of continuing with dairy cattle. It
seems that in the years following 1967 the level of anxiety about the possibility
of the disease coming back gradually reduced, up until the scare in 1981. But
since then FMD has fallen off the agenda. Certainly for my generation of
veterinary students it really wasn’t anything. I think we were shown a film, but
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7/1070. For details of policy discussions following the Northumberland Committee Report, see TNA(PRO)
FCO 67/71, 67/72, 67/73.
115 See TNA(PRO) MAF 276/403.
that was the limit of our education on FMD; it was history. Obviously this
year is going to provoke quite a few rethinks on that one.116
Soulsby: Is there any social report on how farmers got back to normal? Was it a
long time that it took them to accommodate to the loss of animals and restocking?
Woods: I am not sure about that, to be honest. I believe the state of farming was
in quite good shape then, so farmers were probably more likely to go back and
restock than they are today. 
Plumb: They didn’t have the milk or livestock quota restrictions we have today.
You only had to go to market and buy some cattle. A lot did restock and a lot
improved their stocks by doing so. I remember one farmer in particular who said
he had stepped some ten years forward by buying some pedigree stock that he
now felt that he could afford, from the stock that he had before. So in times of
adversity things [progress] did happen.
Taylor: After the FMD outbreak of 1967–68 we had a big importation of
Holstein cattle from Canada. I think about 500 came in. I have a record that one
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were ‘inexcusable’, such as the absence of a vaccination policy and the failure to bring in the military at an
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Figure 14: Restocking plans discussed
following the 1967 FMD epidemic.
L to R: Tom Stobo, Henry Plumb and
Mary Brancker.
farm in Cheshire that was able to restock eight weeks after disinfection had been
completed. I am very puzzled at the moment as to why it has taken so long in the
present epidemic for people to restock,117 because they didn’t seem to have that
difficulty in Cheshire. Ken Tyrrell may remember it better than I do, but I don’t
think we had a great problem. The NFU set up a register of people who had stock
for sale and this was a great help to the farmers when it came to restocking. 
Tyrrell: Angus is quite right. Those Canadian Holsteins came in, but there were
also a lot that came from Scotland. The farmers unfortunately were under
pressure to get a milk cheque going and they often turned round and bought in
a lot of brucellosis problems. 
There is one question that I would like to ask my colleagues here. The
Government has said, through their Ministers this year, that regulations were
relaxed too soon in the 1967–68 outbreak. That’s not my recollection. My
recollection is that we allowed a certain amount of restocking to take place under
controlled conditions,118 and there was recrudescence. It was not that regulations
were relaxed too soon. I think this has just been put on so that they can continue
at present, or up until recently, holding farmers under restrictions far longer than
we would consider a veterinary necessity.
Meldrum: It’s absolutely right. I remember having to go back to Crewe to re-
disinfect farms, because this trial restocking under controlled conditions had
indicated that there was still virus present. In particular we had to re-fumigate grain
and spray haystacks with formalin to ensure that any residual virus was removed. 
Chairman, may I pick up just one or two more points from the Northumberland
Committee Report. Questions are often asked why burial is still not taking place
on farms. Well, it’s BSE related. Advice is that carcasses containing the brain and
spinal cord should not be buried. It’s simply a reflection of the concerns within
the agriculture department on BSE and advice from the Spongiform
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117 Mr Angus Taylor wrote: ‘There appeared to be much more political interference in 2001 and the
20-day movement restrictions imposed on farmers after the outbreak appeared to be draconian and not
necessary from a veterinary point of view – 14 days would have been sufficient initially.’ Note on draft
transcript, 19 May 2003.
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Cheshire, two in Staffordshire, two in Shropshire, two in Flintshire, one in Denbighshire and one in
Worcestershire, plus six cases where it spread to neighbouring farms.’ Note on draft transcript, 20 May
2003. See Northumberland (1969a): 42, para 70.
Encephalopathy Advisory Committee (SEAC). So rendering (pressure heat
treatment) took place and that in itself raises additional problems. 
One or two things though from the Northumberland Report were not picked up.
Lime was mentioned in the context of burial. I don’t think lime has ever been used
in pits. I think most of us would agree that you shouldn’t use lime, because it
preserves the carcasses, so we would not follow that suggestion. We haven’t discussed
milk.119 To Angus surely and also to Ken, one of the biggest problems we had in
Cheshire was disease following the milk tanker, from farm to farm, due to
evacuation of air from the back of the tank when there was infected milk on board
– I think Bob Sellers is making a rude noise in my direction that indicates dissent.120
Be that as it may, there is still a provision in place that milk tanker drivers should
put an air filter on their vehicle in an infected area. I think that has been practised
recently, but it took an awful long time to put in place. Another point to mention
about firearms, about pistols. In the old days Angus [Taylor] said we went to farms
carrying a pistol, I think these have been withdrawn from the field since I retired
four and a half years ago, for health and safety, or safety reasons. A pity though,
because in the old days when you went to a farm, all the affected stock were killed
on the spot, that day, and the rest were killed maybe the next morning. Any animals
with lesions were put down straight away that evening, or whenever you were there.
The Northumberland Report said that a vet should be in charge of the centre. That
did not happen recently. It also says that there should be no reports made to
Tolworth, to headquarters, when a vet visits a farm to examine a suspect case. That
recommendation was not implemented, and up until this year any animal that was
believed to have disease, be it this or any other notifiable disease, would have to be
reported and discussed with a vet in Tolworth. I believe that to be a very useful
safeguard. I do actually remember, by the way, cases that were referred back from
Tolworth to the field, correctly, for a second opinion. I also recollect we had a
problem with a particular diagnostic procedure at Pirbright, way after this report
was written, so mistakes can occur. We have to be very careful that the right decision
is made on the right grounds. It also says in the report that ministers should have
new powers, additional powers, to ensure that all their controls are supported in
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120 Dr Bob Sellers wrote: ‘Experimental investigations at that time at the Micobiological Research
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legislation. Quite clearly, that was not the case recently and that’s why the Animal
Health Bill has now been pushed through the House of Commons in an awful
hurry.121 Lastly on artificial insemination (AI), there was a very useful comment in
the report about DIY AI, which has been picked up recently, and practised
successfully in affected areas – that is farmers doing their own cattle insemination
with their own equipment, using a proper syringe which deposits semen in the
vagina or lower part of the cervix. That has actually worked extremely well. 122
Rees: Just a quick one, in the 1967 outbreak essentially the first phase of it finished
in February 1968, followed by a 25-day period of freedom, and then 24
recrudescences of disease. Eighteen farms had the disease for the second time, but
only 12 of them were true recrudescences and the opinion at the time was that it was
due to contaminated hay, which was difficult to disinfect. As a rule of thumb infected
premises were cleared four weeks after the completion of disinfection, or six weeks
after the completion of slaughter, whichever was the sooner, but in the case of the
outbreaks in 1967–68, farms were released in groups, because there were many
contiguous farms. They were allowed to restock to 50 per cent initially, and if they
were healthy after two weeks, then they were permitted to complete restocking.
Soulsby: Right, we have one minute and I think I will use that minute, unless
there’s any other pertinent comment about this, to say that I think we have had
a good afternoon, we have had lots of discussions, and all that remains for me to
say is thank you all very much for coming along and participating. It will all be
put in writing because it’s all been taped, and you will get an opportunity to see
what you have said, and to correct it in a minor way, but you can’t rewrite your
speech. Now I will invite you to go for informal drinks. 
Tansey: Before we do that, may I add the thanks of the History of Twentieth
Century Medicine Group to you all for providing not only an entertaining and
educational afternoon, but it has been a great privilege to listen to your
reminiscences and I would like to ask you to thank our Chairman, Lord Soulsby,
for his excellent chairing of this session. Thank you very much.
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122 Restocking in 1967–68 was helped by the DIY AI breeding programme that continued to operate
using semen from the Milk Marketing Board’s Artificial Insemination Centres. Disposable syringes of
semen were delivered to the farm gate in response to a telephone call. About 50 per cent of the 30 000
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necessary because personnel trained in AI were not permitted to visit farms to inseminate cattle.’ Note
on draft transcript, 17 June 2003. See also O’Sullivan (1971).
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Dr Maurice Allen
DVSc PhD MRCVS FRCPath 
(b. 1937) was in veterinary practice
before joining the staff of the
Biochemistry Department at the
Central Veterinary Laboratory,
Weybridge. He was Head of the
Department of Functional
Pathology at the Institute for
Animal Health, Compton, from
1975 to 1984. Subsequently he
established the Compton Paddock
Laboratories, which provided
diagnostic veterinary services to the
veterinary profession and, more
recently, milk-testing services for the
farming industry. He was involved 
in the 1967 FMD outbreak at the
Crewe centre and in 2001 at
Gloucester. He is Past-President 
of the Association of Veterinary
Research Workers and has more than
100 publications, mainly relating to
noninfectious diseases in cattle.
Dr John Brooksby
DSc PhD MRCVS was Director of
the Animal Virus Research Institute
at Pirbright, Surrey, during the
FMD outbreak in 1967, until his
retirement in 1979.
Miss Mary Brancker
CBE FRCVS (b. 1914), a veterinary
surgeon in general practice, was
President of the British Veterinary
Association (BVA) at the time of 
the 1967–68 FMD outbreak. She
collaborated closely with both
MAFF and the National Farmers’
Union. Following the outbreak she
chaired the BVA committee that gave
evidence to the Northumberland
Committee.
Professor Leslie Brent
PhD FInstBiol MRCP (b. 1925), a
transplantation immunologist, was
Professor of Immunology at St
Mary’s Hospital Medical School
from 1969 to 1990, later Emeritus. 
He co-discovered immunological
tolerance in 1953 and graft-versus-
host disease in 1957. See Brent L.
(1997) A History of Transplantation
Immunology. San Diego 
and London: Academic Press.
Professor Fred Brown
OBE FRS (b. 1925) following
lectureships at Manchester and
Bristol Universities, he joined the
Food Preservation Research Station
and the Hannah Dairy Research
Institute, Ayr, as Senior Scientific
Officer in 1950, followed by the
Christie Hospital and Holt Radium
Institute, Manchester, from 1953 
to 1955. He was appointed to the
Animal Virus Research Institute,
Pirbright, Surrey, as Head of the
Biochemistry Department in 1955
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and was Deputy Director from
1980 to 1983. He moved to the
Wellcome Research Laboratories,
Beckenham, Kent, as Head of the
Virology Division until 1990 and
Professor of Microbiology at the
University of Surrey from 1989 to
1990. He has been Adjunct Professor
at the School of Epidemiology and
Public Health, Yale University, since
1990, and Visiting Scientist at the
USDA Plum Island Animal Disease
Center, NY, since 1995. He was a
member of the Spongiform
Encephalopathy Advisory Committee
(SEAC) from 1990 to 1998.
Mr Gareth Davies
MRCVS Dip Bact MRCVS DipBact
(b. 1935) was Head of the
Epidemiology Unit at the Central
Veterinary Laboratory, Weybridge,
from 1975 to 1986. After a period at
Tolworth he became the Veterinary
Epidemiologist at the Veterinary
Unit of DG6 (Agriculture) at the
European Commission. He has been
a consultant to the European
Commission and the FAO since he
retired in 1994, and headed the
team that prepared the cost–benefit
analysis of vaccination policies for
the European Commission in the
late 1980s. While in DG6, he dealt
with the FMD epidemics in Italy
(1993) and Greece (1994) and led a
team that recommended an FMD
control strategy in Bolivia (1995).
Dr Alex Donaldson
PhD ScD MBE FRSE FRCVS 
(b. 1942) was Veterinary Research
Officer at the Animal Virus
Research Institute (the AFRC
Institute for Animal Disease
Research from 1986 to 1988 and
the Institute for Animal Health,
Pirbright Lab, since 1988) from
1973, Principal Veterinary Research
Officer from 1976 to 1989 and
Head of the World Reference
Laboratory for FMD at Pirbright
from 1985 and has been Head of
the Pirbright Laboratory since 1989. 
Dr Tony Garland
PhD MRCVS (b. 1938) qualified at
the University of Glasgow in 1962
and gained his PhD at the
University of London. He worked
for the Institute for Animal Health,
Pirbright Laboratory, for 17 years
from 1962 to 1979, including four
years seconded to the Regional
Reference Laboratory for FMD in
Nairobi, Kenya. At Pirbright he
worked in the Departments of
Experimental Pathology and
Vaccine Research and also in the
World Reference Laboratory. He
moved to the Wellcome Foundation
in 1979 until his retirement in
1997, as Director of Biological
Production, including both medical
and veterinary vaccines. He had also
been based in Brazil in charge of
veterinary vaccines research,
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development and production. Since
retirement he has been a consultant
for the FAO, the EU and the British
Government. He returned to the
Pirbright Laboratory in early 2001
during the FMD epidemic for 20
months, including six months as
Acting Head of the World
Reference Laboratory.
Professor Alan Glynn
FRCP FRCPath (b. 1923) practised
clinical medicine at St Mary’s
Hospital, London, from 1956 to
1958. He took up bacteriology at 
St Mary’s, was appointed Professor
in 1971 and Head of the
Department of Bacteriology in
1974. In 1980 he became Director
of the Central Public Health
Laboratory at Colindale until his
retirement in 1988.
Sir Ernest Arthur Gowers
GCB KCB CB KBE GBE
(1880–1966) entered the Civil
Service in 1903 and transferred to
the India Office in 1904, becoming
a barrister in the Inner Temple in
1906. He served several
departments including India, the
Chancellor of the Exchequer and
the Coal Mines Department. 
He later became Permanent Under
Secretary for Mines, Chairman of
the Board of the Inland Revenue,
the Coal Mines Reorganization
Commission and the Coal
Commission until his retirement 
in 1946. During the Second World
War he administered London’s civil
defence. He chaired many
committees, including the
Committee on Admission of
Women to the Foreign Service, 
the Royal Commission on Capital
Punishment and the Committee on
FMD from 1952 to 1953. He wrote
three books on the use of English
and became editor of Fowler’s
Modern English Usage in 1965.
Mr Sherwin Hall
DHMSA MRCVS (b. 1928)
qualified as a veterinary surgeon from
the Royal Veterinary College in 1953
and spent five years in farm animal
practice before joining MAFF’s
Veterinary Investigation Service. He
worked in the Wolverhampton and
Cambridge laboratories and spent
two years on a United Nations
project in La Paz, Bolivia. In 1977 he
was appointed Veterinary Scientific
Liaison Officer on the Chief
Scientist’s Group of MAFF until his
retirement in 1988. He founded the
Veterinary History Society in 1962.
Sir William MacGregor Henderson
Kt DSc MRCVS FRSE FRS
(1913–2000) qualified from the
Royal (Dick) Veterinary College,
Edinburgh, in 1935, and was on
their staff for three years. He joined
the staff of the newly formed
Animal Virus Research Institute at
Pirbright in 1939, and was Deputy
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Director in 1955 to 1956. He left
in 1957 to become Director of the
Pan- American Foot and Mouth
Disease Centre, returned to the UK
in 1966 as Head of the new
Department of Microbiology at the
Institute for Research on Animal
Diseases at Compton, and was
Director from 1967 to 1972, when
he became Chief Executive of the
Agriculture Research Council until
1978. See Henderson W. (1981)
British Agricultural Research and
the Agricultural Research Council: 
a personal historical account, in
Cooke G W: (ed.) Agricultural
Research 1931–1981: A history of the
Agricultural Research Council and a
review of developments in agricultural
science during the last 50 years.
London: Agricultural Research
Council.
Mr Keith Meldrum
CB MRCVS DVSM HonFRSH 
(b. 1937) was Chief Veterinary
Officer at the MAFF from 1988 until
1997 during the dark days of BSE.
He saw FMD in the 1960s as a
young veterinary officer in the State
Veterinary Service: ‘This leads me to
feel that a comparison of the two
diseases and the control methods that
are employed would make a
fascinating study for a veterinary
historian, but count me out!’ Note
on draft transcript, 24 October 2002.
The Duke of Montrose
James Graham, 8th Duke of
Montrose (b. 1935) has been a
livestock farmer since 1962. He was
a council member of the National
Farmers’ Union for Scotland from
1982–90, President of the
Strathendrick Agricultural Show
since 1966, and President of the
Royal Highland and Agricultural
Society in 1997–98. He has been
Opposition Whip (Conservative)
for DEFRA in the House of Lords
since 2001.
Mr James Morris
DVSM (b. 1929) was in general
veterinary practice in north Wales
from 1952 to 1960. He became a
veterinary officer with MAFF in
Essex from 1960 to 1966 and in
Pembrokeshire from 1966 to 1971,
before moving to Tolworth as
Divisional Veterinary Officer in the
import/export section until 1974,
and in Kent from 1974 to 1976. 
He was Deputy Regional Veterinary
Officer for the South-West Region
from 1976 to 1981 and Regional
Veterinary Officer at Tolworth
covering meat hygiene and staff
officer from 1981 to 1989.
Dr Noel Mowat 
PhD MRCVS (b. 1927) trained in
veterinary medicine at Glasgow
University, was in general veterinary
practice and in 1957 joined the staff
of the Animal Virus Research
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Institute, Pirbright (which merged
with the Institute for Research 
on Animal Diseases (Compton),
Houghton Poultry Research 
Station (Houghton) and the
Neuropathogenesis Unit
(Edinburgh) to become the 
Institute for Animal Health 
from 1988). He has been concerned
with the development of vaccines
directed to the control of the
economically important virus
diseases of livestock, principally
FMD. He retired as Deputy
Director of the Pirbright Laboratory
in 1987. 
The Duke of Northumberland
Hugh Algernon Percy, 10th Duke of
Northumberland G GCVO TD PC
JP FRS (1914–88) chaired the
Departmental Committee for
Recruitment of Veterinary Surgeons
in 1964, the Committee of Enquiry
on FMD from 1968 to 1969, the
Agricultural Research Council from
1958 to 1968 and the Medical
Research Council from 1969 to
1977, among others. He was also
member of the Agricultural
Improvement Council, 1953–62;
the National Forestry Committee
for England and Wales, 1954–60;
the Hill Farming Advisory
Committee for England and Wales,
1946–60; the County Agricultural
Executive Committee, 1948–59;
and the Royal Commission on
Historical Manuscripts, 1973–88.
He was Chancellor of the University
of Newcastle from 1964 to 1988.
Dr Hugh Platt
PhD MRCVS (b. 1921) is a
veterinary pathologist with particular
interest in the pathogenesis and
control of infectious diseases of
animals. He was a scientist in the
Animal Virus Research Institute,
Pirbright, from 1954 to 1967
publishing a number of papers on
experimental FMD. From 1967 to
1986 he was Senior Pathologist at
the Equine Research Station,
Newmarket. His publications include
A Survey of Perinatal Mortality and
Disorders in the Thoroughbred [1979,
Newmarket: Animal Health Trust]
and an account of a previously
unrecognized sexually transmitted
disease of horses [Platt H, 
Taylor C E D. (1982) Contagious
equine metritis. Medical Microbiology
1: 49–96].
Dr Walter Plowright
CMG DVSWc FRCVS FRS 
(b. 1923) qualified from the Royal
Veterinary College, London, in
1944. He held posts in the Colonial
Veterinary and Research Services
from 1951 to 1971, partly on
secondment from Pirbright. He was
Professor of Veterinary Microbiology
and Pathology at the Royal
Veterinary College, London, from
1971 to 1978 and Head of the
Department of Microbiology,
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Institute for Research in Animal
Diseases (IRAD, Compton) from
1978 to 1983. He worked in Africa
and at Pirbright on many tropical
diseases, especially rinderpest (cattle
plague), developing a vaccine which
has been adopted universally for
over 40 years.
Lord Plumb
Henry Plumb DL FRAgS (Lord
Plumb of Coleshill from 1987) 
(b. 1927) farms in Coleshill,
Warwickshire. He was elected 
Vice-President of the National
Farmers’ Union (NFU) in 1964 
and was President from 1970 to
1979. From 1975 to 1977 he 
was President of Comité des
Organizations Professionnelles
Agricoles de la CEE (COPA),
President of the International
Federation of Agricultural Producers
(IFAP) from 1977 to 1980, and has
been President of the National
Federation of Young Farmers’ Clubs
(NFYFC) from 1976 to 1986 and
Deputy President to HRH The
Prince of Wales from 2002. He 
was first elected to the European
Parliament (EP) in 1979 and
remained a member until his
retirement in 1999. He has chaired
the European Union Committee 
of Agriculture (1979–82) and the
European Democratic Group
(1982–87) and was President of the
European Parliament (1987–89),
Vice-President of the European
People’s Party (EPP) from 1994 
to 1997, and Co-President of the
African, Caribbean and Pacific
Countries (ACP)–EU Joint
Assembly from 1994 to 1999. 
His responsibilities included the
partnership between the European
Union and African, Caribbean and
Pacific nations. He was elected
Chairman of the Assembly of
Former Members of the European
Parliament in 2001. See note 100.
Mr Howard Rees
CB DVSM HonFRCVS (b. 1928)
qualified at the Royal Veterinary
College, London, in 1951, and
joined the SVS in 1953. He served 
as a veterinary officer in Staffordshire
from 1953 to 1966 and was involved
in numerous outbreaks of FMD in
various parts of the country. He was
involved in the major outbreak of
FMD in 1967–68 and was
responsible for the investigation into
its origin. He was appointed Chief
Veterinary Officer for the SVS in
Great Britain in 1980 and retired in
1988. He served as President of the
International Animal Health Code
Commission of the Office
Internationale des Epizooties (OIE)
from 1988 to 1997 and as Chairman
of the FAO European Commission
for the Control of FMD from 1987
to 1989. Following retirement he has
been a veterinary consultant on
control procedures for FMD to
eastern European countries.
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Mr John Reid
CB MRCVS DVSM (1906–90) was
Regional Veterinary Officer in 1958
and Chief Veterinary Officer,
Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries
and Food from 1965 to 1970. He
was Vice Chairman of the European
Commission for the Control of
FMD from 1967 to 1970 and a
member of the Committee of
Inquiry into the Veterinary
Profession from 1971 to 1975.
Mr Alan Richardson
PhD MRCVS (b. 1940) was in
large animal veterinary practice for
three years before being appointed
to the MAFF's State Veterinary
Service. He was a Veterinary
Investigation Officer (VIO) based 
at Penrith in Cumberland in 1967.
Being judged to be a competent
diagnostician by the Officer in
Charge at the Macclesfield FMD
centre, the late Mr John Loxham,
he was included in a team
responsible for second opinions 
and awkward cases. Later, he was
Director of the Sir William
McDonald Veterinary Laboratory,
Victoria, Australia from 1975 to
1976; veterinary clinical research
manager with ICI Pharmaceuticals
Ltd., Macclesfield, from 1977 to
1985; and a Home Office Inspector
from 1987 to 1996.
Professor David Rowlands 
PhD (b. 1940) was a member of
staff at the Animal Virus Research
Institute, Pirbright, researching
FMD virus from 1964 to 1983.
Subsequently he was head of FMD
virus research at Wellcome Biotech,
Pirbright, working principally on
new approaches to vaccination
against FMD. He has been
Professor of Molecular Virology,
University of Leeds, since 1996.
Mr Chris Schermbrucker
DTVM MIBiol QP MRCVS 
(b. 1935) a veterinary surgeon,
trained in the development of
vaccines against FMD at Wellcome,
Pirbright, from 1966 to 1967. 
He led a joint-venture team
producing successful African-strain
vaccines in Nairobi for 14 years,
returning to Pirbright in 1980,
where he set up modern quality-
control systems at the foot and
mouth laboratory there and at
related laboratories overseas. He 
is recognized as a Qualified Person
under the EU directive and has
been consulted by the UK and
many overseas governments on 
the practicalities for the control 
and eradication of FMD. He retired
from the Vaccine Production Lab 
at Pirbright in 2000.
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Mr Jim Scudamore
MRCVS (b. 1944) was DVO, later
Veterinary Research Officer in
Kenya from 1968 to 1974, joining
MAFF (DEFRA from 2001) 
in 1974 as a Veterinary Investigation
Officer, rising to DVO at Tolworth
from 1980 to 1994 as well as DVO
in Taunton from 1984 to 1987, and
RVO in Edinburgh from 1987 to
1990, later Assistant Chief
Veterinary Officer, Edinburgh until
1996. He served as Assistant Chief
Veterinary Officer (meat hygiene) at
Tolworth in 1996–97 and has been
Chief Veterinary Officer since 1997
and Director General of Animal
Health and Welfare from 2001.
Dr Bob Sellers
PhD ScD MRCVS FRSE (b. 1924),
a veterinary virologist, worked on
FMD and other vesicular virus
diseases (tissue culture, vaccines and
interferon, diagnosis and disease
control, and spread of virus by the
airborne route) and on bluetongue 
at Pirbright from 1953 to 1958 
and from 1964 to 1979 as Deputy
Director and as Director from 1979
to 1984. He also worked at the
Wellcome Research Laboratories,
Beckenham, from 1958 to 1962 
on canine distemper and hepatitis
vaccines, and on interferon. In
Venezuela from 1962 to 1964 he
worked on FMD and Venezuelan
equine encephalitis and in Canada
from 1985 to 1988 as a consultant on
foreign animal disease. In 2001–02 
he was a member of the Royal Society
of Edinburgh Inquiry into FMD in
Scotland. At the beginning of the
2001 outbreak he prepared two
documents for friends and family,
‘Ruminations on FMD’ (BFMD1a)
and ‘Vaccination, treatment or
slaughter or a combination’
(BFMD2), which will be deposited
with the records of this meeting in the
Archives and Manuscripts, Wellcome
Library, London.
Lord Soulsby
Ernest Jackson Lawson Soulsby PhD
MRCVS DVSM (Baron Soulsby 
of Swaffham Prior from 1990) 
(b. 1926), was a graduate 
of the Royal (Dick) School of
Veterinary Studies, Edinburgh, in
1948, with honorary degrees from
several universities and has served 
as President of the Royal College 
of Veterinary Surgeons from 1984 
to 1985, and of the Royal Society 
of Medicine from 1999 to 2000. 
He spent 15 years as Head of the
Department of Pathobiology at the
University of Pennsylvania, USA,
and from 1978 to 1993 was
Professor of Animal Pathology at the
University of Cambridge and Dean
of the Veterinary Faculty from 1978
to 1992. His major research and
veterinary interests have been the
immunology of parasitic infections,
the parasitic zoonoses and livestock
research and development in
Foot and Mouth Disease:The 1967 outbreak – Biographical notes
92
developing countries, having been
an adviser and consultant to national
and international organizations and
governments.
Dr Tilli Tansey
PhD PhD HonMRCP (b. 1953) 
is Convenor of the History of
Twentieth Century Medicine Group
and Reader in the History of
Modern Medical Sciences at the
Wellcome Trust Centre for the
History of Medicine at University
College London.
Mr Angus Taylor
MRCVS (b. 1917) qualified as a
veterinary surgeon in Edinburgh in
1941. After two years as an assistant
in practice, he joined the Ministry 
of Agriculture and Fisheries in 1943.
He became the Divisional Veterinary
Officer for Cheshire and set up the
first Foot and Mouth Centre in the
country at Crewe in 1967. It was
the 17th outbreak of FMD in which
he had worked since 1944. He was 
a technical adviser to the BVA when
evidence was prepared for the
Northumberland Committee, 
and gave evidence on behalf of 
the Association of State Veterinary
Officers. He was Regional Veterinary
Officer at Cambridge from 1971
until 1982, and President of the
British Veterinary Association from
1972 to 1973 and of the Royal
College of Veterinary Surgeons from
1982 to 1983. 
Mr Ken Tyrrell
MRCVS (b. 1929) qualified in
veterinary medicine at Trinity
College Dublin in 1951 and joined
the Ministry of Agriculture and
Fisheries in 1953, where he worked
until his retirement in 1987. He
was first involved in FMD control
in Torrington, Devon, in August
1953, later Askerswell, Dorset;
Blandford, Sturminster Newton,
Marlborough, Yeovil, Liskeard,
Downham Market, Rothbury 
and Nantwich. In 1967/68, he
diagnosed the first case of FMD in
Cheshire on 30 October 1967 and
the last case in 1968. He was
seconded as a consultant on FMD
to the Food and Agriculture
Organization of the United Nations
in Turkey, and to the Pirbright
Research Institute on vaccination
trials in Namibia in 1962. He
examined Charolais cattle for FMD
in France prior to the first
importation of this breed into 
the UK and Simmental cattle in
Switzerland in 1965.
Professor Sir William Weipers
Kt FRCVS DVSM FRSE
(1904–90) was in general veterinary
practice for 24 years before
becoming the Director of Veterinary
Education at the University of
Glasgow in 1949 and Dean of the
Faculty of Veterinary Medicine from
1968 until his retirement in 1974.
He was a member of the Council of
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Royal College of Veterinary
Surgeons from 1949 to 1974 and
President during 1963–64, and a
member of the Northumberland
Committee from 1969 to 1969.
Dr Abigail Woods 
PhD MRCVS (b. 1972) worked 
in general veterinary practice for
two years before studying the
history of science, technology 
and medicine at the University of
Manchester. In 2002 she completed
a Wellcome Trust-funded PhD
thesis entitled ‘FMD in twentieth-
century Britain: Science, policy 
and the veterinary profession’.
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AI
Artificial insemination.
Animal Health Act 2002
Received the Royal Assent on 
7 November 2002. The provisions
strengthen existing controls and
introduce new powers to include
other animal diseases. A national
contingency plan and an annual
report on import controls are to be
published, as well as details of illegal
imports of animal products.
Rigorous and detailed conditions
must be met before a warrant is
granted to enter a farm and permit
the slaughter of contiguous
livestock. The Secretary of State 
has a duty to consider whether
vaccination is appropriate. 
See DEFRA news release 455/02, 
8 November 2002, at
www.defra.gov.uk/news/2002/
(visited 25 November 2002).
Animal Health Group
MAFF’s traditional civil service
generalist administrators were
located at Tolworth (along with the
SVS), whose undersecretary (Grade
3 head) was based in London until
mid-1992. Its responsibility covered
policy development for animal
health, welfare and breeding, meat
hygiene, exports and imports of
animals, meat and meat products;
and licensing, distribution and
control of veterinary medicines until
the Veterinary Medicines Directorate
was set up in 1989. It was also
responsible for implementing 
many aspects of these policies.
Blanket vaccination
Vaccination of all animals within 
a defined area.
BSE 
Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy.
BVA
British Veterinary Association.
Capsid
The outer protein coat of a virus,
enclosing the nucleic acid. See
Figure 10. 
Complement fixation test
One of the first laboratory methods
used for the identification of a virus
serotype or the presence of FMD
antibodies in an infected animal. It
is based on the fact that complement
– a normal constituent of serum – is
bound or ‘fixed’ when antigen and
antibody that are specifically related,
interact or combine. The test is
carried out in two stages: (1)
antigen, complement (usually
guinea-pig serum complement) and
serum which has been inactivated
by heating, are incubated together.
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(2) When this reaction is complete,
an indicator component prepared
from sheep erythrocytes sensitized
with antisheep red blood cell
antibody is added. If complement
remains from the first stage, the
sensitized red blood cells will lyse. 
If no lysis occurs the antigen and
antibody are serologically related.
Knowing the serotype of either the
antigen or the antiserum makes it
possible to identify the other
component. A result is obtained in
three hours if sufficient antigen is
present in the sample. Assay
methods to measure (titrate) the
amount of either component were
developed and the serum-virus
neutralization test was also
introduced to assess the antibody
levels in animals which had either
been infected in the field or had
been immunized by vaccination.
Both these methods have now been
largely superseded by the enzyme-
linked immunosorbent assay
(ELISA) test – which offers
significant practical advantages over
the earlier tests. Additional
information from Dr Noel Mowat
and Dr Bob Sellers. 
Contiguous
Land next to an infected farm with
livestock and if livestock were in the
field adjacent to the affected stock
on the IP, then they might be
slaughtered as ‘dangerous contacts’.
The term was not used to mean all
livestock within two miles (3 km) as
in 2001.
CLA
County Landowners Association.
CVO
Chief Veterinary Officer.
DEFRA
Department for Environment, Food
and Rural Affairs took over the
functions of the Ministry of
Agriculture, Fisheries and Food in
June 2001.
DVO
Divisional Veterinary Officer,
usually responsible for one English
county.
DVSc
Doctor of Veterinary Science.
EC/EU
European Commission/European
Union.
EC cost–benefit analyses
‘The Commission of the EC,
seeking a harmonized policy for
FMD when the single market was
due to come into operation after
1992, had undertaken cost–benefit
analyses for two possible strategies:
either nonvaccination or pan-
Europe vaccination. The results
were interpreted to mean that the
overall economic benefits would be
greater if prophylactic vaccination
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would be stopped. They concluded
this having considered that the
worst possible future outbreak
scenario could be something like 
13 primary outbreaks and 150
secondaries during a ten-year
period. (Of course the recent UK
outbreak shows this to have been 
far too optimistic, however it is the
historical case.) The case for
cessation of vaccination was also
considered to have an advantage 
due to the EC regulations for the
movement of animals and animal
products at the time.’ Additional
information from Mr Chris
Schermbrucker. See notes 30 and
62. See also Vaccination in EC.
FAO
Food and Agriculture Organization
of the United Nations.
FMC
The Fatstock Marketing Corporation
(FMC) was set up in 1954 by the
National Farmers’ Union (NFU).
Capital was raised by subscription
from members. FMC became a
public company in 1962 and
bought Marsh and Baxter Ltd. 
By that time the business had more
than 10 500 employees. Hillsdown
Holdings bought the FMC meat
processing and slaughterhouse
business in 1984, and later sold its
abattoirs, eventually ceasing red
meat production. See also NFU.
FMD
Foot and mouth disease.
FMD vaccine
The first experimental FMD
vaccines were prepared in 1925 by
Vallée and his colleagues using
formaldehyde-inactivated vesicular
fluid from infected calves. It soon
became clear that a method for the
large-scale production of virus in
vitro would be required for the
extensive application of a vaccine in
control programmes. H S Frenkel in
Holland developed the first
industrial method by collecting the
tongue epithelial tissues from
healthy cattle at local abattoirs and
producing the virus in quantity in
large sterilizable vessels. The virus
was inactivated with formalin, and
aluminium hydroxide was added as
an adjuvant. This vaccine was
effective in the early national
control programmes, but there were
some disadvantages. In some
batches, virus inactivation was not
totally complete, resulting in a low
level of infectivity that could initiate
outbreaks of the disease.’ Additional
information from Dr Noel Mowat. 
Form C
An order enforcing an emergency
standstill (under the FMD Order) or
stop on all movements of susceptible
animals within a limited area (5
miles). When the disease was
confirmed the area was extended to
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cover about a ten-miles radius from
the infected premises.
Foyer
Siège principal d’une maladie, or main
source of the disease. See page 46.
GSOII
Royal Army Veterinary Corps (RAVC)
General Staff Officer Grade II.
HEPA
High efficiency particle abstractions
filter, effective for virus control.
Immunogenic
Some antigens stimulate a better
immune response than others and
are described as highly
immunogenic.
IP
Infected premises or ‘infected area’
as defined by the Foot and Mouth
Disease (Infected Areas Restrictions)
Order of 1938.
International Vaccine Bank
It was established at the Institute for
Animal Health, Pirbright, Surrey, in
1985, which also held the World
Reference Laboratory for FMD for the
Food and Agriculture Organization of
the United Nations (FAO) from 1958
and the Office Internationale des
Epizooties (OIE) from 1960, and the
EC Reference Laboratory for FMD
from 1985 to 1995. See also Forman
and Garland (2002).
Lairage
An area of a slaughterhouse where
animals are rested, fed and watered
prior to slaughter.
LVI
Local Veterinary Inspector.
MAFF
Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries
and Food, formerly Ministry of
Agriculture and Food , which has
been DEFRA since 2001.
NCO
Non-commissioned officer.
NFU
The National Farmers’ Union was
started by a group of nine
Lincolnshire countrymen in 1904.
See www.nfu.org.uk/ (visited 21
November 2002). NFU archives,
including files from the Fatstock
Marketing Corporation (SR 2NFU
SP1/1–4), are held by the Rural
History Centre, University of
Reading. See archive listing at
www.rdg.ac.uk/Instits/im/rural/archs
r.html (visited 25 June 2003).
NUAW
National Union of Agricultural
Workers.
ODA 
Overseas Development
Administration.
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OIE
Office Internationale des Epizooties
with 158 member countries sets
sanitary rules for international trade
in animals and animal products,
and disseminates veterinary
scientific information on animal
disease control.
Pirbright
The Animal Virus Research
Institute at Pirbright, Surrey, was 
a grant-aided Institute under the
Agricultural Research Council (later
Agricultural and Food Research
Council). Diagnosis and research
before 1964 was primarily devoted
to FMD, but later expanded to
include many other exotic virus
diseases. See Skinner (1989). In
1986 the Institute for Animal
Disease Research was formed by the
amalgamation of the Institute for
Research in Animal Diseases (IRAD)
at Compton, Berkshire, the Animal
Virus Research Institute at
Pirbright, the Houghton Poultry
Research Station, at Houghton,
Cambridgeshire (closed in 
1993) and the ARC/MRC
Neuropathogenesis Unit in
Edinburgh. The name was changed
two years later to the Institute for
Animal Health (IAH), administered
from Compton. An extract from the
Biotechnology and Biological
Sciences Research Council (BBSRC)
paper in June 1988 summarized the
Council’s position towards Pirbright:
‘The conclusion... was that IAH
should be consolidated on a single
site at Compton within five years.
However, there were a number of
constraints limiting Council’s ability
to achieve this scientifically desirable
objective. Because of the need for
high security disease containment
for some of the work on exotic virus
diseases, it would be necessary to
retain a centre for the diagnosis and
control of foot and mouth and
other exotic diseases at Pirbright.’ 
E-mail to Mrs Lois Reynolds from
Allan Black, BBSRC Council
Secretariat, 14 July 2003.
Additional information from 
Dr Bob Sellers.
Plum Island Animal Disease
Center
The United States Department of
Agriculture (USDA) research centre
is located on Plum Island, off the
north-eastern tip of Long Island,
and is part of the town of Southold,
in Suffolk County, New York, USA,
with an area of 840 acres (1.3
square miles). 
See www.ars.usda.gov/plum/
index.html (visited 24 June 2003).
Primary outbreak
One with no established connection
with a known outbreak in Britain,
therefore from a foreign source.
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RASE
Royal Agricultural Society of
England.
RAVC
Royal Army Veterinary Corps.
RVO
The Regional Veterinary Officer
headed one 
of MAFF’s seven English centres
[with separate organizations in the
Welsh Department and Scottish
Office] in 1967 with close
collaboration with MAFF
administrators at divisional level
located in the same premises. By
2001, the regional structure had
been amalgamated into three
regions, while the National
Assembly for Wales and the Scottish
Executive had become separate
bodies, as was the Institute for
Animal Health [funded by a core
grant from the Biotechology and
Biological Sciences Research
Council and from contracts from
MAFF]; the Veterinary Laboratories
Agency [an executive agency of the
Department for Environment, Food
and Rural Affairs (DEFRA) from
1990, which provided vets and
scientific advisers; loaned staff to
Pirbright as well as equipment,
protective clothing, firearms and
ammunition; and developed risk
assessments; coordinated sero-
surveillance and testing at its
Penrith, Luddington and Shewsbury
laboratories]; the Met Office 
[a trading fund of the Ministry 
of Defence] and the Rural Payments
Agency [formerly the Intervention
Board, a MAFF executive agency,
which administered and organized
disposal of carcasses]. 
Ring vaccination
A method of controlling the 
spread of infections that involves
vaccinating susceptible animals 
in a circle around outbreaks. 
An economic assessment of costs
prepared for the Northumberland
Committee in 1968 suggested that
vaccination in an area of five to ten
miles around an outbreak could take
seven to ten days to complete, with
a further 14 days for full immunity
to develop. Each vaccination ring
would cover an area of 50 000 acres,
enclosing average livestock numbers
of 12 500 cattle, 22 500 sheep and
7500 pigs at a total cost of 211/4p per
dose for cattle; 91/2p for sheep and
311/2p per dose for pigs. See ‘An
economic assessment of alternative
control policies for FMD in Great
Britain’, MAFF/CI/12 for
NC(MAFF)(68)13, Appendix 9, 1. 
RSPCA
Royal Society for the Prevention of
Cruelty to Animals.
Secondary outbreak
One that comes from established
infections in Britain.
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Slaughterhouse
The Northumberland Report
distinguished between
‘slaughterhouses’ and ‘knacker’s
yards’: the former were constructed
to a high standard of disease
security, the latter operated to a
lower standard of hygiene and were
licensed. The Meat (Sterilization)
Regulations 1969 covering England
and Wales required all meat and
offal unfit for human consumption
and all knacker meat to be sterilized
before sale. See Northumberland
(1969b): 42–43, paras 85–87.
Standstill order
Form C (under an FMD Order)
enforced a standstill or cessation of
all movement of susceptible animals
within five miles of premises where
disease was suspected to be present.
When the disease was confirmed an
extended area covered about ten
miles radius from the infected
premises (‘infected area’) as defined
by the Foot and Mouth Disease
(Infected Areas Restrictions) Order
of 1938.
State Veterinary Service
In 1967 the State Veterinary Service
(SVS) of qualified veterinary staff,
headed by the Chief Veterinary
Officer (CVO), was part of MAFF’s
Agricultural Development and
Advisory Service (ADAS). It became
a separate service in 1987, managed
by the CVO, who retained a line
management link to the Director-
General of ADAS. Between 1990 to
1994 this link ceased when the SVS
became part of MAFF’s Animal
Health and Veterinary Group
(AHVG), created by the merger of
the Animal Health Group and the
SVS. The SVS is now an agency
within Great Britain responsible for
animal health matters, including
notifiable disease outbreaks, the
control of which involves slaughter
and burial, or incineration, of
carcasses on farms, together with
disinfection of buildings and
equipment. Their official journal, the
State Veterinary Journal, covers disease
control, animal welfare, public health
and consumer protection.
Susceptible animals
For FMD these are defined as
cloven-hoofed animals, such as
cattle, sheep, pigs and goats.
SVD
Swine vesicular disease.
Tolworth
Headquarters of the State
Veterinary Service in Tolworth,
Surrey, from 1945 to 2001. 
The Animal Health Group was also
located at Tolworth (although its
Grade 3 head was based in London
until mid-1992) and was responsible
for developing policy on animal
health, welfare and breeding; meat
hygiene; exports and imports of
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animals, meat and meat products;
and (until the Veterinary Medicines
Directorate was set up in 1989 as 
a separate unit) on the licensing,
distribution and control of
veterinary medicines. It was also
responsible for implementing many
aspects of these policies.
TVI
Temporary Veterinary Inspector.
Vaccination in EC
Mr Chris Schermbrucker wrote:
‘The proposal by the Commission
to the Council of Ministers was
made on 26 June 1990 in 
the form of Directive 90/423/EEC.
Article 4 required the completion 
of the arrangements to set up a
bank of FMD vaccines for
emergency use, and revision of
control measures for the
importation of animals and animal
products from third countries.
Member countries would cease
vaccination against FMD by 
1 January 1992 and on the same
date prohibit the importation of
vaccinated animals into their
territory.’ Additional information
from Mr Chris Schermbrucker.
Vaccine Bank
See International Vaccine Bank.
WRVS
Women’s Royal Voluntary Services.
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abattoirs
closures, 44
livestock movement in restricted
areas to, 43–44
see also slaughterhouses
acetylethyleneimine (AEI), 45, 46
administrative staff, 6–7, 23
Africa, 58
see also East Africa
agricultural correspondents, 37, 39, 43
AI, see artificial insemination
air filters, see filters, air
aluminium hydroxide saponin vaccines, 
see vaccines
Anglia Television, 41–42
Animal Health Act (2002), 30, 76, 95
Animal Health and Veterinary Group,
23, 42–43, 95, 101
Animal Health Group, Tolworth, 95, 101
Animal Virus Research Institute,
Pirbright (later the Institute for
Animal Disease Research and the
Institute for Animal Health; IAH,
from 1986), 5, 44–59, 99
confirmation, 17, 21
decontamination procedures, 27, 30
diagnosis of FMD, 17, 18, 19, 
67–68, 75
media relations, 38–39, 40
mobile laboratory, 67
upgrading of facilities, 51
vaccine bank, 69, 70
vaccine development, 44, 45–46, 48 
49–50, 55–56, 66
vaccine procurement, 12
virus leaks, 51–52
virus studies, 28, 54, 57–58, 69
as World Reference Laboratory, 45, 
49–50
Annual Price Review and Determination
1968 (Cmnd 3558) (White Paper), 61
annual FMD vaccination, see vaccination
Argentina, 23, 56
FMD control, 47–48, 50, 66
frigorificos, 62, 65–66
import of meat or meat products, 56,
58, 61–62, 72
as source of outbreaks, 5, 7, 10, 
59–63, 65–66
Army, 24, 63, 66, 73
artificial insemination (AI), 76
Assistant Chief Veterinary Officer, 10
Australia, 24, 69, 70
aziridine compounds, 45, 46
Bacillus globigii spores, 75
Banffshire, Scotland, 8
British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC),
37, 41
beef, importation of, 62, 65, 67
BEI (binary ethyleneimine), 46
Belgium, 63
BHK21 (baby hamster kidney cells), 45
birds, 63–64
Blackpool, 24, 33
blanket vaccination, 20, 65, 95
Bledisloe Agreement (1928), and
amendments, 56, 58, 62
bonemeal, 63
bones (as a source of disease), 7, 10, 60,
61, 63, 65, 66
bovine spongiform encephalopathy, 
see BSE
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Index: Subject
Brazil, 23, 47–48, 50, 56, 65
British Veterinary Association (BVA),
11, 35
brucellosis, 74
Bryn Farm (Ellis Farm), Nantmawr,
Oswestry, 3, 8, 9, 10, 12–13 (maps), 
20, 59
BSE (bovine spongiform encephalopathy),
36, 37, 38, 64, 74–75, 95
Bulgaria, 5
burial of slaughtered animals, 26, 27,
31–33, 74–75
burning of slaughtered animals, 26, 33
Burnside Farm, Heddon on the Wall,
Northumberland, 17
butcher, Oswestry, 59, 60, 61
BVA (British Veterinary Association),
11, 15, 35, 95
Canada, 24, 73–74
capsid, see virus, FMD
Carnforth, Lancashire, 9–10
carrier animals, 53–54, 56–58, 69
cattle, 10, 64
carriage of FMD virus, 56, 57
diagnosis of FMD, 17–18, 19
in East Africa, 43
indicators, 69
on originally infected farm, 8, 9
at Pirbright, 51, 52
restocking, 72–74
vaccination, 53
chains, 32
Cheale’s slaughterhouse, Essex, 
see slaughterhouse
Cheshire, 12, 18–19, 30–33, 36, 37
control centres, 20–21
restocking after outbreak, 72, 74
see also Crewe
Cheshire Agricultural Society, 25
Cheshire Chronicle, 39, 43
Chicago, ILL, USA, 71
Chief Veterinary Officer (CVO), 6, 11,
15, 17, 23, 24, 61, 96
Chile, 50, 56, 62
clinical diagnosis, 16–18, 19
clothing, protective, 28–29
complement fixation test, 18, 95–96
confirmation, disease, 16–19
Contagious Diseases (Animals) Act
(1892), 3
Contagious Diseases and Animals Act
(1869), 4
contiguous contacts (livestock, in use in
2001), 25, 26–27, 30, 96
contractors, plant hire, 31, 32–33
control centres, 7, 12, 15, 20–22, 75
Crewe control centre, 12, 20–21, 22,
24, 31, 43
Ellesmere control centre, 12
Macclesfield control centre, 21
Northwich control centre, 12, 21
Oswestry control centre, 9, 15, 43
size, 21–22, 23
Stafford control centre, 12
Towcester control centre, 41–42
control policies, FMD, 4–5, 46–48, 
54–56, 66
cost–benefit analyses, 47, 49, 56, 
96–97
public attitudes and, 58–59, 66
see also slaughter; vaccination
Coopers, Uruguay, 12
cost–benefit analyses, 47, 49, 56, 96–97
costs
FMD outbreaks, 3, 73
vaccination, 72
vaccine bank, 69–70
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CLA (County Landowners Association),
15, 96
Crewe, Cheshire, 16, 19, 25, 30, 31
Crown Hotel, Lyndhurst, 18
Cryovac pack, 65
Cumbria, 24
Customs, USA, 71
CVO, see Chief Veterinary Officer
dangerous contacts, 27, 96
see also contiguous contacts
Darnhall, Cheshire, 19, 20
data collection, 1967 outbreak, 15–16
de Mulder rendering plant, Nuneaton,
Warwickshire, 27
decontamination, of people, 28–29, 30
DEFRA, see also Ministry of
Agriculture, Fisheries and Food
(MAFF)
Denbighshire, 74
Denmark, 23, 24, 49, 63, 67, 69
Department for Environment, Food
and Rural Affairs (DEFRA), 41, 59, 96 
see also Ministry of Agriculture,
Fisheries and Food (MAFF)
Deputy Chief Veterinary Officer, 17, 21
Deputy Regional Veterinary Officer,
21, 68
Devon, 8
diagnosis, 16–19, 62, 67–68, 75
digger (agricultural machinery), 31, 32, 33
Diseases of Animals Act (1950), 7
Diseases of Animals (Waste Foods)
Order (1957), 61
disinfectants, 29, 39, 41
disinfection
infected premises, 24, 30, 74, 76
people, 28–29, 30
disposal of animals, 24, 26, 27, 31–33,
74–76
Divisional Veterinary Officer (DVO,
Divisional Veterinary Manager in
2001 outbreak), 9, 10, 35, 96
disposal of animals, 27, 31
organization, 20, 21, 22, 68
dogs, 60, 61, 63, 66
Dorset, 10
Drummond Report (1999), 21
DVO, see Divisional Veterinary Officer
East Africa, 40, 43, 57
education, veterinarians, 18–19, 20, 31,
72–73
Ellis Farm, see Bryn Farm
Embakasi, Kenya, 43
endemic FMD
elimination from Britain, 4–5
meat imports from areas of, 56, 65, 
66
epidemics of FMD, 5
equipment, contractors’, 31, 32–33
estancias, Argentine, 65–66
Europe (including European Union
(EU) and European Commission (EC))
annual incidence in France, Germany
and Holland, 47
carrier animals, 58
cost–benefit analyses, 47, 96–97
EC Directive to cease vaccination, 
102
FMD outbreaks, 46–47, 49, 51
meat imports, 67
as origin of outbreaks, 5, 50–51, 52
vaccination policy, 5, 46–47, 50, 55, 59
vaccine bank, 71
experience, veterinary staff, 18–19, 20, 21,
22, 31
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fairs, 4
FAO (Food and Agriculture
Organization of the United Nations),
45, 97
farmers
attitudes to regulation, 36
impact of FMD, 5, 33–36
information provision, 41, 43
objections to slaughter, 26, 30
relations with veterinary staff, 20, 
24–27, 30, 36
farms
burials on, 26, 27, 31–33, 74–75
restocking, 72–74, 76
see also infected premises
Fatstock Marketing Corporation (FMC),
97, 98
Wrexham, 60, 63, 
filters, air, 52
double HEPA, 51–52, 98
on milk tankers, 75
Finland, 69
fire brigade, 30, 31
firearms, 18, 22, 28, 75
Flintshire, 74
FM1 (report of investigation of original
outbreak), 59
FMC, see Fatstock Marketing
Corporation
FMD (foot and mouth disease)
FMD/01 (first case in 2001), 17
vaccine, 97
virus capsid, see virus, FMD
Food and Agriculture Organization of
the United Nations (FAO), 45
Form C (emergency standstill order), 7,
8, 17, 97–98
formaldehyde, 46
foyer, 46, 98
France
FMD outbreaks, 46–47
as origin of outbreak, 50–51, 52
supply of vaccine, 12
frigorificos, see slaughterhouse
Funtley abattoir, Hampshire, 17
General Staff Officer Grade II
(GSOII), 24, 33, 98
Germany, 23, 46–47, 49, 63
Gloucestershire, 10
Gowers Committee and Report (1954),
3, 5, 56, 63
Greece, 5
Hampshire, 10, 16, 17, 59
helicopters, 31, 32–33, 40
HEPA (high efficiency particle
abstraction) filters, 51–52, 98
history of FMD, 4–5
Holland, 23, 45, 46–47, 57, 63
Holstein cattle, 73–74
House of Commons; House of Lords, 
see Parliament
Hungary, 24
IgG antibody, 53
IgM antibody, 53
immunogenic vaccine, 45, 98
imports
livestock, 4
meat and meat products, see meat
and meat product imports
incidence of FMD, annual, 47
income, loss of, 34
infected premises (IPs; infected areas), 
24, 98
designation, 6–7, 17
disinfection, 24, 30, 74, 76
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life on, 34–35
movement of livestock, 43–44
movement of people, 27–30
press reporters, 39
see also farms
information services, 37–38, 41–43
Insel Riems FMD Laboratory,
Greifswald, Germany, 49
Institute for Animal Disease Research,
see Animal Virus Research Institute,
Pirbright
Institute for Animal Health (IAH), 
see Animal Virus Research Institute, 
Pirbright
Institute for Research in Animal
Diseases (IRAD), Compton, 
Berkshire, 51, 99
instruction manual, 6, 21, 22
inter-epizootic host, 57
International Vaccine Bank, 69–70, 98
interviews, tape recorded, 15–16
IP, see infected premises
Iran, 48
Ireland, 24, 67, 69
Isle of Wight outbreak (1981), 37, 40,
41, 42, 44 –45, 50–51
Israel, 48
Italy, 5, 49
JCB 
John Kerr outbreak, 10
Joint Information Systems Committee
(JISC), 38
Kenya, 43, 57
laboratories
FMD diagnosis, 17, 18
FMD virus leaks, 49, 51–52
mobile, 67–68
lairage, 17, 98
lamb
Argentine, 3, 20, 59–64, 65–66
imports, 67
New Zealand, 59, 60
roast (as source of infection), 9
Lebrecht management review
(1993–94), 22, 23, 68
letters, from general public, 41, 62–63, 66
licences, movement of livestock, 43–44
lime, 75
lions, 43
livestock
farming industry in 1967, 10
import controls, 4
movement controls, see movement,
of livestock
restocking, 72–74, 76
virus carriers, 53–54, 56–58, 69
local veterinary inspectors (LVI),
33–34, 98
Lysol, 29
MAFF, see Ministry of Agriculture,
Fisheries and Food see also DEFRA
manual, instruction (SVS procedures), 6,
21, 22
markets, 4, 10
Aberdeen, 26
Oswestry, 7–8, 9, 16, 25
meat and meat product imports, 61–62, 
67, 71
Bledisloe Agreement, 56, 58, 62
Northumberland Report, 65, 66, 72
as origin of outbreaks, 7, 49
role of vaccination, 44–45
see also lamb
media, 36–43, 64
Meteorological Office, 63–64
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Microbiological Research
Establishment, Porton, Wiltshire, 75
Middle East, 5, 48
Middlewich, Cheshire, 31
milk, 67–68, 75
Milk Marketing Board, 76
milk tankers, 75
Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and
Food (MAFF) (DEFRA from 2001), 
5, 16, 28, 61, 66, 96, 98
administration, 21, 23, 68
Animal Health and Veterinary 
Group, 23, 42–43, 96, 98
decision not to vaccinate, 12–15, 54
FMD control policy, 5, 54–56, 58–59
media relations, 38–39, 42–43
policy implementation, 20–33
response to Northumberland Report,
72
State Veterinary Service, see State 
Veterinary Service
tape-recorded interviews on 1967
outbreak, 15–16
veterinary staff, see veterinary 
staff/officers, MAFF
website, 41
Ministry of Defence, 40
movement
of dead animals, 33
of livestock, 4, 33
licensed, 43–44
restrictions, 74
see also Form C
of people, 27–29
Nairobi National Park, Kenya, 43
Nantmawr, Oswestry, 12, 13
see also Bryn Farm
National Archives (formerly Public
Records Office, PRO), 16, 72
National Farmers’ Union (NFU), 15,
20, 25, 35, 55, 74, 93
National Science Foundation, Animals
Committee, 23, 71
Netherlands, see Holland
New Forest, Hampshire, 17
New Zealand, 24, 69, 70
NFU, see National Farmers’ Union
1967 outbreak
data collection, 15–16
map, 12–13
number of cases, 3, 9, 12–15
origin of infection, 3, 10, 20, 29, 
59–64, 65–66
original case, see Bryn Farm
peak, 12
recrudescences, 74, 76
nitrogen, liquid, 69, 71
North America, vaccine bank, 71
Northumberland, 10, 16, 17, 59, 67
Northumberland Committee and
Report (1969), 4, 21, 64–71, 75–76
acceptance by MAFF, 72
disposal of slaughtered animals, 74–76
evidence from overseas, 23
information services, 37–38, 42–43
minority report, 65
origin of outbreak, 63, 65–66
vaccination, 48–49, 65, 66, 72
vaccine bank, 68, 69–71
Norway, 63, 69
nose, FMD virus in, 28, 29, 30, 54
NUAW (National Union of
Agricultural Workers), 15, 98
numbers of FMD cases
1967 outbreak, 3, 9, 1–15
outbreaks before 1967, 6
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ODA (Overseas Development
Administration), 57
offal, 7, 56, 65
Office Internationale des Epizooties
(OIE), 50, 99
oil vaccines, 71
origins of outbreaks, 63–64
1954–1967, 7, 64
1967, 3, 10, 20, 29, 59–64, 65–66
1981 (Isle of Wight), 50–51
2001, 17, 67
in Europe, 49, 51, 52
oro-pharynx, persistence of virus, 56–57
Oswestry, Shropshire, 9, 10, 40
investigation of origin, 59–64, 66
market, 7–8, 9, 16, 25
meeting on vaccination (2 December
1967), 11, 12, 54
see also Bryn Farm
outbreaks of FMD, 44–45
1967, see 1967 outbreak
before 1967, 3, 5, 6, 10, 64
1981, see Isle of Wight outbreak (1981)
2001, see 2001 outbreak
earlier in 1967, 10, 59
in Europe, 46–47, 49, 51
Overseas Development Administration
(ODA), 57
Page Street, London, 42–43
Paraguay, 50, 65
Parliament (House of Commons;
House of Lords), 23, 41, 61, 76
disinfectants, 39
questions, 16, 25, 40–41
pH sensitivity of FMD virus, 41
pharyngeal region, FMD virus in, 56–57
pigs
amplifiers, 69
confirmation of FMD, 16, 17
disposal of slaughtered, 27
meat imports, 65
original infection, 9, 10, 20, 60, 61, 62
at Pirbright, 52
swine fever virus, 52
vaccination, 50–51
Pirbright, 99, see also Animal Virus
Research Institute, Pirbright
pistols, 18, 28, 75
plant, contractors’, 31, 32–33
Plum Island Animal Disease Center,
NY, USA 23, 58, 99
Poland, 24
police, 8, 31, 43–44
press, 36–43, 64
primary outbreaks (cases), 7, 8, 20, 59,
61, 94
public
attitudes to FMD outbreaks, 58–59, 
66
letters from, 41, 62–63, 66
Public Records Office (PRO, The
National Archives from 2003), 16, 72
radio, 37, 43
RASE (Royal Agricultural Society of
England), 15, 100
RAVC (Royal Army Veterinary Corps),
22, 24, 100
RCVS (Royal College of Veterinary
Surgeons), 15
records, 1967 outbreak, 15–16
recrudescence of FMD, 50, 74, 76
Regional Veterinary Officer (RVO), 100
in 1957, 17–18
in 1967, 8, 12, 24, 40, 43
organization, 21
rendering, 27, 75
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Report on the BSE Inquiry (2000), 37, 38
restocking, 72–74, 76
rheumatism, 20, 62
rifles, 22
ring vaccination, 27, 65–67, 72, 100
Rising Sun Inn, Tarporley, Cheshire,
18–19
Royal Army Veterinary Corps (RAVC),
22, 24
RSPCA (Royal Society for the
Prevention of Cruelty to Animals),
15, 100
RVO, see Regional Veterinary Officer
Santa Cruz, Argentina, 62
Scotland, 8, 36, 74
secondary outbreaks (cases), 61, 100
sheep, 10, 19–20, 52, 69
maintenance hosts, 69
see also lamb
Shropshire, 31, 74
see also Oswestry, Shropshire
slaughter
animals at Oswestry market, 8
contiguous contacts, 25, 26–27, 30
by contractors, 31
of dangerous contacts, 27, 30
disposal of animals after, 24, 26, 27, 
31–33, 74–76
as FMD control policy, 3, 5, 55, 56, 66
movement of animals after, 33
need for speed, 20
numbers of animals, 3
objections by farmers, 26, 30
pro-slaughter culture, 54–55
responses of farmers and vets to, 34–36
by veterinary officers, 17–18, 22, 75
slaughterhouse, 8, 17, 101
Cheale’s slaughterhouse, Essex, 17
South American (frigorificos), 62, 
65–66
see also abattoirs
social aspects of FMD controls, 34–35, 
36
Somerset, 10, 22
sources of outbreaks, see origins of
outbreaks
South America
FMD control, 47–48, 50
import controls, 56, 62, 65
as source of outbreaks, 7
vaccine bank, 71
see also specific countries
Spongiform Encephalopathy Advisory
Committee (SEAC), 74–75
spread, see transmission
Staffordshire, 74
Standing Veterinary Committee (SVC),
67
standstill order, 95
emergency (Form C), 7, 8, 17, 97, 101
starlings, 63, 64
State Veterinary Service (SVS), 101
head office (Tolworth), 101–102
preparations for outbreaks, 6, 12, 21
response to 1967 outbreak, 6–9
staffing levels, 23, 68
see also veterinary staff/officers, MAFF
Stocker Lane Farm, Darnhall, Cheshire,
20
susceptible animals, 7, 57–58, 101
SVD, see swine vesicular disease
SVS, see State Veterinary Service
Sweden, 63, 69
swill, pig, 3, 7, 10, 64, 65, 66–67
swine fever, 52
swine vesicular disease (SVD), 16, 27,
37, 39
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tape recorded interviews, 15–16
Tarporley, Cheshire, 18–19
technical staff, 22
Teepol, 29
television, 37, 40, 41–42, 43
temporary veterinary inspector (TVI), 22
Tierra del Fuego, 62
Tilbury docks, London, 60
Tolworth (SVS head office), 6, 10,
101–102
contacting, 17, 21, 22, 75
investigation of origin, 59–60, 61
media relations, 37, 39, 42–43
use of helicopters and, 32, 33
vaccination plans, 11–12
see also State Veterinary Service
tongue, 45, 56, 58
transmission, 29, 63–64
by carrier animals, 53–54, 56–58, 69
by milk tankers, 75
by people, 28–30, 54
see also origins of outbreaks
tripartite area, 48
see also Argentina; Brazil; Uruguay
Turkey, 5
TVI (temporary veterinary inspector), 22
2001 outbreak, 49
costs, 3, 73
criticisms of handling, 21, 23, 73, 74
origin, 17, 67
public attitudes, 58–59
United States Department of
Agriculture (USDA), 23
USA, 23–24, 58, 71
Uruguay, 23, 47–48, 50, 56, 65
vaccination, 44–59
annual FMD vaccination, 66
antivaccination culture, 54
blanket, 65, 95
campaigns, 46–48, 50, 57, 66
EC Directive to cease, 102
as FMD control policy, 5, 47, 54–56, 
66, 72
protection, 
public attitudes and, 58–59
ring, 65, 66, 72, 100
contingency plans, 9, 11–12, 55, 
67–68
decision not to, 12–15, 54
virus carriage after, 53–54, 57–58
vaccine bank, 9, 68, 69–71, 72
international, 69–70, 98
vaccines
aluminium hydroxide saponin 
vaccines, 71
availability in 1967, 9, 12
formulations in vaccine banks, 71
Frenkel-type, 12, 45
immune response, 52–53
inactivated, 45–46, 48, 50–51
live attenuated, 45, 48
production, 45–46, 47–48
research and development, 44, 
45–46, 48, 49–50, 55–56, 66
as source of outbreaks, 49, 50–52
trials in East Africa, 43
valuation of animals, 30
veterinary inspectors, 4, 5, 22, 33–34
Veterinary Investigation Centre,
Wolverhampton, 15
veterinary staff/officers, MAFF, 9, 20–33
education/experience, 18–19, 20, 21, 
22, 31
FMD kit (clothing), 28–29
movement between farms, 27–30
organization, 21–23
Foot and Mouth Disease:The 1967 outbreak – Index
111
from overseas, 22, 23–24
relations with farmers, 20, 24–27, 
30, 36
responses of, 33–36
slaughter of animals, 17–18, 22, 75
spread of infection by, 29
staffing levels, 22, 23, 68
veterinary surgeons
education, 18–19, 20, 31, 72–73
local, 33–34, 35
virus, FMD
A5 strain, 48
A22 strain, 48, 70
capsid, 42, 95
in 1967 outbreak, 68–69
leaks from laboratories, 49, 51–52
number of strains, 48, 49
O Pan-Asian type, 49
O1 subtype, 59–60, 68, 70
strains in vaccine bank, 70, 71
structure, 42
survival in environment, 41, 69
transmission, see transmission
Warwickshire, 10, 35, 59
websites, 38, 41
welfare, livestock movements, 43–44
Wellcome Foundation, 57
Wellcome Trust, 3, 38
Weybridge, 69
Wimpeys, 31
wind, 63–64
Worcestershire, 74
World Reference Laboratory, 45,
49–50, 71
Wrexham, 60, 63
WRVS (Women’s Royal Voluntary
Services), 15, 102
zoo-sanitary measures, 47
Foot and Mouth Disease:The 1967 outbreak – Index
112
Aickin, David, 3
Allen, Maurice, 31, 85
Beech, Alan, 20
Bell, Peter, 37
Beynon, A Gwyn, 56, 62
Brancker, Mary, 11, 12, 25, 30, 33–35,
36, 54, 73, 85
Brent, Leslie, 9, 27, 85
Brooksby, John, 15, 18, 85
Brown, Alec, 37
Brown, Fred, 55, 58, 85–86
Burrows, Paul, 50
Callis, Jerry, 58
Cawthorne, Richard, 50
Christie, Daphne, 3
Colmer, Tony, 42
Corrigall, Ernest, 8, 16
Coulson, Nick, 50
Cripps, Anthony, 4
Davie, John, 18
Davies, Gareth, 43, 49, 51, 52, 57,
58–59, 86
Donaldson, Alex, 63–64, 86
Doody, Mike, 31, 32–33
Ellis, Norman, 8, 9, 20, 59, 60, 61
Evans, David, 4
Frenkel, H S, 12
Garland, Tony, 40–41, 43, 57–58, 71, 86
Glynn, Alan, 33, 87
Gowers, Sir Ernest Arthur, 87
Gull, Keith, 50
Gummer, Rt Hon. John, 23
Hall, Sherwin, 15–16, 17, 25, 26,
32–33, 41–42, 87
Harris, S A, 56
Henderson, Sir William MacGregor
(Gregor), 56, 62, 87–88
Hendrie, Eric, 51
Hurst, G W, 63
Jotcham, John, 4
Kerr, John, 10
Lebrecht, Andy, 23
Loxam, Mick, 24
Macrae, W D (Roger), 56, 62 
McCready, Peter, 19
Meldrum, Keith, 16–17, 22–23, 24,
27, 30, 32, 36, 37–38, 39, 40, 
42–43, 51–52, 66–68, 74–76, 88
Minson, Tony, 50
Montrose, The Duke of, 26, 36, 88
Morris, James (Jim), 9, 20, 28–29, 33,
62, 67, 88
Mowat, Noel, 12–15, 28, 29, 41, 42,
44–48, 50, 53, 54–55, 71, 88–89
Nash, Tony, 50
Northumberland, The Duke of, 4, 58,
64, 66, 89
Foot and Mouth Disease:The 1967 outbreak – Index
113
Index: Names
Biographical notes appear in bold
Parkinson, Bill, 9–10
Peart, Frederick (Lord Peart of
Workington), 4, 61
Phillips, Nicholas Addison (Lord
Phillips of Worth Matravers), 38
Platt, Hugh, 53, 89
Plowright, Walter, 27, 52, 89–90
Plumb, Henry (Lord Plumb of
Coleshill), 4, 35,  48–49, 58, 64–66,
67, 73, 90
Power, A P, 56
Preston, John, 50
Rees, Howard, 5, 6–9, 10, 12, 16, 17,
19–20, 23, 24, 25–26, 27, 30, 31,
37, 38, 40, 50–51, 54, 56, 58,
59–63, 68–70, 76, 90
Reid, John, 11, 15, 91
Richardson, Alan, 21, 24, 35, 64, 91
Rowlands, David, 10, 55, 91
Schermbrucker, Chris, 49–50, 57, 91
Scott, Gordon, 57
Scudamore, Jim, 23, 92
Sellers, Bob, 5, 9–10, 12, 18, 28, 29,
38–39, 48, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54,
56–57, 58, 63–64, 68, 75, 92
Soames, Hon. Nicholas , 23
Soulsby, Lawson (Lord Soulsby of
Swaffham Prior), 3–4, 5, 8, 9, 10,
12, 19, 20, 21, 23, 24, 26, 27, 30,
31, 33, 35, 36, 39, 41, 43, 44, 55,
56, 59, 62, 63, 64, 70, 73, 76, 92
Stobo, Tom, 73
Sutmoller, Paul, 58
Tansey, E M (Tilli), 3, 76, 93
Taylor, Angus, 6, 10, 17–18, 20–21,
22, 25, 30–31, 32, 37, 38, 43, 44, 68,
73–74, 75, 93
Taylor, George, 31, 33
Thomas, Eric, 4
Thompson, Sir Edward, 4
Tyrrell, Ken, 18–19, 20, 24, 27, 31, 33,
38, 43–44, 55, 74, 75, 93
van Bekkum, J G, 57, 58
Verdin, Lt Col. Sir Richard, 25
Walker, Cyril, 17
Walker, David, 4
Weipers, Sir William (Bill), 4, 58, 66,
93–94
White, Melba, 4
Wilson, Harold (Lord Wilson of
Rievaulx), 62–63
Woods, Abigail, 3, 4–5, 54, 71, 72–73,
94
Foot and Mouth Disease:The 1967 outbreak – Index
114


